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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is comprised of three separate essays that analyze decision-
making and education within resource-constrained households. Each essay makes use of
data from households and schools in rural China to investigate problems of broad interest
in development microeconomics.
Low income coupled with incomplete credit markets make financing educational
investments difficult in poor areas even when the returns to education exceed the costs.
These problems are compounded by the prevalence of less educated parents in poor areas
because such parents may be less likely to educate their own children. In particular, less
educated parents may have a lower ability to assist their children with schoolwork, may
be less able to provide complementary inputs to learning, and may value education less.
Moreover, their children may face lower returns to schooling. In addition, the low
education levels of women may affect their relative intrahousehold bargaining positions
and thus household decisions about children's education if parental preferences differ.
·"Education and Poverty in Rural China," co-authored with Albert Park, examines
the effects of poverty and credit constraints, decision-lnaking authority, and school
quality on educational attainment. Controlling for per capita expenditures, children from
households that are poor and credit constrained are much more likely to drop out of
school. Thus, for some of the poor, the lack ofcredit is a major obstacle to financing
educational investments. However, being poor and credit constrained does not
significantly affect academic performance. By contrast, there is weak evidence that
wealth affects the duration of schooling independently ofwhether one is poor and credit
constrained, and strong evidence that it affects test scores. In related findings, father's
education has a weakly positive effect on the duration ofschooling, and the children of
more educated parents are considerably less likely to be held back in scbool. These
results show that household wealth and parental education provide distinct advantages for
1
2children's human capital accumulation even when households are not credit constrained.
Next, women's intrahousehold bargaining position has strong implications for the
probability that children have been held back. Moreover, the likelihood that children
drop out of school falls dramatically when women have a greater say in enrollment
decisions. This finding is particularly true for sons in junior secondary school,
suggesting that women value education more than men and that, relative to men, they
favor sons more than daughters. Finally, our measures of school quality do not
noticeably impact learning in school as measured by test scores or being held back.
School quality does have some effect on the duration of schooling, however, particularly
at the primary level.
The other essays in this dissenation develop two of these themes. First, given that
women's decision.making authority in the household has significant implications for
children's education, discerning when women have this authority is important. ""Dowry
and Intrahousehold Bargaining: Evidence from China" seeks to determine whether her
intrahousehold bargaining position affects a woman's decision.making authority and
welfare within marriage, and is largely concerned with identification issues. In contrast
to previous empirical studies which use contemporary control of resources and other
endogenous measures to proxy for bargaining power, this study uses dowry (a pre·marital
transfer that is assignable, exclusive, and returnable to the bride in the event of divorce -
a realistic option in rural China) to measure bargaining position. While this approach
eliminates concerns about simultaneity bias, omitted variable bias may remain a problem.
To address this matter, I proxy for dowry using exogenous shocks to grain yield in the
year preceding marriage and the sibling sex composition of the bride and groom as
instruments. Shocks to grain yield are likely to have a substantial impact on household
wealth accumulation in rural areas that depend on farm incomes, and thus on the ability
of households to make transfers associated with marriage. Sibling sex composition likely
affects the savings available for marital payments given the high costs associated with
marrying sons versus the expected income from marrying daughters. These instruments
influence payments made before marriage while remaining plausibly exogenous to
household allocation decisions after marriage. I find that dowry has a positive and robust
impact on a variety ofhousehold resource allocations of interest to the wife, including her
3leisure time~ the time that her husband allocates to household chores~ spending on
women's goods as a share of the total household expenditure, the probability that wives
self-identify as being satisfied with their lives, and the degree to which wives have the
authority to make decisions when the husband and wife disagree about household issues.,
e.g., children's schooling.
'·Parental Education and Child Learning: Investing in Goods and Time" seeks to
understand why higher parental education is associated with a lower incidence of children
being held back in school, or more broadly, why parental education is such a strong
determinant ofchildren~s learning in empirical studies from developing countries. One
possible explanation is that more educated parents make greater investments in their
children's human capital acquisition. However, resource-constrained parents may face a
tradeotTbetween being able to provide more goods used in human capital production
(resulting from increased time allocated to market work) and allocating more time to
activities such as helping children with homework; hence, how more educated parents
choose to invest is an empirical issue. I find that more educated parents allocate higher
levels of both goods and time to their children's human capital accumulation. There is
evidence that more educated parents expect higher returns to education for their children,
offering one reason why parents in resource-constrained households make greater
investments in both goods and time. I also find that parental education has a strong,
positive effect on children's test scores and that controlling for investments in goods and
time reduces the estimated effects of parental education on children's learning. Although
the estimates may be susceptible to endogeneity bias, I show that more educated parents
make larger investments in their children's human capital accumulation in rural China.
and that these investments are an important mechanism - though certainly not the only
mechanism - by which parental education affects children's learning.
CHAPTER II
EDUCATION AND POVERTY IN RURAL CHINA1.2
2.1. Introduction
In developing countries, poverty is often associated with low levels of educational
attainment, as well as larger gender gaps in education (Filmer 2000). Low incomes and
wealth combined with incomplete credit markets make it difficult to finance educational
investments even when the returns exceed the costs. In addition, even after controlling
for wealth differences, a robust fmding is that parents with lower levels ofeducation are
less likely to educate their own children. Poorly educated parents may value education
less, may have low scholastic aptitude which they pass on to their children, or may be
less able to provide complementary inputs to learning (e.g., helping children with
homework). The low education of mothers, in panicular, may reduce their bargaining
po\ver within the household and affect family educational decisions if parental
preferences over education differ. Further, a lack ofcommunity resources in poor areas
often leads to lower quality schools, which may reduce the returns to education and
discourage enrollment. Finally, in segmented labor markets, the returns to education in
poor, remote areas may be sufficiently low to discourage educational investments.
In this paper, we analyze data collected from surveys of households and schools
in poor counties in six Chinese provinces to examine the effects of individual, family, and
school characteristics on educational attainment, focusing in particular on the importance
of poverty and credit constraints, intra...household decision...making (especially as it relates
to gender), and school quality. The detailed data make possible several innovations.
First, unlike many studies that focus on single measures ofattainment, especially
enrollment, we examine multiple outcomes that reflect both investments in schooling and
learning within school. Next, the data enable us to construct more direct measures of
4
5variables of interest than in previous studies. Using data on existing debt and the ability
to borrow money from both formal and informal sources~ we construct a measure of
household credit lirnits~ which allows us to test separately the effects of wealth and credit
limits. A direct question on the role ofmothers relative to fathers in the decision to enroll
children in school serves as a measure ofwomen's empowerment. Last, local school
quality measures, not included in most household surveys, are available from separate
surveys of local primary and junior secondary schools. These innovations provide
general insights, but also enable us to go well beyond the scope ofexisting empirical
studies of educational attainment in rural China, which have typically used large data sets
with limited information.
Previous research suggests that the different hypothesized connections between
poverty and educational attainment are likely to be important in the Chinese context.
Tsang (1996) and Hannum (1998) report that many schools have increased fees to offset
rising costs resulting from education decentralization, and Park and Wang (2000) find
that twelve percent of informal loans to households in our sample are used to pay school
fees, which implies that credit constraints may be important for some poor households.
Hossain (1996) reports that the poorest quintile of households in China spend 14.2
percent of annual income on education~ while the wealthiest quintile spend only 5.5
percent.
With regard to intra-household decision-making, Knight and Song (2000) use
1995 survey data to show that a wife's bargaining position, measured by the relative
education level of the mother, is positively correlated with children's education, and
disproportionately so for boys. They also fmd that boys have a higher probability of
enrolLnent at all levels. Hannum (1998) uses census data to demonstrate that boys are
more likely to enroll than girls, and that this gap is exacerbated when households face
resource constraints. Thus, it is not surprising that the gender gap in enrollment is much
larger in poor counties than in non-poor counties (World Bank, 1999). Research also
finds that after controlling for wealth and expenditure levels, educated parents in China
are more likely to educate their children (Jamison and van del' Gaag, 1987; Connelly and
Zheng,2000).
6Finally, school quality is likely to be a concern in the Chinese context. China's
fiscal system has struggled to generate adequate revenue, leading to a marked
decentralization of fiscal responsibility and a revenue crisis for governments in poor
counties (Park, Rozelle, Wong, and Ren, 1996). This has led to large differences in
public spending on education and in teacher quality across regions (Tsang, 1994; West"
1996). World Bank (1999) reports that the recurrent per-pupil expenditure in the
wealthiest 10 percent of counties was more than 4.5 times that in the poorest 10 percent
in 1997. Unfortunately, no existing studies ofeducational attainment in China
empirically examine the effects of school quality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a simple
model to illustrate the interplay of credit constraints, intra-household decision-making,
and school quality variables in educational investment decisions. Section 2.3 describes
the 1997 survey and describes the dependent and independent variables used in the
analysis. Section 2.4 introduces China's rural educational system. Section 2.5 describes
the empirical specifications and identification strategy. Section 6 presents descriptive
and estimation results for each of the educational attainment outcomes. Section 2.7
concludes.
2.2. Modeling Edueationallnvestments
We model the educational investment decision made by a family consisting ofa
mother, a father, and a single child. Educational investments (i.e.~ the number of years of
schooling) are made by parents" who ma.ximize a joint utility function U which is a
weighted sum of parent and child payotTs.3 Household income during the period of
investment (and any initial wealth) is y, and the family invests E,: in the child~s
education and must pay a cost of p£! which includes required school fees as well as the
opportunity cost of the child"s time (which we assume accrues to parents). Let R denote
the returns to the child's education, and let a be the share of the returns that are
transferred from the child to the parents through future fmancial support and care. Thus,
(1-a) is the share of returns retained by the child. The parameter A represents the
degree to which parents are altruistic toward their children. If A =1, parents care as
7much about their children as themselves. Total spending on education cannot exceed the
sum of income and the household~s credit limit (b). The parent's utility maximization
problem is thus:
(1)
~\;{';"'Cu = Y - PEE,. + aR(EJ + A(l- a)R(E,.)
s.t. PEE.: S Y + Ii
where a e [0,1], A E [0,1], and b~ O.~ To simplify, we assume a zero interest rate and
perfect enforcement of lending contracts.
We make several further assumptions about the model parameters. First, the
share of returns to education retained by the parents is a function of the child's sex, i.e.,
a =a(S). This is plausible in that in China daughters marry and leave the family, while
sons often co-reside with parents and are generally responsible for the support of elderly
parents (Parrish and Willis, 1993; Hannum and Xie, 1994; Hannum, 1998). Second, we
model altruism as a linear combination of mother's preferences (Am) and father's
preferences (Af ), the relative weight placed on each depending upon the mother's intra-
household bargaining power ({3). Parental preferences are a weighted combination of
sex (S), and parental education (Em and Ef ). Thus, the altruism parameter is defined as
follows:
(2)
A = PAm +(1- {3)A,
Am =alS + a 2E m
AI =hiS +b2 E f
where {3 e [0,1]. Thus, A = A(P,S, Em' Ef ).
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas function with decreasing returns, the return function
can be expressed as:
(3) R(E(J=rEt
8where 0 < ¢J < 1. Let X be a vector ofvariables that affect the returns to schooling~ so
that r = w' X. where w is a coefficient vector. The variables atTecting returns to
education~ X~ include child characteristics (Xc)~ household characteristics (XH)~ and
school characteristics (XQ ). Thus~ X = [Xc XH XQ ].
If credit constraints do not bind~ then the tirst order condition tor equation ( 1) is:
(4) aR PE-- =---=----
aE~. a + (I-a)A
For the Cobb-Dougla't return function~ we can solve explicitly tor the unconstrained
optimum:
(5)
Note that if parents capture the entire return to children~s education (a= 1) or if parents
are fully altruistic (A=l)~ then the frrst order condition (equation 4) collapses to
R'(Et:) =P£ ~ i.e.~ the marginal return equals the price. This special case serves as an
efficiency benchmark (denoted E;) since the investment decision maximizes social
returns. Educational investments are only affected by factors that affect returns.
If the credit constraint does bind, however, then the constrained optimum is
(6)
In this case, educational investments are solely determined by income and credit limits.
Thus, under different assumptions (unconstrained~ efficien~ and constrained)
educational investments are functions ofdifferent arguments:
(7)
9
E~: = E~'[X"PE.,A(S .. E, .. E", .. p).. a(S)]
El.~ = El.~' [X., PE ]
E~' = E~·[y.. b.. PE]
Note that X contains the full set of independent variables and that all variables affect
whether the credit constraint binds.. so that these different functions do not provide
overriding restriction tests to distinguish among E~l .. El.~" and E~·. But they do illustrate
the multiple pathways through which variables of interest may affect educational
outcomes.. and so facilitate interpretation of the estimation results.
Consider.. for example, the effect of a child's sex, which may be important if the
returns to education differ for boys and girls.. either because of labor market conditions..
differential treatment in school., different levels of motivation, or different support tor
educational attainment at home. In addition, the share of the returns to education
accruing to parents may differ by sex if girls marry and leave the family while boys
remain within the family after marriage. Finally., the altruism that parents show to their
children may differ tor sons and daughters. If the preferences of fathers and mothers
differ, bargaining power within the household also matters.
Household characteristics also affect schooling. Economic variables., including y
and b , impact educational investments by facilitating the purchase of goods that are
complementary to learning (e.g.., food.. utilities., furniture) and.. when credit constraints
bind., directly determining the ability ofhouseholds to finance desirable educational
investments. Parental education affects optimal schooling levels by increasing returns
(e.g., if educated parents provide more or better support for children"s learning or have
connections to better jobs in the labor market) and by affecting altruistic preferences
(which depend on the interaction with women's empowerment ifparental preferences
differ). Education of parents also increases educational investments in children indirectly
through household income and expenditures, and women"s empowerment. Finally"
school quality affects educational anainment by increasing the returns to education.
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2.3. Data and Variables
The data come from a 1997 survey of households conducted by one of the authors
in collaboration with the China Poverty Research Association. The households are
located in six poor counties, each in a different province: Shaan.xi and Gansu in the
northwest, Sichuan and Guizhou in the southwest, and Henan and Jiang.xi in central
China. The provinces were chosen to broadly represent different poverty regions in the
country. The county chosen in each province was selected from among counties that
were: I) nationally designated poor counties; 2) State Statistical Bureau (SSB) national
rural household sample survey counties (about one third of all counties in China); and 3)
located in the main poverty belt within each province. The household sample in each
county was the same as that selected by the SSB. which draws a nationally representative
stratified random sample each year. The survey encompassed 446 households and the 40
primary schools and 37 junior secondary schools that serve them. School data come from
interviews with local primary and junior secondary school principals, which included
questions about school infrastructure, teachers, enrollment, and finances. Student test
scores in the most recent semester were also collected.
The household part of the survey included 472 school-aged children (between tive
years, six months and 16 years, 11 months). Of these, 296 were enrolled in primary
school, 71 were in junior secondary school, and 3 were in senior secondary school
(Figure 2-1). There were 55 drop outs, and 47 children had never enrolled. Of those who
never enrolled, 83.0 percent were below age 10 at the time of the survey and thus
plausibly would enroll in the future. Households provided data on time allocation, assets,
income and credit, and family background. Table 2-1 presents summary statistics for the
households with children and schools in the sample. Mean per capita expenditure is 1134
yuan (in 1997, US$I == 8 yuan), the mean household credit limit is 4643.4 yuan, the mean
number ofchildren is 2.2, and the mean number of years ofparental education is 7.3
years for fathers and 3.4 years for mothers. Data on school-related variables are
described below.
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2.31. Dependent Variables
We study the determinants of one educational investment measure (years of
schooling) and two learning outcomes (test scores and whether the child was ever held
back). The former correspond to E~' in the model, the latter to the return function, R .
DitTerences in labor market returns are controlled for via community fixed effects.
Years ofschooling are calculated as the sum of grades completed and years held
back. Examination scores are the average scores on the most recent language and math
exams. which are administered each semester and which are the same tor students in the
same grade in the same county. We standardize test scores by grade within each county
to make grades on different tests comparable; test score is thus defined as the number of
standard deviations from the mean score of all children in the same grade in the same
county. The survey also asks about the number of years held back. but does not report
the grades in which children were held back. The large majority of those ever held back
are held back for one year only (74 percent). We thus focus attention on whether
children have ever been held back.
2.32. Independent Variables
As described above. factors affecting educational investments and learning
outcomes (X) include child (Xc). household (XH), and school quality variables (XQ ). Xc
includes sex (8). age ofenrollment, number ofolder siblings. and number of younger
siblings.s XH includes household expenditures per capita(y), the household's credit limit
(b) , father's education (Ef ) , mother's education (Em) , and women's empowennent (p) ,
which is also interacted with mothers education and child gender. Xo includes the
student-teacher ratio, the percentage ofclassrooms that are rainproof, the percentage of
teachers with post-secondary education, and under certain assumptions, school fees and
distance to school. School fees and distance to school are also measures of the price of
educational investments (P£).
Expenditures per capita, calculated from self-recorded diaries kept by households
and tabulated by local State Statistical Bureau enumerators, is our main poverty measure.
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With incomplete capital markets, expenditures per capita reflect wealth effects (Glewwe
and Jacoby" 2000)" which often have been found to influence educational investment
decisions.6 In theory" wealth could affect educational decisions even when credit
constraints are not binding if wealthier households consume goods that are
complementary to learning and also provide consumption value to the household for
reasons unrelated to education (e.g." nutritious toad" tables and chairs" books" TV). Thus"
non-separable consumption and educational investment decisions can lead to wealth
effects even in the absence ofcredit constraints. Tests using direct measures ofcredit
constraints can help clarify the ambiguity inherent in measured wealth effects. In the
survey, respondents were asked the value of outstanding fonnal and informal loans, and
the additional amount that they felt they could borrow either from institutions or trom
friends and family members in the event of an emergency. Our credit limit variable is the
sum of these values. Theory says that wealth should have a strong effect only when
credit constraints bind; therefore we generate an interaction dummy variable indicating
whether households are both poor and credit constrained" defined as being below the 33 rd
percentile of the sample in tenns of both expenditure per capita and credit limits,
accounting for 14.1 percent of sampled households.7
In evaluating the decision-making role of women versus men" the survey asks
which parent is responsible for deciding whether children attend school. The variable for
women's empowerment equals one if the wife decides, 0.5 ifboth decide, and zero if the
husband decides. The defmition ofaltruism in equation (2) suggests that women's
empowerment should be interacted with the child's gender and mother's education.8
Conditional on ability, previous achievement, and earnings prospects, school
quality has been found to have a positive impact on enrollment in other studies (e.g.,
Hanushek and Lavy, 1995). We focus on variables that measure different key aspects of
school quality - class size, teacher quality, and infrastructure. Following much of the
literature, our specific measures are the student-teacher ratio, the percentage of teachers
with post-secondary education,9 and the percentage ofclassrooms that are rainproof
(Glewwe and Jacoby, 1994). In addition to these measures, our t\vo cost ofschooling
measures, school fees and distance to school, might also reflect differences in school
quality. Villages that set higher school fees may have larger per-pupil budgets, and field
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interviews suggest that schools that serve multiple villages (Le., schools that are likely to
be farther away) achieve economies of scale and receive better funding.
2.4. China's Rural Educational System
While the minimum age of enrollment in China is six, households in many areas
are accustomed to sending their children to school at older ages. The mean age of
enrollment in our sample is 7.4, or about one year later than would be expected if all
children enrolled as soon as possible after age six. 1O As seen in Figure 2-2A, a significant
proportion of children do not start school until they are 8 or older, and girls are more
likely to start later (the average starting ages are 7.3 for boys and 7.5 for girls).
Interestingly, the age of enrollment for junior secondary school is lower for girls (mean
of 13.1 versus 13.5 for boys, see Figure 2-28).11 This finding suggests a selection
process in which only academically strong girls stay enrolled through primary school.
Nearly all children walk to the nearest primary school, usually located in the
village. Primary school is completed in five or six years, depending on the region.
Junior secondary schools are usually located in the nearby township. Despite the
compulsory education law mandating nine years of education, children whose families do
not pay school fees are not allowed to attend school. In our sample, school fees averaged
100.9 yuan in primary schools and 317.8 yuan in junior secondary schools (Table 2-1).
Additional, non-required school-related fees, e.g., supplies and books, averaged 71.4
yuan per child. Thus, a family with one child in primary school and another in junior
secondary school would spend about 550 yuan on school-related expenses, or fifty
percent of mean expenditures per capita, likely a very high share ofa family's cash
income.
School quality has emerged as an important concern in China, where fiscal
reforms have reduced redistributive budgetary transfers, exacerbating inequities. In our
sample of schools, the mean student-teacher ratio is 28.5 for primary schools and 15.1 for
junior secondary schools. The mean percentage of teachers with post-secondary
education is 54 percent at the primary level, and 88 percent at the junior secondary school
level. Seventy-eight percent ofprimary school classrooms and nearly all junior
secondary school classrooms are rainproof: There is significant variation in school
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quality among provinces (Table 2-1). For example~ just 28 percent of primary school
teachers have post-secondary education in Guizhou~ compared to 86 percent in Shaan..xi.
2.5. Empirical Specification
We analyze the determinants of years of schooling, test scores~ and whether
children have ever been held back. With exceptions noted below, we include a consistent
set of child~ household, and school quality variables~ as described above.
We model the duration of schooling as a Cox proportional-hazard model (see. for
example, Khandker, 1996 and Glewwe and Jacoby, 2000). Hazard models account for
the dependence ofcurrent enrollment on past enrollment decisions, and handle censored
observations (students currently enrolled at the time of the survey) in a natural way. The
Cox model is attractive because it does not require a parametric specification of the
baseline hazard function and thus allows the baseline hazard rate for each community to
vary (Cox and Oakes, 1984).12 We estimate separate hazard models for dropping out of
primary school conditional on primary school enrollment~ and for dropping out ofjunior
secondary school conditional on junior secondary school enrollment. The hazard ratios
can be interpreted as risk multipliers. 13
Because nearly all children attend at least one year of primary school, there is no
selection bias in the sample used to study the primary school duration of schooling. We
include age of enrollment as an independent variable in the dropout hazards and other
outcome equations because we expect age to affect school pertormance and the
opportunity cost of children~s time. We recognize that the coefficient will be upward
biased if unobserved poor ability or lack of parental support delays the age ofenrollment
or makes dropping out more likely.
Test scores are regressed on the full set of independent variables using OLS, with
different specifications employing county, viIlage~ and household fixed effects. We
specify the equation estimating whether a child was ever held back as a conditionallogit
in order to be able to include county, village~ and household fixed effects without
introducing bias. We also include dummy variables for the number of grades completed
to account for the fact that students who have reached higher grades have more chances
to be held back.
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2.51. Identification
Some independent variables may be endogenous because of simultaneity or
omitted variables. Variables resulting from household decisions made by parents, such as
expenditures per capita and number of siblings, are particularly susceptible to such bias
because they are likely to be made simultaneously with investments in children's
education. Expenditures in particular may include educational costs~ which naturally
increase if children are enrolled. To deal with this specific problem, our expenditure
measure excludes educational expenditures, which creates downward rather than upward
bias on the expenditure coefficient - a more severe test for finding signiticant effects.
Expenditure levels also reflect household income, which is affected by labor supply
decisions of parents, which in turn may depend on whether or not children are in school.
Fertility may be negatively correlated with educational investments if there is a tradeoff
between quantity and quality ofchildren. However, given China's strict family planning
policy, the number ofchildren in many rural families is below desired levels~ especially
in poor areas. 14 When we regress the number ofchildren on parental education and other
parental characteristics~ we find no significant effects.
Coefficients on household decision variables and on variables that are plausibly
exogenous to household decisions on education (e.g.~ father~s and mother's education,
women~s empowerment, and credit limits) also may misleadingly pick up the effects of
unobserved child and/or parent characteristics. Parental education, for instance, may
correlate positively with higher motivation or ability, which may also correlate with
willingness to invest in children's education. If this is true, the inclusion ofother
variables that reflect ability and motivation, such as women~s empowerment,
expenditures per capita, and credit limits, could better isolate the effect of preterences
related to parental education.
Without better data, dealing \\lith all of these endogeneity concerns is challenging.
As a practical matter, the vast majority ofstudies, especially those using cross-sectional
data, do not attempt to do so, ignoring potential bias (e.g., Jamison and Lockheed, 1987;
Parish and Willis, 1993; Glewwe, Grosh, Jacoby, and Lockheed, 1995; Khandker, 1996;
Case and Deaton, 1999; King, Orazem, and Paterno, 1999)..~ few studies treat income
and expenditure data as endogenous (Glewwe and Jacoby, 1994; Glewwe and Jacoby,
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2000), and Lillard and Willis (1994) explicitly model the endogeneity of parental
education. A conservative approach is to restrict the variable set to those that are strictly
exogenous and do not reflect household decisions, leaving out variables such as
expenditures per capita. Although this solves the simultaneity problem, it does not solve
the omitted variables problem, and the strict reduced form estimates may be difficult to
interpret because they are picking up multiple effects. Another approach is to use
instrumental variables, but it may be difficult to fmd suitable instruments that are
plausibly exogenous and explain sufficient variation in the endogenous variable. Finally,
one can add additional controls to try to pick up background factors, but the possibility of
omitted variable bias remains.
In our estimation, we tried a combination of these approaches. Adopting linear
specifications tor each outcome, we instrumented expenditures per capita and credit
limits using cultivated land and the share ofcultivated land that is irrigated. To help
control for unobserved parental attributes, we added background variables such as the
education of grandparents and the number ofsiblings ofeach parent. In the end,
however, we report estimates from specifications that do not control for endogeneity
because none ofour alternative specifications substantially alters the magnitude or sign of
our coefficient estimates. Our instrumental variables, although significant in first stage
regressions, suffer from being ·'Weak" in that they do not explain sufficient variation in
the endogenous variable to produce precise estimates (Bound, Jaeger. and Baker, 1995).
Nonetheless, inclusion of IVs increased rather than decreased the magnitude of the
coefficient of the instrumented variable in every specification, suggesting that our
coefticients underestimate the true effects. Including family background variables did
not appreciably alter the statistical significance or magnitudes ofour estimates, and we
dropped them to maximize sample size, since data on background variables were missing
for some households. Even ifendogeneity bias remains, our estimates are still
informative in describing the statistical association between outcomes and various
individual, household, and community factors, providing suggestive evidence. if not
defmitive proot: of causal relationships.
Estimates of the determinants of test scores may be subject to sample selection
bias because data are available only for enrolled children. Despite the difficulty of
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finding convincing identifying instruments, we estimate Heckman selection-correction
models of test scores. IS We fmd that the selection correction term does not enter
significantly into the test score regression but that the effects of gender become smaller in
magnitude and statistically insignificant. This lends weak support to the notion that a
selection story underlies gender differences in test scores. However~ because of the
questionable identification assumptions we have imposed, we do not want to read too
much into these results. Rather, we present the results for the uncorrected estimates and
consider possible biases introduced by selection etfects.
Another possible selection problem is endogenous school choice. If children who
have higher ability or more supportive parents choose to attend higher quality schools.
the measured effect of school quality variables will be biased upward. However, 94.1
percent of the children in our sample attended the nearest primary school, and of those
that do not, 59 percent report that the main reason for not doing so is unrelated to school
quality. This suggests that only 2 percent ofchildren are changing schools for reasons
related to quality.
Even without endogenous school choice, the student-teacher ratio may suffer
from endogeneity because it is affected by the enrollment decisions of households,
resulting in downward bias. This may be more important in middle school where dropout
rates are higher. To deal with this potential problem, we instrument the student-teacher
ratio in the test score regression with village population, and fmd that the results do not
change.
In all specifications, we control for community unobservables by including a set
ofcommunity dummy variables (or, in the hazard estimations, by stratifying by
community). To identify the effects of school quality variables, which are village level
attributes, we control for county fixed effects or stratify by county. Dropping these
variables, we include village fiXed effects or stratify by village. When possible, we also
control for village attributes by stratifying by households or by implementing household
fixed effects, although the effective sample is much reduced because it includes only
households \\lith more than one child. In some cases, especially for the years of
schooling hazard, the effective sample for village and household stratification is too small
for estimation. Also, when employing county fixed effects or stratification by county we
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allow for error correlation (or clustering) within villages, adjusting reported standard
errors appropriately. When employing village fixed effects or stratification by village,
we allow for clustering by household.
2.6. Results
2.61. Enrollment
The enrollment rate for children in our sample is 78.4 percent - 81.8 percent for
boys and 74.4 percent for girls (Table 2-2). Using a sample of 8000 households in 19
provinces, Knight and Song (2000) calculate a rural enrollment rate of 91 percent for
children aged 7-12 and 87 percent for children aged 13-15. In our poor county sample.
the enrollment rates for the same age groups are 92.1 percent and 71.2 percent,
respectively. The lower enrollment of 13-15 year aids in poor areas is striking
considering the fact that children in poor areas tend to enroll at older ages, so that many
13-15 year olds are not in junior secondary school but rather in primary school where
enrollment rates tend to be higher. Nationally, the percentage of poor counties with
junior secondary schooling enrollment above 85 percent is only 40 percent. compared to
70 percent in all counties (World Bank, 2000).
Figure 2-1 summarizes the enrollment status ofchildren in the sample. School
dropouts comprise 12.9 percent of the sample, and fonn a sample of students who have
completed their educations, assuming that they do not subsequently return to school. Of
these, 49.1 percent do not reach junior secondary school, 23.6 percent drop out during
junior secondary school, and the remaining 27.3 percent withdraw just after completing
junior secondary school, oftentimes involuntarily because they cannot pass senior
secondary entrance exams. The mean number ofgrades completed among dropouts is
5.89. In our sample, male dropouts complete 6.5 years of schooling while female
dropouts complete 5.3 years. The drop out rate for girls relative to boys is particularly
high in the first three years ofprimary school (Figure 2-3). Students begin dropping out
in earnest as early as age 12. Among 16-year-olds who had ever enrolled in school, 62.2
percent had dropped out (Figure 2-4).
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Parents ofdropouts were asked to select from a list of reasons for withdrawing
their children from school, and they appear to be less willing to pay for the education of
girls. For primary school dropouts, inability to pay high fees, the most frequent response,
led to the drop out decision for 47 percent of girls, but only 33 percent of boys, while for
junior secondary school dropouts, high fees were cited for halfof the girls but only 8
percent of the boys.16 This is consistent with a higher price elasticity of education tor
girls, which is found in many developing countries (World Bank, 2000).
Because the factors affecting the decision to continue schooling in primary and
junior secondary schools may be different, we look separately at the number of years of
schooling for children who ever enrolled at each level. Table 2-3 presents results from
Cox proportional hazard models of the likelihood of stopping schooling at each level. 17
We stratifY by county and by village to control for regional and community-level
unobserved heterogeneity. 18
Conditional on having remained in school until the current time, the probability
that poor and credit constrained children will drop out of primary school is three times
that ofother children. Thus, it is not surprising that just 6.9 percent of those who had
ever enrolled in junior secondary school are poor and credit constrained, while 13.9
percent of primary school enrollees are. Children from poor and credit constrained
households who enroll in junior secondary school are much less likely to drop out,
perhaps the result ofa selection process in which only top students or children of
particularly supportive parents remain by junior secondary school. Higher wealth
(expenditures per capita) reduces the likelihood ofdropping out from primary school, but
the coefficient is not statistically significant. The number of siblings reduces the
likelihood ofdropping out, again suggesting that siblings either substitute for each other's
household labor contributions or provide complementarities through cost saving or
improved learning.
Variables reflecting intra-household decision-making also affect the duration of
schooling. For each additional year ofa father's education, the probability ofhis child
dropping out of school falls by 12-14 percent. Also, children ofempowered women are
much less likely to drop out ofprimary school. The degree to which women's
empowerment plays a role is smaller for girls (a finding consistent with Knight and Song,
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2000), although the coefficient is not statistically significant. Finally, boys are more
likely to drop out ofjunior secondary school. There is no statistically significant
difference in the probability of boys and girls dropping out of primary school.
The probability of dropping out fails as school fees and distance to school
increase. This finding is consistent with higher school fees being charged by higher
quality schools. The coefficient is only significant at the primary level, suggesting that
junior secondary school fees may be sufficiently high to be a deterrent to enrollment.
The inverse relationship between distance to school and the probability of dropping out at
the primary level is unexpected ifdistance increases the costs of schooling because of
children's opportunity cost of time. However, the negative coefficient is consistent with
a low opportunity cost for primary school students and a positive correlation between
distance and school quality, as suggested above. When village strata are included, the
coetlicient on distance becomes much smaller in magnitude and is no longer statistically
significant, which is consistent with our school quality story since identification is
coming from within-village differences (where there are no quality effects) rather than
differences between villages. The quality of infrastructure also enters the primary school
decision in an intuitive way: as the percentage of rainproof classrooms rises, the
likelihood ofdropping out falls significantly. 19 Finally, the percentage of teachers with
post-secondary education positively affects the probability of dropping out at the primary
level. We hypothesize that this result stems from teacher education being negatively
correlated with teacher experience. The opposite is true for middle schools, although the
coefficient is not quite significant at the 90 percent confidence level. Unfortunately, we
do not have data on the experience of individual teachers.2o
2.62. Examination Scores
Table 2-4 presents estimation results for the determinants of the standardized
average examination scores of students who were enrolled the previous semester. We
incorporate county-grade fLxed effects, village-grade fLxed effects, and household fixed
effects in separate specifications. Expenditures per capita has a robustly positive impact
on test scores (a 10 percent increase in expenditures increases test scores by 0.05 standard
deviations), suggesting that poverty may reduce human capital accumulation even when
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enrollment rates are high. The poor and credit constrained dummy~ however~ is
statistically insignificant. Also~ children with older siblings have significantly higher test
scores than their peers~ possibly because they receive help from siblings or because older
children substitute their O\vn household labor tor the enrolled child~s.
Controlling for other covariates~ junior secondary school girls outperform boys by
0.2-0.7 standard deviations~ but the test score gender gap at the primary school level is
not significantly different from zero. The performance gender gap is consistent with a
gender selection story in which academically weak girls drop out in primary school but
academically weak boys do not. The estimated junior secondary school gender
difference (and statistical significance) falls as one moves from the county fixed etTects
specification to the village and household tixed effects specifications~ perhaps suggesting
that selection effects are greater in areas of poorer average pertormance~ so that a greater
share of girls with test scores are in the schools with better performance. Alternative
explanations tor higher female junior secondary school test scores are that girls study
harder than boys or that girls have fewer distractions or other responsibilities that
compete for their time. While the latter explanations cannot be ruled out~ we find them
unlikely.
There is some evidence that parental education and women's empowennent have
a negative effect on test scores, although the coefficients are not significant in all
specifications. The negative effect could reflect a higher opportunity cost oftime for
educated parents and empowered women or a selection story in which such parents keep
children in school longer, even when their children are academically weak. The negative
effect ofwomen's empowennent is significant for girls only~ providing weak support for
greater gender bias by mothers than fathers. Finally, and somewhat surprisingly, the
school quality variables do not enter these regressions significantly, suggesting that there
is no effect ofschool quality on learning, that our measures ofschool quality do not
capture important school quality attributes, or that our small sample of40 primary and 37
junior secondary schools does not have enough variation for identification.
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2.63. Grade Promotion
Of students who have ever been enrolled, 30.4 percent have been held back at
least one year (Table 2-2). The mean number of years held back among those ever held
back is 1.30, statistically identical for boys and girls. Of those who are ever held back,
74.4 percent are held back just one year. Ministry of Education (2000) observes that the
percent of children held back is relatively high in tirst grade, but falls in every subsequent
year. The propensity to be held back varies considerably by province; in Sichuan, for
example, just 13 percent have ever been held back, while 47 percent have been held back
in Shaanxi. Boys are more likely than girls to have been held back (35 and 25 percent,
respectively), which may be because boys have poorer study habits or because boys go
farther in their education and so have more chances to be held back.
Patterns in the percent of students ever held back and the average number of years
held back among those ever held back provide support for a story in which poorly
performing girls are more likely to drop out in primary school. If all children stay in
school even if they are held back, or if children drop out tor reasons uncorrelated with
being held back, the percentage of children ever held back should increase with age since
more time in school increases the number of chances ofbeing held back. However, in
our sample, the percentage of students ever held back falls with age for girls but not for
boys, direct evidence that girls who are held back are relatively more likely to drop out.
Also, as seen in Figure 2-5, the average nu..-nber ofyears held back among those ever held
back increases with age for boys but not for girls. Finally, comparing the performance of
boys and girls among dropouts and non-dropouts, we find that the ratio of the share of
boys ever held back to the share ofgirls ever held back is 0.8 for dropouts but 1.4 for
non-dropouts. In other words, among those in school, boys are more likely to have been
held back, but among dropouts, girls are more likely to have been held back. These
patterns provide evidence for a differential selection story, and unlike the test score
results, they have no plausible alternative explanation. King et at., (1999) show that in
the Philippines, too, promotion is a much stronger predictor ofcontinued enrollment for
girls than for boys.
Table 2-5 presents results for a conditionallogit model for ever having been held
back. Odds ratios and coefficients are reported for specifications including county,
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village. and household fixed effects. Dummies for the number ofgrades completed have
been included to control for the number ofopportunities to be held back.
Consistent with the gender selection story in which academically weak boys stay
in school longer than academically weak girls. boys are more likely to have been held
back than girls, particularly for those in junior secondary school. The economic and
school quality variables do not significantly affect the likelihood ofever being held back.
Expenditures per capita enters positively in the county fixed etfects specification but not
in the village fixed effects specification. One of the most significant tactors affecting
whether children are held back is the age ofenrollment. Kids who enroll later are less
likely to have ever been held back, consistent with our expectation that many of the
children who are held back are those who enter school earlier and are held back in tirst
grade. If promotion after first grade is relatively automatic, it may explain why many
variables do not robustly explain whether kids are ever held back.
2.7. Conclusion
[n concluding, we attempt to integrate the important results above to draw broader
inferences about the importance of low wealth and credit constraints, intra·household
decision·making, and school quality on educational attainment in poor areas.
Poverty significantly affects both educational investments and learning.
Controlling for expenditures per capit~ children from households that are both poor and
credit constrained are three times as likely to drop out of school. Thus, for some of the
poor, the lack of available funds is a major obstacle to financing educational investments.
However, being poor and credit constrained does not significantly affect learning in
school (as measured by test scores or being held back), suggesting that the inability to
fmance educational expenditures does not hurt children's performance in school. There
is weak evidence that wealth, measured by expenditures per capit~ affects years of
schooling independently ofwhether one is poor and credit constrained, and strong
evidence that it affects test scores; a ten percent increase in expenditures increases test
scores by 0.05 standard deviations. In addition to pointing out the importance ofcredit
constraints in poor areas, our results show that even when households are not credit
constrained, children from wealthier households have an advantage in school
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perfonnance. Thus, even with high enrollments, poverty still may be an important issue
in educational attainment because of its direct effects on learning. The different results
for the wealth and credit constraint variables also highlight the value of using more direct
measures of credit constraints when evaluating wealth effects on educational attainment.
We lind strong evidence of a gender selection story in which poorly performing
girls drop out in primary school while boys do not begin to drop out in earnest until
junior secondary school. The relative likelihood of having ever been held back is greater
tor girls among dropouts but greater for boys among those in school. The average age of
enrollment in primary school is younger for boys but the average age of enrollment in
junior secondary school is younger for girls. These patterns suggest that girls that are
held back are more likely to drop out than boys that are held back. In addition, girls score
higher on tests in junior secondary school, suggesting a weeding out of poorly perfonning
girls in primary school. The clear gender bias in educational investments may be due to
lower returns to education for girls, the lower selfish returns to parents trom investing in
girls that will marry into other families, or from parental preferences that favor sons.
Further research that more convincingly distinguishes among competing explanations for
gender bias should receive high priority.
With regard to women's empowennent, the strongest etTects occur tor years of
schooling. The coefficient estimates suggest that the likelihood ofdropping out of
primary school falls dramatically when women have a greater say in enrollment decisions
(but not quite statistically significant with village strata), and the probability ofdropping
out ofjunior secondary school falls dramatically for sons. These results imply that
women value education more than men, and that if anything they favor sons more than
daughters, relative to men. Whether children were ever held back is also significantly
influenced by women's empowerment; the empowerment of less educated women has a
significantly stronger negative effect on the likelihood ofchildren being held back than
the empowerment of better-educated women.
Father's education has a much greater influence on educational investment
decisions than mother's education. An additional year of father's education reduces the
likelihood of dropping out by 12-14 percent and reduces the likelihood that the child was
ever held back by 14 percent. These positive effects may reflect preferences associated
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with higher education or higher returns to education if children have more educated
fathers. This might be true if children ofeducated fathers have greater ability~ if a
father~s education serves as a complementary input to children ~s learning, or if more
educated parents have better social and professional networks that increase future labor
market opportunities. The relative unimportance of mother's education may be partly
due to the very low average educational level of women in the study areas.
We tind evidence that the presence of siblings reduces the likelihood ofdropping
out~ especially if siblings are older. and that children with older siblings score higher on
exams. These findings suggest that children benefit from having siblings, and that
younger siblings in particular benefit from the presence ofolder siblings. Siblings can
increase the desirability ofeducational investments by substituting for each other·s labor
contributions to the household~ economizing on costs, or helping each other with
schoolwork.
Finally, our measures ofschool quality do not appear to affect learning in school
(test scores, ever having been held back), but they do have some effect on the years of
schooling. Higher school fees and distance to school, each of which may be a proxy tor
quality, result in lower probabilities of dropping out ofprimary school. The percentage
ofclassrooms which are rainproof and the percentage of teachers with post-secondary
education significantly impact the number of years ofprimary schooling (although the
latter has an unexpected sign which we attribute to a negative correlation between
education and experience). Thus, while school attributes do affect educational
investment decisions, our estimates do not pick up direct effects on learning. This may
be because there are no effects, because our particular measures of school quality do not
adequately measure important school attributes in the Chinese context, or because our
small sample of schools lacks the variation necessary to detect the effects ofdifferences
in school quality. Future research using better measures will be of great interest.
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I This work is co-authored with Albert Park. It previously appeared as Brown, P.H. &
Park.. A. (2002). ""Education and Poverty in Rural China." Economics ofEducation
Review. 21(6): 523-541.
2 We thank the Ford and Luce Foundations for supporting the field surveys in China.. and
Emily Hannum~ David Lam, Lee Lillard~ Gary Solon, Rohini Somanathan, Jan Svejnar,
Sangui Wang~ Robert Willis, seminar panicipants at the Harvard Graduate School of
Education, the University of Michigan Department of Economics, the 2000 NEUDC
Conference at Cornell University, the Institute of Population Studies (Chinese Academy
of Social Sdences)~ and a Workshop on Poverty Policies in China held by the China
Poverty Research Association in Beijing, as well as two anonymous referees for helpful
comments.
J By modeling the parents' joint payoff~we abstract from possibly different payoffs to
fathers and mothers. We do allow for different parental attitudes toward the welfare of
children.. however.
~ We omit consumption in order to simplify; minimum consumption requirements would
reduce further the maximum educational investment ofcredit constrained households.
5 We include sibling effects to capture competition for resources even though our model
includes only one child. It is straightforward to adjust the model to allow for multiple
children. Presence of siblings might also affect the expected future contributions from
children.
6[n a systematic analysis using panel data, Glewwe and Jacoby (2000) find wealth effects
for Vietnam; see also Filmer (2000) for cross-country evidence, Jacoby (1994) for
evidence of the importance ofcredit constraints in Peru, and Behrman and Knowles
(1999) for a review of the issues. Schultz (2000) and World Bank (2000) show that
tuition subsidies increased enrollment in Mexico and other developing countries. Foster
and Rosenzweig (1996)~ however, find no wealth effects for India.
7 These cutoffs ate, ofcourse, arbitrary. However, a simple interaction term between
expenditures per capita and credit constraints would miss an important nonlinearity. We
tried different cutoff values and chose the highest values for which the effects were
significant. Lower cutoffs produced similarly significant results.
8 There is mixed evidence on whether men and women favor sons and daughters
differently (World Bank, 2000). For example~ Lillard and Willis (1994) fmd that
mothers' education has a greater impact on daughters~ education and that fathers~
education has a greater impact on sons' education in Taiwan, but Quisumbing and
Maluccio (1999) find the opposite in South Africa.
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9 Case and Deaton (1999) fmd significant effects of student~teacherratios in South
Africa. Birdsall (1985) finds strong effects of teacher's education in Brazil. Hanushek
(1995) concludes from a review of previous studies that teacher training deserves greater
support.
lO 5.5 percent of our sample had enrolled before age six. Interviews suggest in most cases
such children have siblings already attending school.
11 We estimated age ofenrollment hazards in which we stratified by county, village, and
household. We found that the number ofolder siblings positively impacts the probability
ofenrollment, perhaps because an older siblings can accompany younger ones to school
and can provide hand~me~downs that reduce the cost of schooling. Having a higher birth
order reduces the probability ofprimary school enrollment, perhaps because families
have accumulated less wealth when their tirst children are born or because older children
contribute to the household in ways that make it easier to send younger children to
school. Surprisingly, per capita expenditure has no discemable effect on the age of
enrollment, and children who are both poor and credit constrained are likely to enroil
earlier in primary school. We also find that boys enroll earlier in primary school than
girls (50 percent more likely to enroll all things equal), and that an additional year of
father's education raises the probability of earlier enrollment by 9 percent. Finally, our
school quality variables do not enter the initial enrollment decision significantly.
12 Using the stratified Cox proportional hazard model, the hazard at time f for child i in
community j is assumed to equal h,(f) = ~J(l)eP'.,J, ·_·P.~, .
13 For example, a hazard ratio of 1.5 means that the child is 1.5 times more likely to drop
out if the independent variable increases by one unit. Thus, hazard ratios greater than one
correspond to positive coefficients and hazard ratios less than one correspond to negative
coefficients.
14 In most of the study regions, family planning policy dictates up to two children. Areas
of the county in Guizhou may allow up to three children, since it is a minority county.
The data show that two thirds of the families in the sample have two or fewer children.,
and 95 percent of families have three or fewer children. This would appear to be roughly
consistent with the expected effects of the family planning policy.
IS There are no obvious identifying variables for a selection equation. Many researchers
have used distance to school and tuition as identifying variables. However, because our
estimates find both to have positive effects on enrollment., we believe they are likely to
reflect school quality differences, which may affect learning outcomes. Tuition., in
particular, seems strongly associated with the wealth of the community and the quality of
schools. In addition to our previous explanation about distance as an indicator of school
quality, distance also could affect attendance (unobserved), ability to spend more time in
school after class, etc., which could have effects on learning outcomes. Without good
identifying variables, a Heckman-type selection model can only be identified from the
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assumption ofjoint normality of the error terms in the selection and outcome equations.
We estimate the selection model with and without distance as an identifying variable, and
obtain similar results.
16 For primary dropouts, the other main reasons cited were child unwillingness to attend
school (44 percent), the interpretation of which is unclear, and poor grades (7 percent).
For junior secondary dropouts, 35 percent reponed poor grades.. and 15 percent cited an
unwillingness to attend.
17 We could alternatively use an ordered logit model to estimate the determinants of grade
attainment. We feel that years of schooling has a more natural behavioral interpretation
since the decision of families is to keep the child in school, not to promote the child to the
next grade. Grade attained also conflates the decision to stay in school and performance
in school, and one ofour goals is to consider these aspects ofeducational attainment
separately. Nonetheless.. we did estimate an ordered logit model of grade attainment" and
found the imponant results to be quite similar.
18 We do not stratify by village in the junior secondary school estimates, nor by
household in either the primary or junior secondary school estimates. In each case, there
was too little variation within the strata ofconcern.
19 The rainproof classrooms variable was omitted from the junior secondary school
hazard because it perfectly predicted dropping out in some counties due both to the small
number ofjunior secondary school dropouts in the sample and to the large number of
junior secondary schools without any leaking classrooms.
20 To check the robustness of results to the included variable set, we also estimated the
hazard models dropping the age of enrollment, and fmd no substantial changes. In
general, the model is less precisely estimated, and in no cases do variables gain
significance when the age ofenrollment is excluded.
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Figure 2-1. Enrollment Status of Children in Sample
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Figure 2-2A. Age of Primary School Enrollment by Sex
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Figure 2-28. Age of Junior Secondary School Enrollment by Sex
IS
Age
1311
Boys
-:
.4
c.35 "I
Q ...
·5·.) !
e.25 -:
.2 i
.15 ~
.1 -:
.05 -.
o -'-~----r-----r-----r----
Girls
.4 i
=.35 l
.g
.3 -1I
Y I
e.2S ~!
.2 i I
.15 ~!
.1 1
.05 ....I
0 ...) i I I
II 12 13 14 IS
Age
34
Figure 2-3. Years of Schooling Among Dropouts
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Figure 2-5. Mean Number of\'ears Held Back (Among Those Ever Held Back)
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Table 2..1. Summary Statistics for Sample Households and Schools
All Means
Variable Unit Obs Mean SId dev Benan Jiangxi Sichuan Guizhou Shaanxi Gansu
WI father's education years 261 7.31 3.40 8.00 7.24 7.58 4.92 8.69 7.25
"a
mother's education 252 3.35 3.40 3.31 3.35 5.66 1.00 4.28 2.66
-
yearsc
i women's empowemlent % 262 0.26 0.31 0.28 0.12 0.29 0.29 0.36 0.24WI
= number ofchildren #I 262 2.15 0.84 2.28 1.93 1.98 2.12 2.16 2.44c
= per capita expenditure yuan 262 1133.54 651.97 857.10 1682.67 1718.75 971.18 687.60 811.81
credit limit yuan 262 4643.41 6596.45 6513.85 5000.29 3866.80 1685.78 6287.22 3468.44
poor and credil conslrained 1/0 262 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.25 0.19 0.22
distance to primary school km 195 1.22 (1.20) 0.54 1.20 1.56 2.34 0.62 1.24
distance to junior secondary km 71 3.55 (4.87) 4.27 2.78 2.08 2.25 2.46 4.45
school
t-= school fees yuan 40 100.92 (47.01 ) 73.86 120.42 169.66 42.30 113.28 64.64• c student-teacher ralio 1# 40 28.15 (9.49) 31.56 24.21 35.06 22.20 26.27 20.61&'5
'C II) teachers with post- % 40 0.54 (0.34) 0.52 0.61 0.55 0.28 0.86 0.33 vJQ,
secondary education ......
rainproofclassrooms % 40 0.78 (0.51) 0.66 1.00 0.82 0.74 0.80 0.70
~= school fees yuan 37 317.80 (122.98) 295.68 304.95 383.90 216.86 400.25 294.83II) C student-teacher ratio #I 37 15.10 (6.63) 14.10 18.78 18.64 11.66 11.39 11.37
.. .c.2~ teachers with post- % 37 0.88 (0.20) 0.91 0.95 0.85 0.79 0.93 0.83
c: secondary education
=..., rainproof classrooms % 36 0.90 (0.18) 0.95 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.80 0.68
Table 2-2. Educational Attainment Indicators
All Children Boys Girls
Variable Unit Obs Mean Std deY Obs Mean Sid deY Obs Mean Std deY
current enrollment rate % 412 0.78 (0.34) 253 0.82 (0.39) 219 0.14 (0.44)
age of primary enrollment years 418 7.46 (1.13) 231 1.34 (1.01) 181 1.60 (1.17)
age ofjunior secondary enrollment years 91 13.38 ( 1.04) 54 13.52 (1.08) 37 13.17 (0.94)
ever held back % 425 0.30 (0.46) 234 0.35 (0.48) 191 0.25 (0.43)
years held back, if held back years 129 1.30 (0.55) 81 1.30 (0.56) 48 1.31 (0.55)
highest grade completed among dropouts #I 55 5.89 (2.79) 26 6.51 (2.58) 28 5.28 (2.92)
average years per grade years 336 1.17 (0.37) 234 1.21 (0.27) 152 1.14 (0,37)
W
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Table 2-3. Years of Schooling (Cox Proportional Hazard)
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Unit Haz. Coef. Haz. Coef. Haz. Coef.
Ratio Ratio Ratio
male dummy 1.148 0.138 0.599 -0.513 3.102** 1.132
(0.23) (1.15) (2.26)
age ofenrollment years 1.430* 0.358 1.090 0.086 0.477* -0.740
( 1.73) (0.62) ( 1.68)
younger siblings ;# 0.654 -0.424 0.576 -0.551 0.577 -0.549
( 1.36) (1.32) ( 1.34)
older siblings ;# 0.147** -1.917 0.138* -1.980 0.617 -0.483
(2.04) (1.79) (0.62)
fathers education years 0.881 -0.127 0.875 -0.134 0.855 -0.157
(1.61 ) (1.51 ) ( lAS)
mother's education years 0.975 -0.025 0.960 -0.041 0.921 -0.082
(0.16) (0.34) (0.99)
women's empowerment percent 0.087** -2.441 0.209 -1.566 3.220 1.170
(2.21 ) (1.29) (0.54)
women's empower * male interaction 0.558 -0.583 0.366 -1.005 0.055** -2.898
(0.41) (0.73) (2.08)
women's emp * mother's ed interaction 1.057 0.055 1.102 0.097 1.157 0.145
(0.13) (0.32) (0045)
log expenditure per capita log yuan 0.250 -1.386 0.833 -0.183 0.577 -0.550
(0.78) (0.20) (0.66)
poor and credit constrained dummy 4.891*· 1.587 3.047 1.114 0.244* -1.412
(2.47) (1.43) (1.65)
distance to school km 0.475** -0.745 0.845 -0.169 0.901 -0.105
(2.01) (1.48) ( 1.36)
log school tees log yuan 0.435* -0.832 0.993 -0.007
( 1.68) (0.01)
student-teacher ratio # 0.968 -0.032 0.998 -0.002
(0.93) (0.04)
rainproof classrooms % 0.047*** -3.067
(3.16)
teachers with post-sec ed % 4.164* 1.427 0.131 -2.034
( 1.88) ( 1.62)
County Strata yes yes
Village Strata yes
Observations 373 406 79
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 2-4. Standardized Examination Scores (OLS)
Variable Unit (1) (2) (3)
male dummy -0.668*· -0.443 -0.218
(2.26) ( 1.65) (0.68)
male • primary interaction 0.646** 0.342 0.099
(2.30) (1.51 ) (0.29)
age ofenrollment years -0.020 0.016 -0.032
(0.25) (0.20) (0.31)
younger siblings u 0.152 0.194 -0.117rr
( l.18) (1.41 ) (1.11)
older siblings ;# 0.268*· 0.287*·
(2.38) (2.06)
father's education years -0.021 -0.045*
(0.85) ( 1.79)
mother's education years -0.018 -0.007
(0.74) (0.22)
women's empowerment % -0.635** -0.693
(2.06) ( 1.54)
women's empowerment * male interaction 0.452 0.619
( 1.08) ( 1.52)
women's empowerment • mother's education interaction 0.080 0.068
(1.34) ( 1.03)
log expenditure per capita log yuan 0.535*** 0.544**
(3.03) (2.30)
poor and credit constrained dummy 0.326 0.371
( 1.49) ( 1.50)
distance to school km 0.001 -0.007
(0.05) (0.42)
log schoo1fees log yuan 0.072
(0.45)
student-teacher ratio # -0.015
(0.79)
rainproof classrooms % -0.319
(0.39)
teachers with post-secondary education % -0.316
(0.51 )
log school fees * primary interaction -0.336*
( 1.79)
student-teacher ratio • primary interaction 0.012
(0.69)
rainproofclassrooms • primary interaction 0.716
(0.82)
teachers with post-secondary education • primary interaction 0.726
(1.17)
Constant -2.813* -3.663·· 0.382
(1.87) (2.12) (0.51)
County FE yes
Village FE yes
Household FE yes
Observations 260 271 280
R-squared 0.1I 025 0.71
Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ••• significant at 1%»
The dependent variable is standard deviations from mean test score for the same county-grade. The
variable 'lJrimary» is a dummy variable for whether the child is currently enrolled in primary school
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Table 2-5. Ever Held Back (Conditional Logit)
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Unit Odds Rat. Coef. Odds Rat. Coef. Odds Rat. Coet:
male dummy 3.971·· L.379 3.804· L.336 2.192 0.785
(2.11 ) ( L.89) (0.84)
male • primary into 0.468 -0.759 0.461 -0.774 0.953 -0.048
( 1.15) (1.07) (0.05)
age of enrollment years 0.701··· -0.355 0.693·· -0.367 0.320··· -1.141
(2.67) (2.32) (2.96)
younger siblings # 1.381 0.323 1.095 0.091 2.540··· 0.932
(L.5 1) (0.37) (2.87)
older siblings # 1.081 0.078 0.764 -0.269
(0.36) (1.02)
father's education years 0.864··· -0.146 0.855··· -0.157
(3.03) (2.82)
mother's education years 0.921 -0.083 0.902 -0.103
(1.50) (1.58)
women's empowerment % 0.788 -0.238 0.511 -0.672
(0.32) (0.83)
women's emp * male into 0.685 -0.378 0.961 -0.039
(0.44) (0.04)
women's emp * mother's ed into 1.183 0.168 1.283· 0.249·
(1.41 ) (1.77)
log expenditure per capita log yuan 1.988 0.687 1.329 0.284
( 1.63) (0.61)
poor and credit constrained dummy 0.873 -0.136 1.459 0.378
(0.36) (0.85)
distance to school km 0.948 -0.053 0.962 -0.039
(0.93) (0.61)
log primary school fees log yuan 0.628 -0.466
(0.80)
pri student-teacher ratio # 0.990 -0.011
(0.49)
primary rainproofclassrms % 0.528 -0.639
(0.92)
pri teachers wi post-sec ed % 0.689 -0.372
(0.77)
Grade Completed Dummies yes yes
County FE yes
Village FE yes
Household FE yes
Observations 359 328 113
Absolute value ofz statistics in parentheses
• significant at 10%; •• significant at 5%; ••• significant at 1%
CHAPTER III
DOWRY AND INTRAHOUSEHOLD BARGAINING:
EVIDENCE FROM CHINA1
3.1. Introduction
The predominant model of household behavior formalized by Becker (1991 )
assumes that families maximize a single utility function, i.e., that either all household
members have identical preferences or that one household member functions as a
dictator, determining all allocations within the household. While this '~itary" model
has provided important insights into household behavior, it offers little perspective on
how individual preferences infonn these allocations. More general models of the
household that explicitly account for differences in preferences have resulted. One
prominent set ofmodels treats household decisions as the result of household members
engaging in cooperative Nash bargaining (Manser and Bro\\'n, 1980; McElroy and
Homey, 1981).2 In such -"collective" approaches to household behavior, the bargaining
position of household members plays an important role in determining resource
allocations within the household.
While the concept of intrahousehold bargaining is theoretically straightforward~
measuring bargaining position is difficult in practice; there is a paucity of socioeconomic
data that include both plausible measures ofhousehold bargaining and individual welfare
measures, and it has proven difficult to convincingly correct for endogeneity problems
with existing data (Behrman, 1997). Nevertheless, numerous studies have been
undertaken which find evidence supporting the collective models of households in many
developing countries.
Due perhaps to intuitive appeal and empirical tractability, many studies focus on
assignable income as relative measures of intrahousehold bargaining position, e.g., Folbre
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(1984), Von Braun (1988), Garcia (1990), and Hoddinott and Haddad (1995). They find
grounds to reject the income pooling hypothesis central to the unitary model and find
considerable evidence that control of resources has strong implications for how those
resources are used by the household. However~ by using income as a regressor~ they
unrealistically assume that labor supply decisions are exogenous. To avoid this
simultaneity problem., other studies rely on nonlabor income to measure relative
bargaining power~ e.g.., Schultz (1990) and Thomas (1990). This strategy is also
problematic, however~ because nonlabor income may depend on individuals being in a
particular state., e.g.~ receiving benefits due to temporary illness, and because persistent
unobservable differences in productivity and taste may have influenced past asset
accumulation (Behrman, 1997). Funhermore, nonlabor income may renect previous
labor supply decisions and may thus be endogenous across the lifespan (Strauss and
Thomas, 1995; Hoddinott, Alderman., and Haddad, 1997; Schultz, 2001).3 An appealing
alternative to income as an indicator of bargaining position are sex ratios at the relevant
marriage ages, laws governing divorce, and other environmental factors that may shift
threat points within marriage (Rao and Greene, 1993; Lundberg, Pollak., and Wales,
1997; Ward-Bans, 2001; Chiappori, Fonin, and Lacroix, 2002; Anderson, 2003). In
principle., variation in such parameters can be used to identify how changing threat points
affect household allocations. However, in the absence of randomized experiments, these
factors may also be endogenous (Hoddinott et al., 1997).
[n the search for exogenous determinants of intrahousehold bargaining position,
one interesting recent approach has stressed the importance of assets controlled by
individuals at the time of household formation. If such assets remain under control of the
original holder, they may affect the relative bargaining positions in the household (and
thus marital allocations) without the simultaneity concerns that arise in the previously
described studies. Hence, Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg (1997) and Quisumbing
and Maluccio (2003) find evidence that women's share of the assets brought to marriage
by the spouses influences children's health andlor education outcomes in Indonesia,
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and South Africa. While concerns about simultaneity diminish
when using pre-marital assets as a proxy for bargaining position, the possibility of
omitted variable bias remains. Zhang and Chan (1999) thus implement a two-stage
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estimation strategy in which parental education is used as an instrument for dowry when
estimating the effect of pre-marital endo\\lments on the probability that husbands do
household chores in Taiwan. However, unobservable characteristics of the wife, e.g.,
intelligence, may be correlated with both parental education and household bargaining
outcomes, and the instrument may thus not be exogenous in the second stage. Further,
they do not control for cohort differences, resulting in biased estimates if younger
husbands both have more educated parents and contribute more time to housework.
Their identification strategy is thus subject to endogeneity problems similar to those in
many previous studies of household behavior.
This paper makes use ofdetailed new data from China to investigate the effect of
dowry on household allocation in a cooperative Nash bargaining framework. To control
for the potential endogeneity ofmarital payments, I use two types of instruments. The
first is regional grain yield shocks in the year preceding marriage. The surveyed
households are located in rural areas where livelihoods have long depended on tanning.
Unanticipated shocks to grain yield in the period just before marriage are therefore likely
to have a substantial impact on household wealth accumulation, and thus on the ability of
households to make transfers associated with marriage. The second type of instrument is
the sibling sex composition of the bride and groom. Sibling sex composition likely
affects the savings available for marital paYments given the high costs associated with
marrying sons versus the expected income from marrying daughters and the fact that
credit markets are not well developed. These instruments influence payments made
before marriage while remaining plausibly exogenous to household allocation decisions
after marriage. In contrast to many other studies, I also include family background
measures to better control for unobservable characteristics of the couple that may
correlate with marital payments. In addition, estimates include marriage cohort dummies
to account for the possibilities that the amount of marital payments reflect generational
norms and that factors affecting intrahousehold decisions may vary by cohort. Finally, I
use village fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. This identification
strategy represents a significant improvement over previous studies in controlling
effectively for potential bias from omitted variables and simultaneity.
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I analyze the effect of dowry on a variety ofhousehold allocation decisions of
interest to the wife~ including her total leisure time~ the time that her husband allocates to
household chores~ and the probability that the wife self-identifies as being satisfied with
her life. To help distinguish between wealth effects and bargaining effects~ I also analyze
the impact of dowry on household spending on women~s goods as a share of total
expenditures., on the wife~s share of the couple's total leisure time, on her husband'ts
share of the couple's total time devoted to chores., and on the degree to which the wife
has the authority to make decisions when the husband and wife disagree about household
matters. I tind that dowry has a positive and robust etfect on each of these outcomes..
providing strong evidence that pre-marital endowments affect household bargaining, and
thus household consumption choices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 reviews the
collective Nash bargaining model; section 3.3 describes the role of marital payments in
the marriage ritual in China; section 3.4 details the identification strategy used in the
empirical investigation; section 3.5 introduces the data used in the analysis; section 3.6
presents empirical evidence that dowry affects a wife's bargaining position; and section
3.7 concludes.
3.2. Cooperative Nash Bargaining Model
Following McElroy and Homey ( 1981), consider two unmarried individuals.. w
and h., who each care about their own consumption ofgoods and leisure. Individual rs
utility in the single state is given by U; =U; (X'), where i E {w,h}, which is assumed to
be nondecreasing and quasiconcave. Here, X' E {Xl ,Ii}, x' is rs consumption ofgoods,
and Ii represents i's leisure. Suppose that w has a private endowment given by D. In the
single state, w maximizes utility by choosing X W subject to the constraint given by
pxlt! + r 1t'/1t' =r IVTIV + D and h maximizes utility by choosing X h subject to
pxh + r hIh =rhTh. Here., p is the price ofXl , r i is'-'s wage rate, and T l is the total time
available to i. This Yields the strictly quasiconvex indirect utility functions
V IV (D, p,r lV ,Tl") and Vh (p,rh ,rh ), with the indirect utility of individual w increasing
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in the endowment, D. That is, dV w IdD > o. The indirect utilities outside of marriage
correspond to the threat points of individuals within marriage (Le., the minimum utility
available to each individual in the event of marital dissolution),~ and thus to their relative
intrahousehold bargaining positions.
In the cooperative Nash bargaining framework., w and h jointly choose
consumption to maximize the gains from marriage over their own and their spouse"s
consumption:
(1) [u;, (.X w ,Xh ) - V W (D, p,r w , T W )][U~ (.x w , ..y. h ) _ V h (p,r h ., T h )]
subject to the joint budget constraint equating total household expenditure to total
household income:
(2)
which is assumed to be binding.s In the context of marriage, D may be interpreted as
dowry, and it is assumed that D reverts to w in case ofdivorce.
By the implicit function theorem, the solution to the household's problem is a system of
demand equations for goods and leisure:
(3) ...\,'V =fl(D,p,r
W
,Tw ,rh ,Til)
...\," =f 2 (D,p,r W ,T 'V ,rh ,Til)
The total effect ofa change in dowry on the optimal allocation ofx and I may be
decomposed into a wealth effect, ~ • stemming from a shift in the budget constraint,
d b .. ffi ax' dV"" 1 . fr h . th I· . al thran a argatnmg e ect, ----, resu ung om a c ange In e re atlve mant eatavw dD
points. That is,
(4) dX' ax' ax
i dV tv
--=--+----dD aD avtv dD
47
Holding the total budget constant~ an increase in the relative bargaining position ofone
spouse must lower that of the other spouse. Thus~ the net effect of a change in dowry has
an ambiguous impact on h's consumption because the wealth and bargaining effects
associated with dowry otIset each other, i.e.~ dX h / dD >< 0, assuming that each
individual's consumption is a normal household good. However~ the wealth and
bargaining effects are both positive for w, i.e.~ dX w / dD > O. As such, it is important to
distinguish between bargaining and wealth effects before concluding that dowry shifts
bargaining positions within marriage.
3.3. Marital Transactions in Rural China
Multiple transfers between the natal families characterize the marriage ritual in
China. Brideprice (pinli or pinjin) is a transfer or series of transfers from the groom's
parents to the bride's parents, while dowry (jiazhuang) represents a subsequent transfer
from the bride's family to the bride. Thatcher (1991) documents this system dating to the
Spring and Autumn period of the Eastern Chou dynasty (770 - 256 B.C.), and it persisted
through the first half of the 20th century. However, the Chinese government sought to
combat ·'feudal" practices in marriage with the founding of the People's Republic of
China. Central to this objective was enacting the 1950 Marriage Law that specifically
prohibited ·-ute exaction of money or gifts in connection with marriage" (Meijer. 1971).
Yet as Parish and Whyte (1978) put it, ··Poor peasants were less enthusiastic about
marriage struggle than they were about class struggle/~ and the new rules were largely
ignored (Ocko, 1991; Min and Eades, 1995), particularly in rural areas.
In rural China, brideprice is negotiated between the two natal families, typically
using a matchmaker as intermediary.6 Because the bride formally leaves her own family
at marriage to join her husband's, the brideprice negotiation focuses on how the bride's
family should be compensated for investments made in rearing the bride (Croll. 1981)
and the loss of rights over her (Goody~ 1973). A further consideration~ particularly after
agricultural decollectivization when families could again profit from the sale ofexcess
production, is the loss ofa bride's future productivity (Parish and Whyte, 1978; Min and
Eades, 1995; Zhang, 2000). That is, brideprice is a mechanism for clearing the market,7
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but not generally for making bequests to the husband or to the conjugal unit directly. A
marriage date is also fixed at the time of betrothal~with engagement typically lasting one
year (Liu~ 2000). Brideprice is usually given to the bride's family in several installments
over the course of the engagement.8
After brideprice is received, the bride's family decides the size and composition
of the dowry; unlike brideprice, it is not subject to negotiation by the groom"s parents.
Offering elaborate dO\\lnes provides a vehicle for prestige building (Potter and Potter"
1990; Siu, 1993; Liu, 2000) and serves as an efficient pre-mortem inheritance (Parish and
Whyte, 1978; Croll, 1981). The difference in timing of inheritance tor sons and
daughters may be attributed to higher transaction costs tor daughters who have married
and left the household, and in many cases the local area. In much of rural China.. current
practice is that brides' parents retain part of the brideprice and payout part as dowry.
Dowry today typically includes bedding, clothing, furniture, and possibly other durables
such as a bicycle, sewing machine, radio, and television (Siu, 1993; Liu, 2000). It also
includes a significant cash component for the bride's exclusive use. Dowry thus forms
the basis of the new conjugal unit's household. While the groom has equal access to the
non-pecuniary aspects of dowry, the bride retains ultimate authority in its use (Zhang,
2000). For example, Van (1996) describes brides using their dowries to make high-
interest loans to in-laws who must pay brideprice in the marriage ofa younger son.
Prior to 1981, divorce was legally difficult to obtain and the divorce rate was accordingly
low. The 1981 Marriage Law considerably eased the requirements for divorce, however,
and the rates have risen steadily since. In 1998, there were 0.954 divorces per 1000
population (Wang, 200 I),9 with the highest rates occurring in rural interior provinces
(Zeng and Wu, 2000). Furthermore, the 1981 Marriage Law stipulates that dowry
reverts to the bride in the event of marital dissolution (Ocko, 1991). Divorce is therefore
a realistic outside option for \\lives in the surveyed areas.
Given that brideprice is an intergenerational transfer from the groom's parents to
the bride's parents and that dowry is an intergenerational pre-mortem bequest made by
the bride's parents to the bride, it is expected that dowry affects bargaining position
within marriage, while brideprice has no effec~ as Zhang and Chan (1999) fmd in
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Taiwan. In what follows, I nevertheless test whether brideprice also affects marital
allocations by including it as an additional regressor.
3.4. Empiri~al Spe~ifi~ation and Identification
The wife's share of marital resources, .X no • resulting from the cooperative Nash
bargaining process may be written as follows:
(5)
where D is the dowry a wife brings to marriage, B is the brideprice payment made to the
bride's parents, and Z I is a vector ofdemographic and explanatory variables including
differences in the husband and wife's age and education levels, the number of children
and adults (other than the husband and wife) in the household, household wealth..
characteristics of the natal families, and marriage cohort and village dummies. Age
differences (defined as the husband's age less the wife's) and education differences
(defined analogously) may affect marital threat points. Household demographics may
affect the distribution of household chores and the opportunity to engage in work outside
the home. Household wealth (defined as the current value of household durables) may
influence consumption choices. Characteristics of the natal household are included to
control for unobserved characteristics of the conjugal couple that might correlate with
marital payments. Marriage cohort dummies are included to control for generational
differences in marital norms and the factors affecting intrahousehold decisions. These
dummies were chosen to capture observed variation over time in both marital payments
and household allocations, and vary by county. In addition, a set ofcohort or village
dummies are included to control tor sex ratios, unemployment rates, and unobserved
heterogeneity at the local level.10 Ifdowry affects the ~ife"s consumption of goods or
leisure, then PI will be positive.
Dowry and brideprice are unlikely to be exogenous in equation (5) because any
unobserved characteristic ofthe wife that affects these payments may also affect her
share ofmarital output. For example, Boulier and Rosenzweig (1984) show that physical
attractiveness affects marital allocations, and it is plausible that it might also affect the
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size of the dowry transfer. Alternatively, women with very likable personalities may
receive higher dowries from their parents and have better marital allocations than women
with disagreeable personalities. In either case, estimating equation (5) using ordinary
least squares (OLS) would produce biased and inconsistent estimates. Identification of
equation (5) therefore requires instruments that are excludable from ZI. Dowry and
brideprice may thus be estimated by:
(6) D =a 2 + ZtOl + Z28 2 + 83B +e2
B =a 3 + Z1CtJ1 + Z2CtJ2 + e3
where Z2 is a vector of instrumental variables that explain D and B but which is
independent of ...y w •
With incomplete credit markets in China's rural areas (JaJan and Ravallion,
1999), household savings are the primary source for marital payments. As a result, the
instruments employed in this analysis each retlect savings available at the time of
marriage. The first instrument is a measure of regional grain yield shocks - specifically,
the deviation from trend in provincial per capita grain yield in the year immediately
preceding marriage. Grain yield is a particularly important determinant of income (and
thus savings) in rural western China where virtually all families are engaged in grain
production, and this was even truer for the parents of the surveyed couples. The
deviations from trend are the residuals from regressing historical per capita grain yield
data in each province on a linear spline of harvest year; this identification strategy
isolates the effect of transitory output shocks that are independent of time trends in the
level ofeconomic development in each locality. Because marriage typically occurs in the
year following betrothal negotiations (Liu, 2000), grain shocks are lagged one year.
The timing ofmarriage may be endogenously determined because families may seek to
postpone entering marital negotiations until after a good harvest.. especially in the
absence ofcomplete credit markets. The willingness to wait for a good harvest may
nevertheless be tempered by cultural preferences for children marrying at certain ages. In
any even~ the groom's family is unlikely to permit delays to the wedding once a couple
is betrothed and the wedding date has been fixed. I1 I find that negative regional grain
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shocks have a small negative influence on the number of marriages in the following year~
but that the relationship is not significant (output omitted).. suggesting that current wealth
is not an overriding concern in deciding when to begin marriage negotiations.
The second instrument is the sibling sex composition of the bride and groom.
Because brideprice exceeds dowry in most areas~ the marriage ofa daughter represents
net household income while that of a son represents net household expenditures.
Moreover~ because these transfers tend to be substantial. the sex composition of children
in the household is an important determinant of the lifetime wealth profile of Chinese
families. Note that for this identification strategy to be successful.. sibling sex
composition cannot correlate with important unobservable characteristics of the
individual. To that end.. other family background factors such as parental education and
the total number of siblings are included as additional controls. I:!
Given that the sex composition of children in the household is known~ parents
may anticipate future cash flows and adjust savings in order to smooth consumption over
the lifetime. However, if preferences are time-inconsistent.. Le... if the household discount
rate is hyperbolic (Angeletos. 2001; Harris and Laibson, 2001), then the sex composition
of older children may playa larger role in determining dowry and brideprice than the sex
composition ofyounger children given that Chinese children tend to marry in birth order.
If, on the other hand, parents value future consumption more than current consumption..
the sex composition ofyounger siblings may be more important. Finally, a prominent
thought in the sociology and anthropology literatures is that while the sex composition of
the groom ~s older siblings is a primary determinant of the size of the brideprice (Parish
and Whyte, 1978; Siu.. 1993), the sex composition of the bride"s younger siblings is an
overriding determinant of the size of the dowry (Min and Eades, 1985); this scenario is
plausible because the brideprice payment is made before the dowry payment and because
the former is typically larger than the latter, and suggests that rural Chinese parents may
have difficulty smoothing consumption via savings.
Tables 3-1A and 3-18 present ftrst-stage estimates for the determinants ofdowry
and brideprice, respectively, adjusted to 1985 prices. Column 1 presents the determinants
of dowry and brideprice including exogenous shocks to grain yield as well as the sex
composition ofall siblings (suggesting time-consistent preferences with savings), column
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2 substitutes the sex composition of older siblings (suggesting hyperbolic discounting)~
column 3 substitutes the sex composition of younger siblings (suggesting patience)., and
column 4 presents the determinants of marital payments when the groom"s older siblings
affect brideprice and the bride's younger siblings affect dowry (the scenario described in
the sociology and anthropology literatures). Concurring with the observations of many
social scientists conducting fieldwork in rural China.. F-tests tor the joint significance of
the instruments show that the sex composition of the groom's older siblings and the
bride"s younger siblings are indeed strong determinants of marital payments.. and these
are the instrumental variables used in the analysis that follows. l3 Using Bassman's
(1960) test, overidentification is rejected. These instruments are therefore used in the
two-stage estimations that follow.
There are several concerns about the identification strategy that are worth noting.
First, wealth may be simultaneously determined with household allocation. However, the
only appropriate instrument available is the family's holding of high-quality flat (i.e.~
non-sloping and non-terraced) land - the preferred land for agricultural production. This
instrument is plausibly exogenous from household decisions about the wife's
consumption of goods, XlV .. but not leisure, [IV , because a household's land holding is
correlated with the time used to farm it. Wealth is therefore excluded from the empirical
specifications wherein time is the outcome of interest. For completeness, I nevertheless
included wealth as an additional regressor in these empirical specifications. I found that
the point estimate for wealth is not significant and the other coefficients are not
significantly different when it is included (output omitted).
Another concern is whether the effect ofdowry persists after years of marriage.
On the one hand, the cash component is likely to have been spent and the value of
durables will have depreciated after a number of years, suggesting that dowry becomes
less important. On the other hand, norms established early in the marriage may persist,
so the effect ofdowry on household allocations may endure. Indeed, I find that the
estimated effect ofdowry on certain aspects of a wife's welfare (such as her free time and
the time that her husband allocates to household chores) is not significantly different for
couples married for more than 10 years versus those married fewer than 10 years (output
omitted). This finding suggests that the effects ofdowry persist well into marriage. 14
S3
It should also be noted that it is possible that dowry correlates with some other
characteristic of the bride such as her social network, and that this trait is the true
determinant of her marital bargaining position. To address this particular concern, I
included measures of the bride's social network (e.g., whether family benefactors are
related to the husband or wife and which families were visited during important holidays)
as additional regressors in the empirical work that follows. I found that including these
regressors had no discernable impact on the dowry coefficients (output omitted). IS
A more general concern is whether the relationship between dowry and a wife's
consumption works through her bargaining position rather than through a wealth effect. I
thus analyze the effect of dowry on the wife's share of the couple's time allocation4 on
the household spending on assignable goods, and on the wife's decision-making authority
when the husband and wife disagree. Differences in these outcomes stemming from
differences in dowry suggest changes in the relative bargaining positions of the spouses. a
story that is inconsistent with pure wealth effects (assuming, in the case of an individuars
share of the couple's total leisure time, that any wealth etTect is gender neutral). 16 \\tbile
the evidence [ present suggests that dowry operates through a bargaining etTect, I
nevertheless cannot rule out other models that generate similar comparative statics.
3.5. Data and Variables
The second wave of the China Rural Poverty Survey, a collaborative effort of
researchers from the Chinese Academy ofAgricultural Science's Institute ofAgricultural
Economics and the University of Michigan (including the author), was conducted in
February 200 I. The survey covered four officially designated poor counties, with one
county in each of four interior provinces: Gansu, Guizhou, Shaanxi, and Sichuan. 17 The
survey encompassed 587 households evenly distributed across 40 villages.
Approximately two-thirds of the households also participated in the first wave of
the survey, conducted in December 1997.18 Excluding households whose head is
widowed, divorced, single, or absent reduces the sample to 460. I restrict the sample
further by dropping 5 households that have key variables missing and 4 households in
which marriage preceded the 1950 Marriage Law. The final sample thus consists of451
couples married between 1950 and 2000, inclusive.
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Respondents were asked detailed information about their marriages, including the
values ofdowry and brideprice. 19 Detailed demographic and time allocation data were
collected for all members of the household. Additionally, household expenditures on a
range of goods were collected. Last, a separate instrument designed to assess attitudes,
preferences~ marital roles, and decision...making authority was asked of husbands and
wives separately.
In this study, a wife's welfare within marriage is measured in the following ways:
1. the wife's total leisure (non-work) time;
2. the total time that husbands allocate to household chores;
3. the share of annual household accruing to women's goods;
4. the wife's self-reported satisfaction; and
5. the wife's decision-making authority
As noted above, dowry may have a wealth effect, a bargaining effect~ or both. Spending
on women's goods and the wife's decision-making authority help to distinguish between
these effects. To further distinguish between wealth and bargaining effects, I also
analyze the impact ofdowry on the wife"s share of the couple's total leisure time and on
the husband's share of the couple's time devoted to chores; if wealth effects are gender
neutral (admittedly, a strong assumption), then they cannot explain changes in the share
of leisure time accruing to one of the partners.
These measures may require some explanation. Leisure time is defined as the
time spent outside of market work, farm work, and household chores; although it
excludes the wife's time allocated to gathering wood, cooking meals, cleaning, and
several other chores, it may include unmeasured household activities such as time spent
rearing children, sleeping, or not working because of illness. This measure therefore
represents a wife's total potential leisure time (see Schultz, 2001 tor discussion).
Husbands' time allocated to chores is defmed as the hours spent cooking, cleaning, and
gathering fIrewood in an average week. To proxy for spending on women's goods, I use
a category ofspending called ""ge ren yongpin zhichu" (expenditures on items ofpersonal
use), of which makeup, jewelry, and razors were given as examples. Because razors are
inexpensive and durable, and thus likely contribute little to the total annual expenditure
(unlike jewelry which is expensive or makeup which is consumed quickly), I attribute
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this consumption to the wife.20 This variable is measured as a share of total household
spending. A wife's satisfaction is measured by the extent to which she agrees with the
following statement, "Overall, I am satisfied with my life." This may be of interest
because it may reflect welfare beyond the other outcomes evaluated here. It is reported
as a categorical variable with values 1 ("'completely unsatisfied"), 2 ("'somewhat
unsatisfied"), 3 ("'somewhat satisfied"), and 4 C'completely satisfied,,).21 Because few
wives reported being either '''completely unsatisfied" or "completely satistied," the
analysis will investigate only whether women report being satisfied or unsatisfied; this
bivariate measure has the advantage ofallowing IV probit estimation with corrected
standard errors. Finally, the wife's decision-making authority is an index variable for
which a value of0 is assigned if the husband is responsible, 1 is assigned if the wife is
responsible, and 0.5 is assigned if they are jointly responsible. Unlike decision-making
authority which may simply reflect household specialization strategies (Thomas et al.,
1997), this outcome measures the wife's empowerment to make decisions when there is a
household dispute, a measure that is likely influenced by bargaining position directly.
This question was asked separately of husbands and wives. In the few cases wherein the
spouses disagreed, the wife's assessment is used in the analysis.
Basic indicators tor the 451 sample households are presented in Table 3-2. On
average, women spend 5 hours per day engaged in income-generating activities and
household upkeep, leaving 19 hours per day for other activities, including leisure,
sleeping, rearing children, and other activities. The distribution of leisure between
husband and wife is roughly equal in the mean household, with women spending 4.0
percent less time in leisure than their husbands.22 Husbands spend 44 minutes per week
cooking meals, cleaning, and gathering wood on average, although roughly half of the
surveyed husbands do none of this work. The time that husbands spend helping with
household chores amounts to 17.7 percent of the total time that couples devote to these
activities, but 8.6 percent ofhusbands perform at least halfof these chores. Spending on
women's goods accounts for 0.2 percent ofannual household spending, although this
figure varies widely. Surveyed households commonly spend nothing on this form of
consumption, while one percent ofhouseholds spent 2 percent or more of their total
expenditures on women's goods. Women were split nearly evenly between feeling
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satisfied and feeling unsatisfied with their lives. The majority of women reported feeling
either ·"somewhat satisfied" or ··somewhat unsatisfied," with only 13 women at either
extreme. Finally, wives have sole decision-making authority when disputes arise in 27.0
percent of households, and shared responsibility in a further 16.0 percent of the surveyed
.
households.
Turning to the independent variables, the average couple has been married tor
19.4 years. The typical husband is 43 years old, 3 years older than his wife, and has
completed primary schooling, 3 grades more than his wife. Households include 1.4
children and 0.6 other adults (typically an elderly parent) on average. Using 1985 as the
base year, the real average household wealth as measured by the value of major durables
was 655.9 yuan. Total parental education averages 2.4 years and husbands and wives
have 3.8 and 2.7 siblings in their natal families, respectively.23
The mean real brideprice was 538 yuan (in 1985 yuan) and the mean real dowry
was 247 yuan, suggesting that the bride's family retains 54 percent of the brideprice
received on average. Practice varies widely by province. however. In Gansu, dowry
averages just 22 percent of brideprice, while average dowry exceeds brideprice by 18
percent in Sichuan (Figures 3.1A and 3.18). Further, dowry and brideprice have been
appreciating at 3.8 percent cmd 4.6 in real terms, respectively, since 1950.24 The simple
correlation between real dowry and brideprice is 0.43.
3.6. Empiri~al Results
This section analyzes the effect of dowry on the wite's total leisure (non-work)
time, the husband's time allocated to performing household chores, and the degree to
which wives self-identify as being satisfied with their lives. To help distinguish between
wealth and bargaining effects, I also analyze the effect ofdowry on the amount of money
spent on women's goods as a share of annual household spending, on the wife's share of
the couple's total leisure time and on the husband's share ofthe couple's total time
allocated to household chores, and on the wife's decision-making authority when the
spouses disagree about household issues. Per the discussion in section 3.4, I estimate the
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following fixed effects model for the effect ofdowry on the wife's allocation, X;" in
household h in village v:
(7)
x;, = a + P1Dhv + P2Bhv + P3Ahv + P~Ehv + PsJ.v'!w + P6 1V:'" + P7W
+ FhvPs + ~~A.cm +Yv +ehv
c m
where D is the dowry she received at marriage, B is the brideprice her parents received
when she was betrothed, A is the age difference between the husband and wife, E is the
difference in their education, N k is the number ofchildren in the household, iVa is the
number ofother adults in the household, ~v is the household's wealth, F is a vector of
natal family characteristics, and ;tcm is a county - marriage cohort interaction term.
Table 3-3 shows the OLS, probit, and ordered probit estimates for several
measures of the wife's allocation. Household wealth is omitted to save space, but
including wealth does not appreciably change the signs or magnitudes of the other
coefficients (output omitted). Column 1 presents OLS estimates for the wife's total
leisure time, column 2 presents those tor the husband's total time allocated to household
chores, column 3 shows OLS estimates for women's goods as a share of household
expenditures, column 4 presents the marginal effects for the probability that wives reports
being satisfied (as opposed to unsatisfied) with their lives, and column 5 presents the
marginal effects for the probability that women have some or full autonomy in making
decisions when the husband and wife disagree about household issues using ordered
probit estimation. The ··shares" measures ofhusband and wife's time allocations are
omitted to save space. County-marriage year interactions are included to control for
time and location trends in marriage payments and household responsibilities. Also,
village fixed effects are included in the fust three estimates to control for unobserved
heterogeneity at the local level. Because some survey forms were asked during a
subsequent visit to the household during which some respondents were unavailable, there
are fewer observations for the attitudinal outcomes. Due to the smaller sample size and
the fact that there exists no variation in these outcomes within some villages, county
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fixed effects supplant village fixed effects in estimating the determinants of these
.,-
measures.-;)
With the exception ofa husband's time allocated to household chores, dowry has
a positive effect on a woman's welfare within marriage. Except for intluencing a
woman's decision-making authority, these effects are also significant. Dowry has a
modest effect on a woman's leisure (non-work) time, with a 100 yuan increase (40
percent of the mean real dowry) increasing non-work time by 0.5 percent of the mean.
The effect ofdowry on the share of the household budget accruing to women's goods is
more pronounced, with a 100 yuan increase in dowry corresponding to the mean budget
share increasing by 12.6 percent. Similarly, higher dowry is associated with higher self-
reported levels of satisfaction, with a 100 yuan increase in dowry at the mean resulting in
an 8.9 percent higher probability of feeling satisfied. Again, the marginal effect of dowry
on decision-making authority is not significant.
The estimated etTects of brideprice are considerably smaller than those of dowry
(except in determining the husband's time allocated to chores, although neither of these
point estimates is signiticant) and are largely insignificant, consistent with the theory that
brideprice should not affect marital welfare except via its effect on dowry. Brideprice
has a significant, negative impact on household spending accruing to women's goods,
suggesting perhaps that families that pay higher brideprice negotiate lower consumption
for the bride, but the magnitude is less than one-third that ofdowry.
Other regressors enter largely as expected. When the difference in ages between
husband and wife are greater, the wife's leisure time declines. Simple cross-tabulations
suggest that relatively young wives do more manual labor, such as cleaning and gathering
fire\vood (output omitted). Similarly, as the gap between husband's and wite's education
increases, the likelihood that the wife is less satisfied increases. The presence ofother
adults raises both a wife's satisfaction and the share of the household spending accruing
to women's goods, which is sensible if these other adults are women. The wife's total
number ofsiblings positively affects the time that husbands allocate to chores, perhaps
because such women are used to sharing responsibility for household activities, while the
husband's parents' education and his total number ofsiblings increase a wife's decision..
making authority, perhaps because such men have more progressive attitudes or are used
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to sharing authority. Finally, the wife's parents' education has a positive effect on the
time that husbands allocate to chores for reasons are not immediately clear.
As discussed above, dowry and brideprice may reflect unobserved characteristics
of the bride and groom, and hence these estimates may be biased. For example, Boulier
and Rosenzweig (1984) have shown that physical attractiveness affects allocations within
marriage, and it is plausible that it might similarly impact the size of marital transfers.
Similarly, a bride with a nice personality may receive a higher transfer from her parents
and may also be treated well within her marriage. These unobserved positive
characteristics of the bride will bias the estimated coefficients on dowry upward. By
contrast, higher dowries may also result from unobservable negative characteristics of the
groom and/or his family. That is, the bride's family may attempt to insure against poor
treatment of their daughter in her conjugal home by influencing her bargaining
intrahousehold bargaining position via a larger dowry. In such cases, the estimated
coefficients on dowry are biased downward.26 Because the direction of the bias caused
by omitted variables is ambiguous, whether dowry and brideprice have true effects on
household allocations remains questionable.
Following the procedure described by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), I test for
the exogeneity ofdowry and brideprice. Using the residuals from regressing dowry and
brideprice on all of the exogenous variables in equations (5) and (6) as additional
regressors when estimating equation (5), I test the hypothesis that the coefficients of the
residuals are jointly zero. I fmd that the joint exogeneity ofdowry and brideprice is
rejected at the 99 percent confidence level (output omitted). Therefore, OLS is an
inconsistent estimator and estimation using a two-stage approach is warranted.
Do\vry and brideprice are instrumented using regional grain shocks in the year
preceding marriage and the sibling sex composition of the bride and groom, as detailed in
section 3-4. Because wealth may be simultaneous with household allocation decisions, I
estimate the determinants ofspending on women's goods, the wife's satisfaction~and the
wife's decision-making authority when household disputes arise with and without
controlling for wealth. When including wealth as an additional regressor, the
household's allocation ofhigh-quality, flat land is used as an instrument. However, I
lack a satisfactory instrument when the outcome of interest is related to time allocation,
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so wealth is excluded in these regressions. As noted above, including un-instrumented
wealth in these regressions nevertheless has no impact on the other estimated coefficients
(output omitted).
Table 3-4 presents two-stage least squares estimates for the detenninants of the
wife's potential leisure time, dermed as time spent outside ofwage work, farm vlork~
work in private business, and household chores. Column 1 presents estimates tor leisure
time in hours per day and column 2 presents estimates for the wife's share of the couple's
total leisure time. Increasing dowry by 100 yuan increases the wife's potential leisure
time by 44.4 minutes per day, or 3.9 percent of the mean. This effect is considerably
larger than the OLS estimate presented in Table 3-3, suggesting that dowry correlates
with unobserved negative characteristics of the groom more strongly than unobserved
positive characteristics of the bride, per the above discussion. An alternative explanation
is that dowry may be measured with considerable error. Given the cultural significance
of this transfer, the fact that survey respondents rarely had difficulty recalling exact
values, and the extent to which marital transactions are recorded in the public record,
however, I find this explanation unlikely.
As noted in section 3-2, dowry may have a wealth effect, a bargaining effect, or
both on the wife's potential leisure time. [fthere is only a wealth effect and if the wealth
effect is gender neutral, the distribution of the couple"s total leisure time should be
unaffected by changes in dowry. However, dowry is associated with an increase in the
percent of the couple"s total leisure time accruing to the wife, with her share of leisure
time increasing by 0.8 percentage points for a 100 yuan increase in dowry. Moreover,
dowry has no discemable effect on a husband's total leisure time in separate regressions
(output omitted), suggesting that a bargaining effect may offset a wealth effect associated
with dowry. Controlling for dowry, brideprice has a weakly negative impact on a wife's
leisure time, although the coefficients are not significant at the 0.10 level.
The determinants of the time that husbands allocate to cooking meals, cleaning,
and gathering wood in an average week are presented in Table 3-5, both as a level
(column 1) and as a share of the total time that the couple devotes to these activities
(column 2). For every additional 100 yuan ofdowry, husbands increase their time
allocated to chores by 28.6 minutes on average, an increase of64.4 percent. This finding
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is robust to the time spent on other household chores as well (output omitted). If dowry
operates through a wealth effect alone~ the time that husbands devote to household chores
should fall; this finding to the contrary suggests that a bargaining eftect overrides the
wealth effect. Again~ the magnitude of the effect is larger than that estimated using 0 LS.,
suggesting that the bride"s family uses dowry as a means of insuring against unobserved
negative characteristics of the groom and/or his family. Dowry also impacts the time
share of household chores performed by husbands,27 with a 100 yuan increase in dowry
resulting in an 11.2 percentage point increase in the share of household chores pertormed
by men. This tinding is also consistent with the notion that dowry has a bargaining
effect, assuming again that wealth effects are gender neutral. Larger age gaps are
associated with the husband doing a greater share of the household chores~ as is the size
of the wife~s natal family.
The determinants of women's goods as a share of household expenditures are
presented in Table 3-6. Two specifications are estimated, the tirst excluding wealth
(column 1), the second including it (column 2). The coefficient for instrumented wealth
is not significant., and including this measure does not dramatically alter the point
estimates for dowry or brideprice. Increasing dowry by 100 yuan corresponds to
increasing the expenditure share ofwomen's goods by 0.08 percentage points, or 45.6
percent of the average expenditure. Moreover, regressing the share of household
spending allocated to alcohol and tobacco (goods consumed exclusively by men in the
survey areas) on dowry and brideprice does not yield significant estimates (output
omitted). These findings provide further evidence that dowry works through a bargaining
effect. Additionally, having more adults in the household is associated with higher
spending on women's goods, presumably because some of the additional adults are
women. As before~ the magnitudes of the point estimates are smaller than those
estimated using OlS.
Table 3-7 shows the marginal effects of the determinants ofwomen's satisfaction
using IV probit estimation. Standard errors are corrected following the procedure
described in Maddala (1983) and Newey (1987). As noted above, there are fewer
observations for the attitudinal outcomes, and limited variation in some villages renders
including village flXed effects impossible. Thus, county fixed effects replace village
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fixed effects in the remaining estimations. Column 1 presents estimates when wealth is
excluded from the specification and column 2 presents those when wealth is included.
The point estimates for dowry are 22.9 percent lower when wealth is included~ providing
evidence that the wealth effect is important. Still~ the coefficient is positive and
significant even when controlling for wealth~ again suggesting that there is a bargaining
effect at play. As dowry increases by 100 yuan~ women are 12 to 16 percent more likely
to report being satisfied with their lives. Women report higher satisfaction when there
are other adults in the home~ but neither brideprice nor the other regressors has a
discemable effect on wife's satisfaction. Once again, the point estimates are larger than
those obtained from OLS estimation, supporting the notion that dowry compensates for
negative characteristics of the groom and/or his family.
Wife~s decision-making authority is an index variable that describes whether
women have no authority, complete authority, or joint authority with their husbands to
make decisions when spouses disagree about household matters. Joint decision-making
authority occurs in 16.0 percent of households and may be an important reflection of
bargaining power. Estimates from the two-stage ordered probit model are thus shown in
Table 3-8~ columns 1 and 2. Because the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix has not
been derived for this model.. however, the standard errors have not been corrected and the
z statistics that are shown are unreliable. Point estimates nevertheless suggest that a
wife~s dowry has a strong influence on her decision-making authority, and that this
finding is robust to the inclusion of household wealth, again suggesting that dowry
operates through a bargaining effect. The estimated effect of brideprice is negative, as
above, and much smaller than that of dowry.
Aggregating wives who have no decision-making authority with those who have
joint decision-making authority permits estimation ofan IV probit model with corrected
standard errors (Maddala, 1983; Newey, (987), shown in columns 3 and 4. Again, dowry
has a positive and significant impact on a wife~s decision-making authority. Controlling
for household wealth reduces the point estimate ofdowry by 20.5 percent, but the effect
remains significant. That dowry influences a wife's decision-making authority and that it
does so independently ofhousehold wealth lend further credence to the notion that dowry
affects a wife~s intrahousehold bargaining position. Neither brideprice nor wealth has a
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significant effect on a wife's decision-making authority. Finally, the point estimate for
instrumented dowry is larger than that of un-instrumented dowry, again suggesting that
dowry correlates with negative characteristics of the groom and/or his family, i.e., that
the 0 LS estimates are biased downward.
All of these results show a consistently negative (if insignificant) effect of
brideprice on a wife's welfare. If brideprice only acts as a price mechanism.. then it is
unclear why it should have any impact on marital outcomes once dowry is controlled for.
However, it appears that families who pay higher brideprices may compensate by
extracting more labor or negotiating lower consumption for brides. In the cooperative
Nash bargaining context., it is possible that this outcome is achieved by making
unmeasured, private transfers to sons in order to raise their marital threat points.. but this
hypothesis cannot be confirmed with these data.
3.7. Conclusion
Theory predicts that individual control of resources affects one's bargaining
position within marriage and thus one's allocation of marital output. While the concept
of bargaining position is straightforward., measuring it for empirical investigation has
proven difficult. Labor income., nonlabor income, and extrahousehold environmental
parameters each may suffer from simultaneity bias in the absence of strong identifying
assumptions. An interesting alternative indicator of bargaining position is individual
endowments brought to the marriage, such as dowry. However, previous studies
focusing on the impact of these transfers on welfare within marriage have not sufficiently
controlled for omitted variable bias.
In the Chinese context, brideprice serves as a market clearing price by
compensating a woman's family for human capital investments made during the
woman's childhood (Croll, 1981), for the loss of rights over her (Goody, 1973)'1 and for
the loss of her future contribution to household income (Parish and Whyte., 1978; Min
and Eades, 1995; Zhang, 2000). Dowry, on the other hand, is an intergenerational
transfer that serves primarily as a pre-mortem bequest to a daughter (Parish and Whyte,
1978; Croll, 1981). Because the wife controls dowry and because she retains this
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authority even in the event of divorce (a realistic option in rural China), dowry may serve
as a proxy for a woman's bargaining position.
This paper makes use of new data from rural China to investigate the impact of
dowry on several measures ofintrahousehold allocation in a cooperative Nash bargaining
framework. To control for the potential endogeneity of marital paYments, [ use two types
of instruments that reflect household savings available for marital paYments. The first is
regional grain shocks in the year preceding marriage. Agriculture shocks are likely to
have large effects on savings in rural communities in which credit markets are incomplete
and in which the population consists almost entirely of farmers, and thus on the ability of
households to pay dowry or brideprice. The second instrument is the sibling sex
composition of the bride and groom. Because dowry payments are generally smaller than
brideprice payments in the surveyed areas, the marriage of daughters represents net
household income while that ofsons represents net household expenditures. Hence, the
sex composition of children impacts the resources available to the family for making
marital payments. [control tor unobservable correlates of sibling sex composition by
including family characteristics as additional regressors. All estimates also include
marriage cohort dummies to control for generational norms in household allocation.
Furthermore, the empirical specifications are estimated with village fixed effects to
control for unobserved heterogeneity. This identification strategy represents a significant
improvement over previous studies in controlling effectively for potential bias from
omitted variables and simultaneity.
I find that dowry has a positive and robust impact on the wife"s leisure time, on
the amount of time that husbands allocate to performing household chores each week,
and on the probability that the wife self-identifies as being satisfied with her life. To
better discern between wealth effects and bargaining effects associated with dowry, [ also
analyze the effect ofdowry on spending on women's goods as a share of the total
household expenditures, on the wife's share of the couple's total leisure time, and on the
husband's share of the couple's time allocated to performing household chores. Dowry
has a positive and significant effect on each of these outcomes, and changes in the
distribution ofgoods and time within the household are difficult to explain ifdowry only
has a wealth effect. Finally, I investigate the effect ofdowry on a wife's decision-making
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authority when the husband and wife disagree about maners of importance to the
household. Dowry has a positive and significant effect, again suggesting that dowry
affects the wife's bargaining position.
These results provide strong empirical support for the theoretical literature linking
control ofresources to intrahousehold allocation decisions, and thus to the collective
models of the household. Based on the robustness of these findings, it is plausible that
dowry serves as a vehicle for altruistic parents to improve their daughter's marital
welfare in addition to being a pre-mortem inheritance. Better understanding the
motivation for giving dowry and the determinants ofdowry size remain priorities for
further research.
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Notes to Chapter III
I This research was generously supported by the Ford Foundation. This paper has
benefited from the insights and suggestions of David Lam, Albert Park, Jan Svejnar, and
Bob Willis. [am also grateful for helpful comments from Claudio Agostini, Axel
Anderson, Rachel Connelly, Cheryl Doss, Martin Farnham, Emma Hutchinson, Charlene
Kalenkoski, Peter Katuschek, Laura Malaguzzi, Bill Parish, Vijayendra Rao, and seminar
participants at University of Michigan Department of Economics, the University of
Michigan Population Studies Center, the 2002 NEUDC conference in Williamstown, and
the 2002 RAND Economic Demography Workshop.
2 A more general model assumes only that household members allocate resources in a
Pareto efficient manner (Chiappori, 1988; Chiappori, 1992).
3 Nevertheless, Schultz (2001) points out that there is a dearth of studies that
systematically establish simultaneity bias between nonlabor income and household
outcomes.
4 Lundberg and Pollack (1993) have shown that that the central predictions of the
collective models of household behavior hold even when divorce is precluded in that
couples may revert a noncooperative Nash equilibrium within marriage, Le., the ·"separate
spheres" solution.
; The solution to this game is characterized by Pareto optimality in the allocation of
resources, invariance with respect to linear transformations of each player's utility
function, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Manser and Brown (1980) discuss
these implications.
6 Marriages that are arranged by the bride and groom themselves are increasingly
common throughout China (Cheng, 1992). Interestingly, brideprice and dowry are paid
even in the majority of these marriages (Parish and Whyte, 1978).
7 It may be surprising that brideprice serves as the market clearing mechanism (as
opposed to an analogous transfer from the bride's family to the groom's) because
population growth and sex differences in age of marriage imply that the number of
women exceeds the number ofmen in each marriage cohort (Rao, 1993 investigates a
similar phenomenon in India). Possible explanations are that the benefits of marriage
accrue disproportionately to husbands, that divorced men remarry while divorced women
do not, or that there is greater male vis-A-vis female heterogeneity (Edlund, 1996). This
puzzle remains an issue for further investigation in China.
8 An alternative practice sometimes observed is the ·"exchange marriage" in which a sister
of the groom marries a brother of the bride in lieu of formal brideprice. These marriages
also tend to have lower dowries (Selden, 1993).
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9 For comparative purposes, the equivalent rate in the U.S. was 4.2 divorces per 1000
population in 1998 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention~ 1999).
10 Ideally, dummies for the bride's and groom's home villages would both be used, but
the former are not available in this survey. Still, marriages typically occur between
households in neighboring villages or towns, and only rarely across long distances.
Therefore, conditions in the two natal villages are likely to be similar.
11 The groom's family is expected to give elaborate and expensive gifts to the bride's
family during the length of the engagement, and a postponement increases the family's
expenses (Yan~ 1996). In addition, the bride will contribute to the groom's family's
income, so there is an opportunity cost associated with delaying marriage.
12 If unobservables remain important after controlling for family characteristics, they
might affect outcomes such as education in the same way that they affect marital
allocation. [thus regressed the wife's education on family characteristics, birth year,
province dummies, and sibling sex composition. I find that sibling sex composition does
not have a signiticant effect on a \\'ife' s education.
13 I tried a variety of other instruments as well, including parent occupational status,
historical data on land affected by natural disaster, and historical local grain yield data.
However, none of these measures explains as much variation in dowry or brideprice as
regional grain yield shocks and the sibling sex composition of the bride and groom.
There is low variation in parent occupation, with only 1.7 percent ofhouseholds not
having at least one farmer. Historical natural disaster data has strong predictive power,
but is unavailable for 1967-1977. Like disaster data, local grain yield is unavailable for
several years; moreover, this variable has surprisingly little predictive power even when
it is available. Indeed, even including these variables as additional instruments lowers
the adjusted R2 in the first stage. A related issue is that wealthier households may be able
to smooth consumption and thus be better insulated against income shocks (Foster, 1995
provides evidence for Bangladesh). In my sample, however, interacting the instruments
with parent characteristics such as education and occupation provides no additional
explanatory power.
14 Future \vork will extend the analysis to account for dynamic bargaining models of the
household such as that described by Lich-Tyler, 2001.
15 The relative strength of the wife's social network was associated with each measure of
wife's welfare, but never signitlcantly so. Exploring this issue may be of interest for
further study.
16 Ifhowever, the wealth effect is not gender neutral, then wealth effects and bargaining
effects are indistinguishable when looking at the shares of leisure accruing to each
spouse. It is also possible that wife's leisure is a luxury good desired by both spouses. If
so, then the wealth effect and bargaining effect may again be indistinguishable.
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17 The sampled county in Guizhou is a designated minority county with sizable Miao and
Yi populations, but 80 percent of the sampled households in Guizhou are ethnic Han
Chinese, making it difficult to distinguish differences between minority and non-minority
households.
18 Park and Ren (2001) and Brown and Park (2002) describe the first wave of the China
Rural Poverty Survey.
19 Detailed records of marital transactions are generally kept as part of the public record.
When questioned, few respondents had difficulty recalling the exact amounts of their
brideprice and dowry - or that of their siblings, children, or neighbors. Marital prices
were converted to real values using 1985 as the base year. For marriages occurring prior
to 1985, prices were converted using the general retail price index, which was first
calculated in 1950. For marriages occurring after the mid-1980s, prices were converted
using the rural consumer price index, a more accurate retlection of rural prices that was
introduced in 1985.
20 This interpretation is clearly problematic if many male goods are included in this
expenditure category, but the results detailed below are difficult to explain if this is the
case. In addition, similar (but slightly weaker) results are obtained when using the share
ofexpenditures spent on children's clothing as the outcome variable of interest. This
result is consistent with higher female bargaining power resulting in improved conditions
for children, a common finding in the household bargaining literature, e.g., Thomas
( 1990).
21 Importantly, data on the wite's satisfaction were collected when husbands and
members of his natal family were not present.
22 Again, this measure excludes child rearing. The wife·s share of leisure time may be
misleading ifwives spend more time caring for children than their husbands.
23 Average family size in these areas fell considerably after the One Child Policy was
adopted fonnally in 1979.
24 Regressing do\vry on marriage year yields highly significant., positive coefficients in
each province. Regressing brideprice on marriage year produces highly significant,
positive coefficients for Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu. The effect in Guizhou is positive
but not significant.
25 The difference in the sample size reported in columns 4 and 5 is attributable to the fact
that there is no variation in wife's decision-making authority among the households in
one marriage cohort in one county.
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26 It has been pointed out that negative aspects of the bride may also prompt a larger
dowry in some cultures~ but this may be less likely in the Chinese context because dowry
is assignable and exclusive to the bride.
27 Men are reported as doing all of these chores in 5 percent of the sampled households.
One explanation is that husbands do all of the household chores when wives are
chronically sick. Health infonnation including the frequency and duration of sickness is
available for two-thirds of these households. In this subsample., the wife self-reported no
sickness in the previous year in 47 percent of households. Only one woman reported
being sick for more than a month~ and none reported being sick for more than 5 weeks.
An altemative hypothesis is that men specialize in perfonning these chores in some
households. Dropping these households from the sample reduces the point estimate by
23 percent and the effect remains significant.
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Figure 3-1A. Mean Value of Marital Transactions (Sichuan and Guizhou)
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Figure 3-1B. Mean Value or Marital Transactions (Gansu and Shaanxi)
Marital Transactions Over Time in Sbaanxi Province
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Table 3-1A: Determinants of Dowry (OLS)
Variable Unit (1) (2) (3) (4)
grain shock 1 year betbre marriage kg/person 1.628--- 1.715"·· 1.703·_· 1.709···
(2.66) (2.78) (2.79) (2.81)
sex composition ofwife's sibs difference 24.442*·-
(2.70)
sex composition ofhusband's sibs difference 8.328
( 1.10)
sex comp of wife's older sibs difference 2.964
(0.27)
sex comp of husband's older sibs difference 18.421* 15.494
( 1.77) (LSI )
sex comp of wife's younger sibs difference 37.437··- 35.872·_·
(3.09) (2.96)
sex camp of husband's younger sibs difference -0.373
(0.04)
age difference years -7.032 -7.983· -7.649· -7.378
( 1.54) ( 1.75) ( 1.67) ( 1.63)
education difference grades -3.905 -3.919 -2.833 -3.408
( 1.00) ( 1.00) (0.73) (0.88)
children in home ;# 32.150*· 33.221·· 31.656·· 30.797··
(223) (229) (2.20) (2.15)
other adults in home # -2.167 -0.564 -1.260 -2.534
(0.13) (0.03) (0.07) (0.15)
wife's parents' ed years 5.748 17.450· 15.512 15.384
(0.51) ( 1.79) ( 1.41) ( 1.41)
husband's parents' ed years 17.238 19.647* 4.327 4.566
( 1.58) ( 1.90) (0.43) (0.45)
wife's total siblings # 0.752 -0.944 2.045 0.886
(0.09) (0.11) (0.24) (0.10)
husband·s total siblings ;# 2.945 2.933 3.109 3.145
(0.34) (0.33) (0.36) (0.36)
Constant 240.315··- 235.443--- 241.273·_· 247.216*·-
(3.66) (3.55) (3.68) (3.78)
Village FE yes yes yes yes
County FE
Observations 451 451 451 451
R-squared 0.296 0.286 0297 0.301
F(3. 392) instruments jointly equal 0 5.59 3.58 5.76 6.56
Prob> F 0.0009 0.014 0.0007 0.0002
Village fixed effects implemented
County - Marriage Cohort interactions included
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
• significant at 10%; •• significant at 5%; ••• significant at 1%
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Table 3-18: Determinants of Brideprice (OLS)
Variable Unit (I) (2) (3) (4)
grain shock 1 year before marriage kg/person 1.883 2.118 2.115 2.042
( 1.43) (1.63) ( 1.60) ( 1.57)
sex composition of wife's sibs difference 3'" ""''''*.)._.).)
( 1.70)
sex composition of husband's sibs difference 22.322
(1.37)
sex comp of wife's older sibs difference 25.663
( 1.12)
sex comp of husband's older sibs difference 85.894*** 81.598**·
(3.92) (3.74)
sex comp of wife's younger sibs difference 25.548 16.223
(0.98) (0.63)
sex comp of husband's younger sibs difference -36.074*
( 1.67)
age difference years -8.568 -9.220 -13.218 -9.542
(0.87) (0.96) ( 1.34) (0.99)
education difference grades 12.569 10.377 14.454* 11.215
( 1.50) (1.25) (1.73) ( 1.35)
children in home # 58.892* 58.406* 62.584** 56.734·
( 1.90) (1.91 ) (2.01 ) ( 1.85)
other adults in home OJ. -8.927 -10.471 0.326 -10.293IT
(0.24) (0.29) (0.01) (0.29)
wife's parents' ed years -16.087 -14.528 -6.331 -16.382
(0.74) (0.63) (0.71) (0.70)
husband's parents' ed years -16.407 0.043 -16.868 -6.433
(0.70) (0.00) (0.29) (0.30)
wife's total siblings # 5.852 -1.690 10.366 2.097
(0.32) (0.09) (0.57) (0.12)
husband's total siblings # 4.717 4.377 6.263 5.396
(0.25) (0.24) (0.33) (0.29)
Constant 550.746*** 574.593*·· 527.010**· 565.251*·*
(3.90) (4.11 ) (3.72) (4.04)
Village FE yes yes yes yes
County FE
Observations 451 451 451 451
R-squared 0.426 0.441 0.424 0.440
F(3, 392) instruments jointly equal 0 2.51 6.05 2.00 5.74
Prob> F 0.0583 0.0005 0.1141 0.0007
Village fixed effects implemented
County • Marriage Cohort interactions included
Absolute value oft statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; •• significant at 5%; *.* significant at 10/0
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Table 3-2. Variables and Summary Statistics
Variable Unit Mean Std. Min Max
Dev.
wife's leisure (non- hours per day 19.02 2.57 11.51 24
work) time
wife's share ofcouple's % ofcouple's total leisure time 48.00% 3.820/0 33.02% 58.34%
total leisure (non-work)
time
husband's time allocated hours per week 0.74 1.41 0 15
to chores
husband's share of % ofcouple's total time devoted to 17.73% 27.13°/0 00/0 100%
couple's time allocated chores
to chores
share of household % ofannual household spending 0.19% 0.38% 0% 2.01%
spending accruing to
women's goods
wife's satistaction 1 ;;:; completely unsatisfied, 2 ;;:; 2.60 0.57
somewhat unsatisfied. 3 ;;:; somewhat
satisfied, 4 ;;:; completely sa~isfied
wife's decision-making o;;:; husband makes decisions. 0.5 ;;:; 0.35 0.43 0
authority both make decisions, 1""Wife makes
decisions
dowry yuan. 1985 real value 247.12 313.79 0 2044
brideprice yuan. 1985 real value 537.89 748.19 0 7493
wealth value ofdurables. 1985 real yuan 653.90 80629 0 7297
length of marriage years 19.38 10.80 I 51
husband's age years 43.18 10.79 ..,~ 74_.J
wife's age years 40.45 10.38 21 70
age difference husband's age - wife's age 2.73 3.24 -7 16
husband's education grades completed 6.14 3.80 0 16
wife's education grades completed 2.90 3.47 0 14
education difference husband's ed - wife's ed 3.24 3.75 -12 12
children in home # 1.43 1.14 0 5
other adults in home # 0.64 0.91 0 4
wife's parents' education total years 2.38 4.01 0 24
husband's parents' ed total years 2.36 3.70 0 24
wife's total siblings .. 3.84 1.74 0 III't
husband's total siblings .. 3.70 1.74 0 8I't
Sichuan province dummy 1).24 0.43
Guizhou province dummy 0.30 0.46
Shaan.xi province dummy 0"'''' 0.42_.J
Gansu province dummy 0.23 0.42
grain shock 1 year deviation from time trend. in -1.65 27.86 -90.82 64.01
before marriage kg/person
wife's sibling sex difference in #s ofyounger sisters -0.21 1.38 -4 4
composition and brothers
husband's sibling sex difference in #s ofolder sisters and 0.11 1.41 -6 6
composition brothers
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Table 3-3. Non-Instrumented Estimates (OLS and Probit)
1: wife's leisure (non-work) time (OLS)
2: husband's time allocated to chores (OLS)
3: share ofhousehold spending accruing to women's goods (OLS)
-I: wife's satisfaction (probit)
5: wife's decision-making authority (ordered probit)
Variable Unit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dowry 100 0.10376** -0.01172 0.00024*** 0.08851·** 0.02234
yuan
(2.24) (0.43) (3.46) (5.59) ( 1.30)
brideprice 100 -0.02539 -0.01144 -0.00007·· 0.00263 0.01352
yuan
( 1.16) (0.90) (2.32) (0.43) ( 1.50)
age difference years -0.08083*· 0.02182 -0.00000 -0.00227 0.00056
(2.11 ) (0.98) (0.05) (0.23) (0.03)
education difference grades -0.03858 0.01324 -0.00006 -0.01546* 0.00368
( 1.18) (0.69) ( 1.32) ( 1.70) (0.24)
children in home # 0.07411 0.02665 -0.00025 0.01530 -0.03103
(0.61 ) (0.38) ( 1.44) (0.45) (0.38)
other adults in home # 0.14579 -0.11921 0.00048·* 0.09041·** 0.11499
( 1.03) (1.44) (2.29) (2.63) ( 1.53)
wife's parents' ed years 0.06429 0.11730*** 0.00003 -0.01893 0.02796
(0.83) (2.61 ) (0.26) ( 1.10) ( 1.00)
husband's parents' years 0.02941 0.02935 0.00011 0.01853 0.05837**
ed
(0.32) (0.55) (0.85) (0.89) (2.14)
wife's total siblings # 0.00742 0.09580*· -0.00002 -0.00952 0.01449
(0.10) (2.31 ) (0.17) (0.46) (0.49)
husband's total sibs # -0.06223 0.01293 -0.00007 0.01569 0.07524*·
(0.85) (0.30) (0.62) (0.82) (2.08)
Constant 20.31254*·· 028503 0.00126
(15.49) (0.37) (0.65)
Village FE yes yes yes
County FE yes yes
Observations 451 451 451 290 284
R-squared 0255 0.155 0283
County • Marriage Cohon interactions included
Absolute value of robust t or z statistics in parentheses
Errors are assumed to be clustered by village when county fixed effects are implemented
• significant at 10%; •• significant at 5%; ••• significant at 1%
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Table 3-4. Wife's Time AUocation (IV OLS)
1: wife's daily leisure (non-work) time
2: wife'S share ofcouple's total daily leisure (non-work) time
Variable Unit (l) (2)
dowry 100 yuan 0.74092** 0.00772*
(2.22) (l.75)
brideprice 100 yuan -0.27232 -0.00208
( 1.63) (0.94)
age difference years -0.05477 -0.00025
( 1.06) (0.36)
education difference grades 0.01607 0.00032
(0.31) (0.47)
children in home # -0.00887 -0.0005 I
(0.05) (0.21)
other adults in home # 0.13337 -0.00063
(0.75) (0.27)
wife's parents' ed years -0.04456 -0.00049
(0.40) (0.33)
husband's parents' ed years -0.14026 -0.00205
(0.97) ( 1.07)
wife's total siblings # 0.01996 -0.00026
(0.22) (0.22)
husband's total siblings # -0.07392 -0.00070
(0.80) (0.58)
Constant 17.60930*** 0.44572***
(9.13) (17.44)
Village FE yes yes
County FE
Observations 451 451
County • Marriage Cohort interactions included
Absolute value oft statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3-5. Husband's Time AUoeation (IV OLS)
I : husband's weekly time allocated to chores
2: husband's share ofcouple's total weekly time allocated to chores
Variable Unit (l) (2)
dowry 100 yuan 0.47691** 0.11173**
(227) (2.41)
brideprice 100 yuan -0.11662 -0.02934
(1.11) (127)
age difference years 0.05154 0.01309*
(1.58) ( 1.82)
education difference grades 0.04329 0.01053
(1.33) ( 1.47)
children in home # -0.09568 -0.02296
(0.85) (0.92)
other adults in home # -0.12680 -0.01503
(1.13) (0.61)
wife's parents' ed years 0.03348 -0.01909
(OA8) ( 1.23)
husband's parents' ed years -0.09314 -0.02024
( 1.03) (1.01)
wife's total siblings # 0.09908- 0.01403
(1.75) (1.13)
husband's total siblings .. -0.00180 -0.01509
"' (0.03) ( 1.18)
Constant -1.46965 -0.27327
( 1.21) ( 1.02)
Village FE yes yes
County FE
Observations 451 451
County .. Marriage Cohort interactions included
Absolute value oft statistics in parentheses
.. significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ...... significant at 1%
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Table 3-6. Share of Household Spending Accruing to Women's Goods (IV OLS)
Variable Unit (1) (2)
dowry 100 yuan 0.00081* 0.00074*
( 1.85) (1.67)
brideprice 100 yuan -0.00035 -0.00034
(1.60) (1.56)
age difference years 0.00001 0.00003
(0.21) (0.38)
education difference grades -0.00001 -0.00000
(0.10) (0.05)
children in home .. -0.00029 -0.00028..,.
( 1.24) (1.21)
other adults in home .. 0.00046** 0.00035..,.
( 1.98) (0.89)
wife's parents' ed years -0.00007 -0.00009
(0.47) (0.55)
husband's parents' ed years -0.00004 -0.00007
(0.23) (0.33)
wife's total siblings # -0.00000 -0.00001
(0.02) (0.07)
husband's total siblings .. -0.00007 -0.00009..,.
(0.61) (0.71 )
household wealth 100 yuan 0.00002
(0.38)
Constant -0.00154 -0.00175
(0.61) (0.66)
Village FE yes yes
County FE
Observations 451 451
County * Marriage Cohort interactions included
Absolute value oft statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; **. significant at 1%
84
Table 3-7. Wife's Satisfaction (IV Probit)
Variable Unit (1) (2)
dowry 100 yuan 0.16087** 0.12371 *
(2.23) (1.73)
brideprice 100 yuan 0.00823 0.01649
(0.26) (0.48)
age difference years 0.00947 0.00896
(0.69) (0.66)
education difference grades -0.01546 -0.01420
(1.44) (1.25)
children in home # -0.02719 -0.01917
(0.53) (0.39)
other adults in home # 0.09032** 0.07068
(2.23) (1.29)
wife's parents' ed years -0.03548 -0.03355
( 1.35) (1.29)
husband's parents' ed years -0.00195 0.00006
(0.06) (0.00)
wife's total siblings # -0.00946 -0.01621
(0.43) (0.66)
husband's total siblings # 0.01521 0.01568
(0.70) (0.71 )
household wealth. yuan 100 yuan 0.00531
(0.58)
Village FE
County FE yes yes
Observations 290 290
Marginal effects shown
County • Marriage Cohort interactions included
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
• significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ••• significant at 1%
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Table 3-8. Wife's Decision-Making Authority (IV Ordered Probit and IV Probit)
1 & 2: IV Ordered Probit Estimation
3 & 4: IV Probit Estimation
Variable Unit (1) (2) (3) (4)
dowry 100 yuan 0.40227*'n 0.41359*** 0.15732** 0.12514*
(2.55) (2.54) (2.03) (1.66)
brideprice 100 yuan .Q.0929I -0.09850 -0.03656 -0.02666
(0.96) (0.99) (0.94) (0.69)
age difference years 0.02879 0.02466 0.01023 0.01078
(1.22) (0.95) (0.63) (0.70)
education difference grades 0.02467 0.02416 0.00930 0.01233
(1.56) (l.51) (0.73) (0.92)
children in home # -0.11180 -0.10539 -0.05196 -0.04510
(1.23) ( 1.12) (0.92) (0.85)
other adults in home # 0.07585 0.10048 0.05779 0.02890
(1.02) (0.77) (1.22) (0.44)
wife's parents' ed years -0.03288 -0.02988 -0.01948 -0.02157
(0.82) (0.73) (0.73) (0.83)
husband's parents' ed years -0.04052 -0.03417 -0.04121 -0.04517
(1.14) (0.75) (1.25) (1.37)
wife's total siblings # 0.02638 0.02647 0.01525 0.00639
(0.81) (0.81) (0.59) (0.23)
husband's total siblings # 0.05520 0.05940 0.02624 0.02396
(1.39) ( 1.27) (1.04) (0.99)
wealth 100 yuan 0.00465 0.00645
(0.26) (0.61 )
Village FE
County FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 293 293 284 284
Marginal effects shown
County * Marriage Cohon interactions included
Absolute value of robust z statistics in parentheses
Standard errors are not corrected for IV ordered probit
• significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 10/0
CHAPTER IV
PARENTAL EDUCATION AND CHILD LEARNING:
INVESTING IN GOODS AND TIME l
4.1. Introduction
The landmark study of race and education in the United States known as the
··Coleman Report" (United States National Center for Educational Statistics., 1966)
reported that family characteristics are more important determinants of educational
achievement than school quality or teacher experience., particularly in the early stages of
schooling. From this result sprang two prominent lines of academic inquiry. The tirst
focuses on so-called ··education production functions'" (see Judd., Bridge., and Moock.,
1979 and Hanushek., 1997 tor reviews), with an eye toward cost-benefit analyses of
various investments in teachers and schools. These studies often pay little attention to
family background variables., treating them as exogenous control variables. The second
line of inquiry seeks to promote social policies that foster student achievement by
studying why family background has such a pronounced effect on children's acquisition
of human capital. In these studies, parental education has repeatedly been shown to
strongly influence children"s educational outcomes. These relationships are generally
found to be robust to the inclusion ofvarious household, school, and community-level
characteristics, suggesting that parental education has a real effect on child human capital
acquisition (Strauss and Thomas, 1995). Moreover, the effect of parental education on
children's schooling has been shown to differ for men and women (Lillard and Willis,
1994; Sathar and Lloyd, 1994; Thomas, 1994).
The majority ofthe research on the relationship between parental education and
child educational outcomes focuses on the duration ofchild schooling as the sole or
primary outcome measure (e.g., Rumberger, 1983; Strauss, 1990; Parish and Willis,
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1993; Lillard and Willis~ 1994; Padill~ 1996; Paraita and Pastor~ 2000; Heltberg and
Johannesen~ 2002). Fewer studies have analyzed the relationship between parental
education and children's actual learning as measured by test scores. Behrman~ Khan,
Ross~ and Sabot (1997) control for household income, teacher quality, and school
resources to find that rural Pakistani children whose fathers completed junior secondary
school score 31 percent higher on reading tests and 29 percent higher on mathematics
tests than children whose fathers did not. Case and Deaton (1999) find that the head of
household's education has a strong effect on both literacy and numeracy scores among
black South African high school students after controlling for school characteristics.
Glewwe and Jacoby (1994) find a strong relationship between mother's education and
both mathematics and reading test scores (but no discemable relationship bet\veen
father's education and test scores) using matched household-school data from Ghana.
Yet the reasons underlying these robust results are not well understood. One
possibility often noted in the literature is that more educated parents may make greater
investments in their children's human capital accumulation (Strauss and Thomas, 1995).
That is~ parents may influence learning outcomes via the purchase of goods that
complement educational attainment and via time spent interacting with children (Figure
4-1). In resource-constrained households in areas with incomplete credit markets,
however~ parents face a trade-off between these investment choices. First, more educated
parents may have higher wages and thus may be better able to afford goods~ which
facilitate learning. However, higher wages imply a higher opportunity cost of time spent
outside the workplace~ and these parents may substitute time spent interacting with
children in order to provide more labor. Second~ the returns to interacting with children
may be higher for more educated parents. As a result.. more educated parents may choose
to spend more time helping their children with homework at the cost of forgoing some
wages which could be used to purchase goods. Third~ more educated parents may
provide higher levels of both goods and time if they have different preferences for
education than less educated parents or iftheir children have higher returns to schooling
(Lam and Schoeni, 1993). How parents choose to invest in children's human capital is
thus an empirical question.
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Due to data limitations, however, few studies have analyzed how parental
education affects investments in children's learning. Behrman, Foster, Rosenzweig, and
Vashishta (1999) analyze how mother's education impacts parental time allocation using
household data from India. Controlling tor workforce participation, they find that literate
mothers spend more time than illiterate mothers on "home care," which includes time
devoted to childcare, cooking, and cleaning. Sathar and Lloyd (1994) investigate the
impact of parental education on educational expenditures using survey data from
Pakistan., and show that spending on urban children whose mothers attended school is 60
to 75 percent higher than that of urban children whose mothers never attended school.
Using a unique survey of children., their families, and their schools in 100 rural
villages in Gansu province., China., this study examines how parental education impacts
the provision of two specific types of investment in children's learning - parental time
and education-related goods - paying careful attention to the different effects of mother's
and father's education on sons., and daughters' learning. This study also analyzes the
extent to which these investments ·'explain" the relationship between parental education
and child learning by comparing the estimated impact of parental education on children's
test scores with and without controls for investments. Under certain assumptions, the
difference in the estimated effects may be interpreted as the share of the effect of parental
education attributable to a given investment. If it is indeed tound that investments in
goods and time are important means by which more educated parents atfect the education
of their children, then policymakers may consider adopting policies that encourage these
investments among less educated parents as well. If, on the other hand., investments
explain little of the relationship between parental education and children's schooling,
then other pathways of influence should receive further empirical attention.
The detailed data used in this work afford several innovations. First, these data
capture better measures of investments than elsewhere in the literature. The number of
hours that parents spend helping their children with homework each week, whether
parents read to their children, and whether parents discuss their children's school
performance with teachers measure parental investments in time used in children's
hwnan capital production. Non-required education-related expenditures, whether the
household owns children's books, and whether the household has a designated area for
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children~s studying capture goods inputs. Second~ detailed household, teacher, school,
and village data - all linked to the sampled child - help to control for unobservables to
better isolate the effects of parental education. Finally, these data go well beyond the
scope of most empirical studies ofChinese education, which typically rely on large data
sets with limited information.
I find that more educated parents allocate higher levels of both goods and time to
their children's human capital accumulation. For example, an additional grade completed
by fathers increases the probability that parents read to the sampled child by between 0.7
percent and 1.3 percent, while an additional grade completed by mothers increases this
probability by 2.1 percent to 3.1 percent. There is evidence that more educated parents
expect higher returns to education for their children, offering one reason why parents in
resource-constrained households make greater investments in both goods and time. I also
lind that parental education has a strong, positive effect on children's test scores, and that
controlling for investments in goods and time reduces the estimated effects of parental
education on children's learning. For example, an additional year of mother's education
raises daughters' Chinese test scores by 0.019 standard deviations. Controlling for
whether parents read to the sampled child reduces the point estimate to 0.14 standard
deviations, a reduction of28.5 percent. Although the estimates may be susceptible to
endogeneity bias, I show that more educated parents make larger investments in their
children's human capital accumulation in rural China, and that these investments are an
important mechanism - though certainly not the only mechanism - by which parental
education affects children's learning.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 4.2 develops a model
for the demand for goods and time used in children's human capital production and
derives predictions for household behavior; section 4.3 provides an overview ofChina's
rural education system; section 4.4 describes the empirical strategy and discusses some
identification issues; section 4.5 introduces the data and variables; the demand for
investments in goods and time used in children's human capital production is analyzed in
section 4.6; section 4.7 explores the extent to which these investments may be used to
explain the relationship benveen parental education and child learning; and section 4.8
concludes.
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4.2. Tbeoreticallssues
This paper is primarily concerned with two questions. First't do more educated
parents make greater monetary (goods) investments in their children'ts schooling, greater
time investments in their children's schooling, or greater investments in both goods and
time? Second, to what extent do these investments explain the robust relationship
between parental education and children's learning reported in the literature? The latter
question is purely empirical, but theoretical predictions may be made for the former.
Consider a two-period model in which each household consists of two parents
with identical preferences:! and n children. The household seeks to maximize a utility
function, u, comprised ofconsumption in the tirst period (C l ) and consumption in the
second period (C 2 ). That is't lI(C I ,C2 ), where u is assumed to be strictly concave in
each argument. Second period consumption by parents is derived from children sharing
with them according to a sharing rule, 8" that may differ by individual child.3 Parents
derive utility from their children's consumption according to an altruism function, ;, 't
that may differ by individual child (5, ), by child sex, and by parental education ( H). i.e.'t
~, =;, (5" H). The utility function is assumed to be additively separable in each
argument:
(1)
n
U =~(CI)+(1-;)L[8, +(1-8, );,(S,H)}I(C2 )
,=1
where t/J is the household's preference for frrst period consumption.. ; E [0,1], and
8, E [0,1].
The resources available to children to support parents in period 2 are derived from
human capital acquired in period I according to production function g. This production
function may be written:
(2)
n
C 2 = Lg,(x"8"A"Q,, V, Y; H)
,=1
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where x, is parental investments in education-related goods (e.g., supplementary
textbooks, school supplies, a desk or table for studying, and private tutoring) for child i.
Notably, while some of these inputs are exclusive to child i (e.g., private tutoring), others
are not (e.g., a table used for studying), suggesting that the returns to certain investments
may rise with the number ofchildren in the household. 0, is parental investments in
education-related time inputs (e.g., time spent helping children with homework) tor child
i, A, is the innate cognitive ability of child i, Q, is a vector ofcharacteristics describing
child r s teacher, and V is a vector of school and community characteristics. Household
wealth ( Y) may also affect learning via the provision of complementary goods that have
consumption value beyond the production ofchildren's human capital (e.g., nutritious
food and electric lighting). Figure 4-1 shows the relationships among these inputs. [t is
assumed that g is quasiconcave in each argument, although the cross-partials are of
indeterminate sign. For example, if supplemental textbooks are more useful with parental
assistance, then the two investments are complements in the production of children's
human capital. Alternatively, if textbooks replicate the effect of parents helping children
Yiith homework, goods and time are substitutes in the production process.
Parental education is an exogenous parameter that may affect the choice and level
of investments. First, higher parental education may result in higher wages which parents
use to purchase goods tor children's human capital investment, i.e., a substitution effect
may dominate. Second, higher parental education may increase the efficiency or
effectiveness of the time spent helping children with homework, i.e., an income effect
may dominate. Third, higher parental education may increase the expected returns to
children's education; this is plausible in the developing country context because off-farm
opportunities are often limited in rural areas, and more educated parents may be in better
positions to use professional and social networks to secure such employment tor their
children. Fourth, higher parental education may result in increased demand for children's
education via the utility function because more educated parents are more altruistic or
because part of the returns to children's education accrue to parents, e.g., via caring for
elderly parents.
The household's problem may be written:
max
(". ,:c. ,8, •... ,x" .8"
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n
1I = ;U(CI ) + (1-¢)L[O, +(1-0,);,(S,H)p(C 2 )
,=1
(3)
n
s.t. C 2 = Lg,(X"O"A"Q" V,Y;H)
,=1
pCCI + Px s y
fV +0 =T
cu(H)W = Y
where pC , the price of consumption goods, is normalized to 1. P is the price of goods
used in human capital production, (JJ is a function describing the opportunity cost of
parent's time, Le., the wage received for labor or the shadow value of time spent in home
or fann production, and W is the number of hours worked out of total time T. The budget
constraint is assumed to bind to preserve efficiency. There is no leisure in this simple
model; all hours not spent working are devoted to children's human capital production.
Further, the opportunity cost of time is assumed to be independent of the number of hours
worked, precluding benefits to experience or on-the-job training.
Solving equation (3) yields the tbllowing first order conditions:
(4)
(RIel - A =0
(1- fS)[o, +(1- 8,)0', Pc! g,. - PA = 0
(1- fS)[c:5, + (1- 8, )0', Pc! g'lI - AltJ = 0
where A. is the shadow value ofmoney and arguments have been suppressed. Optimal
investments in human capital for child i occur when g; =: .Le.• \vhen the marginal
product ofmonetary investment in child r s human capital per yuan spent equals the
marginal product of time allocated to child i's human capital development divided by its
implicit cost, the wage foregone by not working. Furthermore,
[0, +(1-8,);,]g,.~ =[8) +(1-8)~J]g).~ and [8, +(1-c:5,)~/]g'l/ =[8) +(l-c5J)~)]gJ8'
i * j. That is, the marginal return for a given type of investment is equal for each child
in the household. Finally, the marginal utility ofadditional spending on current
consumption equals the marginal utility per yuan spent investing in children's human
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.. (1-;)[8, +(1-8,)~'~C2gr . .
capitaL. l.e.~ lIc.• = p TT • At the optunal allocatlon~ then~ the head
of household is indifferent between consuming an additional yuan worth of consumption
goods~ buying an additional yuan worth of education-related goods tor any child in the
household~ and forgoing the time it takes to earn one yuan to spend that time helping a
child to acquire human capital.
To derive theoretical predictions about how investments in children's education
change with parental education~ the nature of the relationship between parental education
and child learning must be known. That is~ does parental education affect wages (case l)~
the effectiveness of time spent helping children with homework (case 2), the perceived
returns to education (case 3), the nature of the household utility function (case 4). or
some combination of these? Also critical for deriving theoretical predictions are
assumptions made about the complementarity ofgoods and time in the human capital
production process. Specifically~ if goods and time are complements in the human
capital production process~ then more educated parents may choose a different strategy
for investing in their children. To illustrate this point simply~ [ derive the comparative
statics for each of the above four scenarios first by assuming that production is
quasilinear in (} {which does not allow for complementarity in goods and time)~4 then by
assuming that the production function is Cobb-Douglas (allo\\ling for complementarity).
I suppose that the household has only one child~ that utility is log separable, Le., that
u(C I ,C2 ) = rp logC I + (1-;)[8 + (l-o)~]logC2 , and that only investments in education-
related goods and time enter the human capital production function. Appendix 4-1
derives the comparative statics fonnally and Table 4-1 summarizes the findings.
Suppose that parental education enters the wage function ( (J) ). but neither the
human capital production function nor the altruism function (case 1), and that the human
capital production function is quasilinear in (} with g(x~f) = Xli + ().; Here:
(Sa) dB/dH <0
dxldH>O
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That is~ more educated parents increase the provision ofeducation-related goods while
reducing time spent in education-related activities. It: instead~ goods and time are
complementary investments in a Cobb-Douglas production function~ i.e.~ if
g(x,O) = x"O(l-u, ~ then:
(5b) d(}/dH =0
d"CldH >0
Le., more educated parents provide more goods tor children's human capital acquisition
without reducing their provision of time to children by shifting some resources from
current period consumption. Complementarity is thus an important consideration;
because goods investments are more productive in the presence of time investments.
more educated parents do not reduce their provision with Cobb-Douglas production..
unlike with quasilinear production.
If, instead~ parental education affects the household problem by augmenting the
returns to time spent with children but neither the wage function nor the altruism
function~ different comparative statics are derived. Ifparental education has no impact
on the efficiency or efficacy of goods inputs (case 2) and if the human capital production
function is quasilinear in 8, Le., g(x~(};H) =XU + He , then parents substitute time spent
in income-generating activities in order to provide more time to their children:
(6a) d(}/dH >0
d"CldH <0
If~ however~human capital is generated according to a Cobb-Douglas production
function~g(x,8;H)= X<lOHtl-u ), then:
(6b) d81dH > 0
d:cldH<O
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i.e.~ parents reduce their investments in goods in order to increase their investments in
time. In this case~ complementarities in production do not affect the signs of the
comparative static results.
A third way by which parental education may affect the household problem is by
increasing the returns to education. Assume again that parental education affects neither
the wage function nor the altruism function (case 3). For simplicity~ assume further that
the percent ofchildren ~ s earning accruing to the parents in the second period is
independent of the amount that children earn. With quasilinear production of the form
g(x~B;H) =(x~ + B)H • time spent helping children with homework rises as parental
education increases while goods investments remain unchanged:
(7a) dB/ dH > 0
d"C/dH =0
With higher returns to education for the children of more educated parents and Cobb-
Douglas production of the form g{x~();H) =(x"Btl-.l)H. investments in both goods and
time rise as parental education rises:
(7b) dB/dH >0
dx/dH >0
Complementarities in production are again important. Assuming quasilinear production..
goods investments do not change with parental education. With Cobb-Douglas
production~ by contrast~ both types of investments increase with parental education.
Finally, suppose instead that parental education affects the altruism function (~ )~
but neither the wage function nor the human capital production function (case 4). If the
human capital production function is quasilinear in B, then:
(8a) dB/dH >0
dhldH=O
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That is~ more educated parents spend more time for the production of children~shuman
capital~ but neither more nor less money. By contrast~ with Cobb-Douglas production:
(8b) dB/dB >0
d,,/dH >0
In this case, parents forgo some of their own consumption in order to provide higher
levels of both time and goods for children~s human capital acquisition.6 Once again~ the
form of the human capital production function is quite imponant in deriving comparative
statics~ with more educated parents providing higher levels of both goods and time
investments in the presence of complementarities.
In sum~ without strong assumptions about the complementarity of goods and time
in human capital production, strong predictions about how parental education affects
investments in goods and time cannot be made. Indeed~ the comparative static results are
ambiguously signed except in the case of dB / dB with complementary production (Table
4-1). However, if it is found that d" / dB < 0, then it must be the case that the efficiency
of parental time (case 2) is the dominant means by which parental education affects the
household problem. If, by contrast, it is found that dB / dB < 0 . then it must be true that
the wage effect (case 1) dominates. Regardless, the demand for investments and the
extent to which these investments explain the relationship between parental education
and children's learning are thus empirical issues.
4.3. China's Rural Edu£atioD System
Most villages in rural China have a government-sanctioned primary school that
offers either five or six years ofprimary instruction, the laner being increasingly
common. Almost every child attends primary school at some point during his or her
childhood, and children generally walk to the nearest school. Junior secondary schools
are predominantly located in townships - administrative hubs for several villages - and
offer three years of instruction. Children whose parents are willing to pay school fees are
generally able to attend through the junior secondary level. Senior secondary schools are
located in some townships, but because admission is contingent on passing competitive
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examinations. many children in rural areas do not attend. In contrast to urban China.
private schools are relatively rare in rural areas.
Despite China·s education law that makes nine years of schooling compulsory for
all children. children whose families do not pay the required fees are not allowed to
attend school. School fees are a burden to rural parents. and many schools have
increased fees to offset rising costs resulting from education decentralization (Tsang.
1996; Hannum. 1998). Hossain (1996) reports that the poorest quintile of households in
China spends 14.2 percent of their annual income on education. while the wealthiest
quintile spend 5.5 percent.
Fiscal decentralization has led to increased disparity in the educational attainment
of boys and girls (Hannum and Xie, 1994). Men are responsible for caring for elderly
parents; hence boys receive a disproportionate share ofeducation in resource-constrained
families. Indeed. Brown and Park (2002) show that high school fees are much likelier to
cause a girl to drop out of school than a boy paying identical fees in China's poor areas.
China systematically evaluates teacher quality on an annual basis. incorporating
such measures as student performance on standardized tests, evaluations by students and
principals, teacher attendance, publications, and teacher education and experience.
Because these official quality rankings incorporate many aspects of teacher performance,
this measure ofquality is likely more informative than the simple proxies (generally
teacher education and/or experience) used to measure teacher quality in other countries
(see Hanushek, 1995 for a survey of the literature from developing countries). Moreover,
teachers in many rural areas (including the surveyed areas) follow student cohorts
through school, so controlling for current teacher quality goes a long way toward
controlling for the quality of teachers in fonner grades (see Park and Hannum, 2001 for a
further description of teacher rankings in China). In the estimates that follow, then,
teacher quality is measured as a variable rather than as a vector ofdescriptors.
Finally, China has a system ofrestrictive residency laws that prevent most rural
residents from legally residing, working, or attending schools in areas outside their
official residences. Regardless, many rural residents migrate to cities for at least part of
the year to find casual work. These facts have several important implications. First, rural
families have little choice over schools~ and virtually all children attend the school
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nearest their homes. Second, education is generally seen as the best means of obtaining
permits that enable the holder to legally obtain desirable, high paying work in urban
areas. And third, migrant parents are less able to supervise their children's human capital
acquisition and are unable to make time investments while absent.
4.4. Empirical Strategy and Identification
To analyze how parental education affects investments in children's human
capital, demand functions for education-related goods and time are estimated. The
demand for goods used in human capital acquisition, x, is measured by the household's
total spending on non-required education-related goods, e.g., spending on pens, pencils,
notebooks, books other than required textbooks, and private tutoring; this measure
excludes school fees, required textbooks, required uniforms, and other spending that is
mandatory conditional on enrollment. I also measure investment in goods used in human
capital production by bivariate measures of whether the household has any children's
books and whether the household has an area suitable for children's study, i.e., a desk or
bookshelf that is used by children. The demand for parental time used in the production
ofchildren's human capital, (), is measured by the total number of hours parents spend
helping their children with homework each week and by bivariate measures for whether
parents read to the sampled child and whether either parent ever discusses the sampled
child's school performance \\ith his or her teachers.
The demand for non-required education-related goods (and similarly for time) in
household h in village v is thus estimated by:
(9a) Xhy = a + PIHt~ + P2H';., + F/n:P3 + KhyP.. + Ps(Ht~ X Shvl
+ P6 (H';., x Shy) + P7~v + PSQhV + P9Ahb + Yv + ehv
for the continuous outcomes and
(9b) Pr(xhv * 0) = «>(a + PIHt, + P2H':v + FhyP3 + KhyP.. + Ps(Ht~ x Shv)
+ P6(H':v x Shy) + P7~Y + PsQhv + P9Ahb + Yv + ehv )
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for the bivariate outcomes. H J is parentj~s education in grades completed, j =E {m, f} ;
F is a vector of family characteristics including parent age,7 the number ofother children
who are enrolled in school, and the number of non-enrolled children in the household; K
is a vector of child-specific characteristics such as sex (S ), age, and a grade level
dummy; Y is the household's wealth; Q is teacher quality; and ehv is an error term.
Because father's and mother's education may affect investments in sons and daughters
differently, the sex of the child is also interacted with parental education.
Parental education has many correlates that may influence the household's
decisions about investment in child schooling (Figure 4-1), and controlling for these
effects may tacilitate and better isolate the direct relationship between parental education
and educational investments. For example~ children's cognitive ability ( A ) may atTect
the optimal household allocation. On the one hand~ parents may invest more in very
gifted children; on the other, they might wish to help less gifted children by providing
greater investments in their schooling. Similarly, community norms and school quality
may influence investment patterns; notably, rural parents have little ability to choose
where they live due to the strict residency permit system, and school selectivity is not an
important issue because virtually all children attend the nearest school. Village tixed
effects ( y v ) are thus included in the estimates as well.
The second objective of the paper is to investigate the extent to which these
investments help to explain the relationship between parental education and child
learning. This is accomplished by following the procedure suggested by Glewwe (1999)
and Heltberg and Johannesen (2002). I flI'St estimate the ·"baseline" determinants of
children's learning:
(lOa)
where Z is children's learning as measured by test scores and u is an error term. I then
estimate the same equation with investments included as additional regressors:
(lOb)
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ZhV =a+bIHl~ +b"!H,":v + Fhvb3+ Khvb.: +bs(Hlv xShv )+b6(H':v xS/rv)
+ b,'lhv + bs (HLx 'lhv) + b9 (H':v X 'lhv) + Uh\.
where '7 E {XhV ,OhV}. There may exist complementarities between parental education and
investments in children's human capital. For example, the returns to time spent helping
children with homework may rise as parental education rises. Parental education x
investment interactions are included to capture these effects. [compare the estimated
coefficients on parental education, interpreting reductions in the coefficient to mean the
extent to which investments ""explain" the relationship between parental education and
children's learning.
[n regressing learning on parental education, omitted variables may bias the
estimates. As a result, the preferred estimation method is instrumental variables ([V)
estimation. Although grandparental education, the education of parents' siblings, and
grandparent occupation have often been used as instruments for parental education in
other studies, each of these may correlate with other unobservables that may impact child
learning (e.g., parent aptitude), so these typical instruments are likely to be invalid. A
second-best strategy is to include additional regressors to control for known omitted
variables. For example, village fixed effects reduce the impact ofcommunity
characteristics and any endogenous sorting. [control for correlation with latent ability by
including the child's score on a test ofcognitive development. [also control for
household wealth via the present value of household durabless and teacher quality via the
ranking described above. Omitted variable bias may ofcourse remain, but if the bias is
identical across specifications (which requires that the investments are not correlated \\lith
the variables biasing parental education), then the comparisons remain valid.
Following an identical procedure to that described above, I compare the estimated
effect of parental education on children's learning in:
(lOa')
with that estimated by:
( lOb')
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Zhv =a+btHL +b1H:V + FhvbJ + K hvb4 +bs(Hfv xShv )+b6 (H/:. xShv )
+ b7 Yhv + bgQhv + b9 Ahv + blO'l + bll (Htv x 'lh.. ) + bl2 (H';., X 'lhv)
+ Yv + lIhv
to see how investments impact the estimated effects of parental education.
4.5. Data and Variables
The data come from the Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF). a
collaborative effort of researchers trom Northwest Nonnal University (Gansu.. China)..
Harvard University, and the University of Michigan, including the author. The GSCF..
conducted in the summer of2000, is a survey of 1,970 children between the ages 01'9 and
12 and their families in 100 villages in Gansu, a province in China's northwest. Gansu is
a sparsely populated province whose 23 million people are primarily engaged in
agriculture. The province is broadly reflective ofother interior provinces and is marked
by low income, low educational attainment, low expenditures on education.. and relatively
high rates of illiteracy.
The multi-stage probability sample drew 20 counties from all non-urban, non-
Tibetan counties in Gansu.9 From these counties, 100 villages were draYiU from these
townships using a probability sample. Within each village, the sampling scheme drew
from lists ofall village households with children in the target age range. Separate
instruments were administered to children, mothers, heads of household, and village
leaders, as well as to teachers and principals for children who were enrolled in school at
the time of the survey. A cognitive development test designed by researchers at the
Chinese Academy of Sciences Division ofPsychology was also administered to each
child; this test was designed to be independent ofachievement.
Of the 1,970 children in the sample, 16 did not reside full-time in the sampled
village, 17 others were missing important household demographic data such as parental
education, and 19 were not enrolled in school at the time of the survey (6 of whom had
dropped out ofprimary school and 1 ofwhom dropped out after completing primary
school). I thus restrict the sample to the 1,918 children who were enrolled in school at
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the time of the survey~ who were full·time residents of the village~ and who have
complete parent, schooling, and teacher data. For variables common to both the
restricted and unrestricted samples, the data are largely indistinguishable. Table 4-2
presents descriptive statistics for the former.
The average household spends 46.5 yuan10 per year on school supplies.. tutoring..
and other non-required education-related goods for the sampled child. Only 6.2 percent
of households allocate less than 10 YUan to this spending, while 1.8 percent of households
spend at least 200 yuan. Some 54.4 percent of households have children"s books and
58.8 percent have study areas for use by children. Mothers and fathers spend 4.1 hours in
total helping children with homework each week on average~ although parents do not
help their children with homework in 32.5 percent of the sampled households. At the
other extreme~ 5.7 percent of households spend at least 14 hours per week helping
children with homework (this statistic reflects the average time allocation of parents
across the entire year~ so labor migrants are included in this tigure). Time spent helping
children with homework is inclusive ofall children, not just the sampled child~ and the
average household has 1.9 children enrolled in school, including the sampled child (the
average household has 2.3 children in total). Parents read to the sampled child in almost
two-thirds of the sampled households and discuss the sampled child"s school
performance y,ith teachers in 76.2 percent of the sampled households.
Fathers have completed one grade in junior secondary school on average.. while
mothers have completed 4.2 primary grades (as distinct from years of schooling). Fathers
spend all or part of two months working outside the village on average~ although the
median father does not migrate at all. Fewer than 4 percent of women migrate for work"
and both parents are absent for the entire year in only 6 households. Total household
wealth (defined as the total present value of housing and other durables) averages
14,773.8 yuan, but there is considerable variation with 3 percent of households having
over 50,000 yuan in wealth.
Boys comprise 53.9 percent of the sample. Primary school enrollees account for
96.0 percent of the sample, an artifact not only of the ages of the sampled children~ but
also of the delayed age ofenrollment prevalent in many areas. The median child is in
fourth grade, having enrolled at age 7. Chinese language and mathematics tests are given
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at the end ofeach semester and are used to determine whether children may proceed to
the next grade. The same exam was administered to each student in the child ~s grade
level across the county, and homeroom teachers reported test scores. Teachers did not
report Chinese scores for 29 students and mathematics scores for 23 students.
A few comments about these variables should be noted. First, scores on the
Chinese and mathematics tests are converted into Z-scores in the empirical analysis. That
is~ test scores are measured as the number of standard deviations from the mean test score
ofall sampled children in the same grade and county. Where sampled children are either
very advanced or very behind (i.e.~ where children attend the third year ofjunior
secondary school and in many cases where they attend the first year of primary school or
the second ofjunior secondary school)~ Z-scores cannot be calculated because there are
too few tests scores for the county/grade~and these children are dropped from that part of
the analysis. Next~ scores on the cognitive development test vary significantly by age.
Thus, the cognitive development test scores were also translated into Z-scores by age
measured in half-year increments. Finally~ nonlinearities in household wealth are
accounted tor by using the log of household wealth in all estimates.
4.6. Demand for Goods and Time Used in the Production of Human Capital
The comparative static results derived in section 4-2 depended critically on the
functional form of the human capital production function. In particular, optimizing
parents were shown to make different consumption choices depending on assumptions
made about the complementarity of goods and time in producing human capital. To
investigate this issue empirically, I regress mathematics test scores (Z) on investments in
goods ( x ), investments in time ( () ), and their interaction~ controlling for parental
education ( H), family characteristics ( F )~ child attributes ( K ), household wealth ( y),
teacher ranking ( Q), child cognitive ability ( A )~ and village characteristics (y ):
(11)
Zhv =a+blH£~ +b1 H'; + Fhvb3 + Khvb" +bs(H/,v X Shv)+b6 (H':v xShv )
f+b7 ¥"v +bSQhv +bgAhv +b10x+bll(Hhv xxhv )+b12 (H; xXhv )
+b13(}+b14 {Htv X (}hV)+b,s(H';, x(}hv)+b16 (Xhv X(}hv) +Yv +uhv
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If goods and time are complements in production (as with the Cobb-Douglas production
functions discussed in section 4-2)~ then the interaction term will be positive. Although I
have 3 measures of goods investments (non-required education-related spending~ whether
the household has children's reading materials, and whether the household has a
children's study area) and 3 measures of time investments (parental time allocated to
helping children with homework~whether parents read to the sampled child~ and whether
parents discuss academic issues with the child's teachers)~ allowing for nine goods/time
combinations, none of the interaction terms is significant (output omitted). This finding
suggests that my measures of investment are not complements in the production of
children's human capital.
4.61. Education-Related Investment in Goods and Services
The demand for (logged) non-required spending on education-related goods and
services for the sampled child is estimated via OLS. Estimates are presented in Table 4-
3. Column 1 presents reduced form estimates for equation (9a)~ excluding household
wealth, teacher quality, cognitive ability, and village tixed effects. Errors are assumed to
be clustered by village, hence robust t statistics are shown. An additional year ofeither
father's or mother's education increases such expenditures by 1.0 yuan (2.2 percent of the
mean) for both boys and girls, significant at the 0.01 level (the effect of mother's
education is significant at the 0.05 level for boys and the effect of father's education is
significant at the 0.05 level for girls). The number of other children who are enrolled also
has a positive effect~ suggesting that parents are more willing to make such investments
when there are more beneficiaries or when there exists the possibility of handing goods
down to other children in the household.
Column 2 includes the teacher quality ranking as well as village fixed effects, thus
controlling for unobservable community characteristics and endogenous sorting (to the
limited extent that it occurs). These variables greatly reduce the estimated effect of
mother's education~ suggesting that mother's education is highly stratified by village.
Column 3 includes household wealth as an additional regressor. As wealth increases,
SPending on non-required education-related goods also increases. Cognitive ability
(column 4) has a negative effect on this category ofspending, indicating that parents
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spend more on school supplies, supplemental textbooks, and private tutoring for children
with lower ability, perhaps in an attempt to make them competitive with their classmates.
Column 5 includes all of these regressors. While the relationship between mother's
education and spending seems to operate largely through village characteristics, father's
education remains a strong predictor of education-related spending for both boys and
girls; one grade completed increases such spending on the sampled child by 2.2 percent
regardless of the child's sex, significant at the 0.05 level. Furthermore, the significance
of the cognitive ability Z-score disappears, suggesting that cognitive ability is not
randomly distributed across villages.
Determinants of whether the household has children's books are estimated via a
probit model (equation 9b). The marginal effects are presented in Table 4-4 and errors
are assumed to be clustered by village. Otherwise, the table is arranged identically to
Table 4-3. An additional grade completed by fathers increases the probability that the
household has children's books by about 1.S percent for boys and 1.6 percent for girls,
each significant at the 0.0 I leveL An additional grade completed by mothers increases
the probability by 1.3 percent for boys and 1.8 percent for girls, again both significant.
Mother's age also has a positive effect. Surprisingly, perhaps, the presence of one more
child in the household reduces the probability ofowning children's books by between 6.7
and 8.0 percent at the margin, suggesting that additional children crowd out such goods.
Child age also enters negatively; controlling for grade level., age may indicate lower
ability because older children either start school later or are held back more often.
As above, column 2 includes teacher quality rankings and village fixed effects,
column 3 includes household wealth, column 4 includes the cognitive ability Z-score, and
column 5 includes all of these concurrently. Due to insufficient variation in the
dependent variable in 5 villages, the sample size falls to 1818 when village fixed effects
are implemented. The marginal effect of mother's education on the probability that
household owns children's books falls to about I percent for boys, but becomes negative
and is not significant when village fixed effects are included. The marginal effect of
father's education persists at 1.4 percent for boys, however, regardless ofadditional
controls. For girls, the marginal effect ofan additional grade ofeither parent's schooling
is roughly 1.6 percent, falling to 1.2 percent (but remaining significant at the 0.10 level)
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as village fixed effects are added. The effect ofhousehold wealth is positive as expected.
Cognitive ability has a positive effect on the probability of owning children~s books, but
the coefficient is not significant when village fixed effects are included.
Table 4-5 is analogous to Table 4-4 except that the probit model estimates the
determinants of whether the household has a study area for use by children. Again. errors
are assumed to be clustered by village and marginal effects are presented. Seven villages
are lost when village fixed effects are implemented due to insufficient variation in the
dependent variable. Each additional completed grade of father's education increases the
probability that girls' households have study areas by between 0.7 and 1.3 percent; the
higher estimated coefficients correspond to the model with village fixed effects, but this
could be an artifact of the smaller sample size. The marginal effect of mother's education
is to increase the probability of having a study area by 1.2 to 1.5 percent per grade for
girls, lower with village fixed effects. The marginal effect of father't s education is small
and insignificant for boys, while that of mother's education ranges between 1.2 percent
(significant at the 0.05 level) with village fixed effects to 2.0 percent (significant at the
0.01 level) without. Child age again enters negatively; as above, this may suggest lower
ability since grade dummies are also included in the regression. Household wealth is a
significant determinant of the probability that the household has a children's study area,
again as expected. Cognitive ability has no impact.
4.62. Education-Related Investment in Time
The demand for total parental time spent helping all children with homework is
estimated as a lobit model (equation 9a) with censoring at 0 (623 households report 0
time allocated to helping children with homework). Estimates are presented in Table 4-6.
As father's education increases by one grade level, time spent helping children with
homework increases by 21 to 25 minutes per week (about 10 percent of the mean) if the
sampled child is a girl and by about 19 minutes per week if the sampled child is a boy.
The effect ofan additional grade ofmother's education is to increase time spent helping
children with homework by 20 to 25 minutes for daughters and by 19 to 29 minutes for
sons. These estimates are all significant at the 0.01 level, regardless ofwhether village
fixed effects are included, suggesting that this relationship is quite robust. Surprisingly,
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the number ofother enrolled children has a negative (but not significant) effect on
parental time devoted to helping children with homework, perhaps because parents must
devote additional hours to income-generating activities in order to provide for more
household members. Age also has a negative effect, due perhaps to older children being
better able to help themselves; alternatively, older children are likely to have enrolled at
later ages, suggesting that their parents are less eager about their schooling. Cognitive
ability has a positive effect, but the estimate becomes insignificant when village fixed
effects are added. Further, it is possible that time spent with children affects scores on
the cognitive ability test, calling the direction of causality into question.
Table 4-7 presents probit estimates for whether parents read to the sampled child
(equation 9b). Marginal etfects are reported, and errors are assumed to be clustered by
village. There is no variation in the outcome variable for 2 villages, and they are thus
dropped from the analysis when village fixed effects are implemented. Although the
questionnaire did not specify which parent reads to the child, the effects are much
stronger for mothers than for fathers. The effect ofan additional grade of school
completed by the mother is to raise the probability that parents read to the sampled child
by 2.2 to 2.7 percent (3.7 percent of the mean probability) when the child is a girl and by
2.7 to 3.1 percent when the child is a boy, significant at the 0.01 leveL The impact of
father's education is smaller than that tor mother's education when the sampled child is a
boy (increasing the probability by 1.2 percent), but the coefficient remains significant as
village fixed effects are implemented. Father's education has a still smaller impact when
the sample child is a girL As fathers age, the probability that parents read to the child
falls; as mothers age, the probability rises. As above, the number of children reduces the
probability that parents read to the sampled child; this is true whether or not those
siblings are enrolled in schooL Interestingly, the sign changes when village fixed effects
are included, although the effect is still not significant. Household wealth has a positive
but insignificant effect on this probability. Cognitive ability Z-scores have a positive
effect, although the direction ofcausality may again be questionable.
Table 4-8 presents the determinants ofwhether either parent discusses the
sampled child's school performance with his or her teachers (equation 9b), once more
estimated as a probit model with errors assumed to be clustered by village. Ten villages
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are omitted when implementing village fixed effects due to insufficient variation in the
dependent variable. Again~ marginal effects are shown and the format follows those
described above. As with reading to the sampled child., father's education has a
significant effect only for sons while mother's education affects sons and daughters alike.
The marginal effect ofan additional grade completed by fathers is to increase the
probability that a parent discusses a sampled son's schooling with teachers by 1.3 percent
(1.7 percent of the mean probability), an estimate that is robust to the inclusion of village
tixed effects (significant at the 0.01 level). Mother's education raises the probability by
1.3-1.9 percent above the mean per grade completed for both sons and daughters.
4.63. Discussion
The results presented in Tables 4.3 through 4.8 sho\v that investments in both
non-required education-related goods and time increase with parental education, and that
the relationships are quite robust. ThUS., more educated parents are not substituting goods
for time investment or vice versa~ but are demanding more of both instead. Section 2
outlined two possible explanations: first, more educated parents may perceive that the
returns to education are higher for their children (equation 7b); second., children's
education may enter the household utility function differently for more educated parents,
e.g., more educated parents may be more altruistic or may have different preferences for
present and future consumption (equation 8b).
Distinguishing between these scenarios is difficult empirically, in part because
parental education may enter the household~s problem through multiple channels.
Nevertheless, the data do provide evidence for the notion that the returns to education are
higher for children ofmore educated parents. Specifically, mothers were asked about the
expected pay difference if their children obtained a junior secondary education versus a
primary education~and if they obtained a senior secondary education versus a junior
secondary education (Table 4-9). In the quintile with the lowest total parental education,
43.3 percent ofmothers believe that junior secondary education has ··a great deal~' of
influence for the future salary ofboys and 40.2 percent ofmothers agree that junior
secondary education has a large influence on the future salary ofgirls. In the quintile
with the highest total parental education~ 48.6 percent ofmothers believe that the
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influence ofjunior secondary schooling is large for boys and 48.5 percent believe that it
is large for girls. Some 51.4 percent of mothers in households with low total education
thought that senior secondary schooling makes a big difference for boys~ while 56.8
percent of mothers in households with high total education did. The corresponding
figures for girls at the senior secondary level are 49.0 and 52.2 percent. Thus, more
educated parents perceive that the returns to education are higher for their children
regardless of sex. This is certainly plausible in the Chinese context, moreover, because
more educated parents generally have better access to non-farm jobs - jobs that have
higher educational requirements and offer higher returns than tarming (Lam and Schoeni~
1993 discuss this phenomenon for Brazil). Untortunately, the data do not otTer insight
into whether more educated parents are more altruistic or whether they have ditferent
preterences over the timing ofconsumption.
4.7. The Impact of Investments on the Estimated Effect of Parental Education
Investments in education are often cited as being an important pathway by which
the relationship between parental education and child learning manifests itself. [t has
been shown that more educated parents invest more money (Le., goods) and time in their
children's education, yet the extent to which these investments explain the relationship is
not well understood. [n this section, I estimate the "'baseline" determinants ofchildren's
test scores (equation lOa) using OlS. I then repeat the estimates while including
investments in goods and time and their interactions with parental education (equation
lOb). Reductions in the point estimates are interpreted as the extent to which the
relationship between parental education and child learning is explained by these
investments.
4.71. Chinese Test Scores
Table 4-10 presents OLS estimates of the determinants ofchildren's Chinese test
scores (converted into Z-scores, defmed as standard deviations from the county/grade
mean score). Table 4-11 presents analogous estimates, but includes household wealth,
the teacher quality ranking, cognitive ability, and village fixed effects. Grade dummies
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are included in all specifications and t statistics are calculated using robust standard
errors. Column I presents the baseline estimates (equations lOa and lOa'). Column 2
controls for the log of non-required spending on education-related goods and services..
column 3 includes a dummy for whether the household has children"s books" column 4
includes a dummy for whether the household has a designated study area for children
(e.g... a desk that children use).. column 5 includes the total hours that parents spend
helping children with homework each week.. column 6 includes a dummy for whether
parents read to the sampled child, and column 7 includes a dummy for whether parents
discuss the sampled child's academic performance with his or her teacher.
Father's education has a strong impact on Chinese test scores (Table 4-10, column
1). An additional grade ofcompleted schooling increases a daughter's predicted test
score by 0.026 standard deviations from the county/grade mean (significant at the 0.05
level) and increases a son's predicted test score by 0.033 standard deviations (signiticant
at the 0.01 level). The effect ofmother's education is weaker for both sons and
daughters, with an additional completed grade raising test scores by 0.016 standard
deviations for sons and 0.019 standard deviations for daughters.. both significant at the
0.10 level. Including household wealth, teacher quality rankings, cognitive ability, and
village fixed effects (Table 4-11, column 1) reduces the estimated etTect of father's
education to 0.022 standard deviations per grade completed at the mean for daughters..
but the effect is virtually unchanged for sons. Including these variables increases the
estimated effect ofmother's education on girls' test scores to 0.024 standard deviations
per grade completed at the mean. Teacher quality has a negative effect on Chinese test
scores; if more educated mothers have children who are taught by worse teachers, this
accounts for the increase in the estimated effect of mother's education with the inclusion
of the additional regressors. Alternatively, mother's education may correlate negatively
\vith some village characteristic to generate the downward bias in the estimates presented
in Table 4-10. This correlation is stronger for daughters than for sons, however, as the
effect ofmother's education on sons' test scores falls slightly when village flXed effects
are included. 11
Boys perform significantly worse than girls on Chinese tests, although dropouts in
this age group are much more likely to be girls, suggesting that the coefficient is biased
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upwards (for a similar interpretation, see Brown and Park, 2002). Age also has a
negative effect on test scores. As noted above, because grade controls are included, age
may indicate lower ability if these children start school later. The sign changes as village
fixed effects are added to the regression, suggesting that age ofenrollment is subject to
local norms and that - conditional on enrolling at the same as their cohort - older
students perform somewhat better (although the estimate becomes insignificant).
Simultaneity between Chinese test scores and various investments may be a
concern. That is, investments in education-related goods and time may result in higher
test scores, else low test scores may prompt greater investments. The estimated effects of
non-required education-related spending and of time spent helping children with
homework are negative (but not significant), suggesting that the latter may be true. The
negative impact of these investments is mitigated, however, by parental education. That
is, the estimated effect becomes less negative as parental education increases. This
finding suggests that more educated parents may use time with children proactively to
encourage high performance while less educated parents help their children with
homework reactively, i.e., in response to poor academic performance.
Other investments have a positive effect on Chinese test scores, however. For
example, children whose parents discuss their academic performance with their teachers
score 0.17 standard deviations higher than their peers (not quite significant at the 0.10
level). As parental education rises, however, these effects are often mitigated. Children
whose parents have completed an average number ofgrades of schooling score slightly
worse (although not significantly differently) on Chinese tests than other children.
Further, children whose parents read to them score 0.13 standard deviations higher on
Chinese exams if their parents have had no formal schooling, but only 0.08 standard
deviations higher if their parents have average education. Likewise, children that come
from households with children~s study areas score 0.09 standard deviations above
average on Chinese test scores when their parents have had not been formally educated,
but the provision ofa study area only raises test scores by 0.01 standard deviations
among children ofparents with average education. These findings, coupled with those
above, suggest that parents adopt different strategies for investing in their children~s
human capital accumulation as their education levels rise. Also of interest, parental help
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with homework positively contributes to Chinese test scores as father's education rises
(this effect becomes negative when village fixed effects are added), but mothers appear to
tutor children who are performing poorly, panicularly more educated mothers.
Although the effects of these investments are not significant at any conventional
level, this is not surprising if most of the variance in these investments is due to variance
in parental education. If their inclusion nevertheless reduces the estimated coefficients
on parental education, this suggests that these are important mechanisms by which
parental education affects children's learning.
Including these investments and the investment x parental education interaction
terms has the etfect of reducing the estimated coefficients on mother's and father's
education for both sons and daughters. Again, these changes are interpreted as the extent
to which the relationship betw~en parental education and child learning is explained by
various investments in education-related goods and time.
Controlling for non-required education-related spending reduces the estimated
effects of mother's education on sons' test scores by 55.8 percent and on daughters' test
scores by 47.2 percent. The associated reductions in the coefficients tor father's
education are negligible. Controlling for whether the household has a study area for
children has a more modest impact on the relationship between mother's education and
children's test scores, but a larger impact on the relationship between father's education
and children's test scores. Including this regressor and its interactions with parental
education reduces the estimated effect of father's education on daughters' Chinese test
scores by 14.2 percent and that on sons' Chinese test scores by 9.0 percent. The
estimated effects of mother's education on sons' and daughters' test scores fall by 14.1
and 12.4 percent, respectively. Time investments are also important in the relationship
between parental education and children's test scores. Controlling for whether parents
discuss academic performance with their children's teachers reduces the estimated effect
of father's education on daughters' test scores by 18.5 percent and on sons- test scores by
15.1 percent. The estimated effect ofmother's education falls by 19.0 percent tor sons'
test scores and by 15.5 percent for daughters' test scores.
Including household wealth, teacher quality rankings, cognitive ability, and
village fixed effects, the estimated coefficients on parental education rise after controlling
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for time spent helping children with homework. This suggests that parental education
and these investments correlate negatively with some unobserved characteristic of the
village. For example~ if more educated parents compensate for poor school quality by
spending more time helping their children with homework~ then including village fixed
effects (which capture school quality) will increase the point estimates tor parental
education, making the changes in the coefficients hard to interpret. Nevertheless,
including dummies for whether the household has a designated children's study are~ for
whether parents read to their children~ and for whether parents discuss academics with
their children's teachers has the expected effect on the point estimates for parental
education despite including village tixed etTects. Controlling for whether parents read to
their children reduces the point estimates tor father's education by 16.1 percent for a
son ~ s test score and by 11.1 percent for a daughter's. The point estimates for how
mother~s education affects sons' and daughters~ test scores tall by 44.8 percent and 17.2
percent, respectively~when controlling for reading to children, suggesting that this is an
important mechanism by which mother~s influence their children ~ s learning, particularly
where sons are concerned. The magnitudes in the reductions of the estimated effects of
parental education are similar when controlling for discussing children's academic
performance with teachers. Controlling for whether the household has a children's study
area reduces the estimated effects of father's education on sons' and daughters' test
scores by 13.3 percent and 21.4 percent, respectively. The effect of mother's education
on sons' and daughters' test scores falls by 12.5 percent and 7.1 percent, respectively.
4.72. Mathematics Test Scores
Table 4-12 presents OLS estimates for the baseline determinants of the child's Z-
score on a mathematics test (equation lOa) and Table 4-13 presents those including
household wealth, the teacher quality ranking, cognitive ability, and village fixed effects
(equation lOa'). As above, investments are added iteratively in columns 2 through 7
(equations lOb and lOb '). Grade dummies are included in all specifications and t
statistics are calculated using robust standard errors.
For the baseline estimates (column 1), an additional grade completed by fathers
equates to an improved performance of0.024 standard deviations from the county/grade
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mean mathematics score for girls &.!ld 0.029 standard deviations for boys, significant at
the 0.01 level. As with Chinese test scores, mother's education has a larger impact on
girls than boys, but the magnitude is much smaller - an additional grade completed
increases predicted mathematics scores by 0.011 standard deviations for girls and 0.008
standard deviations for boys. Including household wealth., the teacher quality ranking,
cognitive ability, and village fixed effects prompts similar changes to those seen above in
the estimated relationships between parents and their daughters and between mothers and
sons. Specifically, the effect of an additional grade completed by mothers increases to
0.017 standard deviations for mothers with female children and taIls to zero for mothers
with male children. For fathers., the effect on an additional grade ofcompleted schooling
falls to 0.020 standard deviations from the mean for daughters, but remains 0.029
standard deviations for sons. These findings suggest again that mother's education
correlates with some positive community characteristic when her child is male, as does
father's education when his child is female. By contrast, mother's education correlates
with some negative characteristic of the community when her child is female.
Father's age has a negative and significant effect on children's mathematics test
scores. One possible explanation is that younger fathers may have better or more recent
mathematics training, but this explanation does not offer insight as to why children's test
scores increase significantly with mother's age. Controlling tor grade level, age has a
negative effect on test scores. Again, this is likely the result of academically weaker
children either beginning school later, and the effect becomes positive (although not
significant) when village fixed effects are included.
Investments have similar signs and similar magnitudes as those that affect
Chinese test scores. Although none of the point estimates is significant., non..required
spending on education..related goods and services and parental time allocated to helping
children with homework negatively impact mathematics test scores. Again, this may
suggest that poor academic performance prompts parental investments rather than
parental investments resulting in higher academic performance. Regardless, neither of
these effects is significantly different from zero at the mean parental education level.
Children from households that have children's reading material score 0.08 standard
deviations above other children when their parents have no fonnal education and 0.11
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standard deviations higher when their parents have completed the average number of
grades. indicating that providing books may be an important vehicle for more educated
parents to influence their children's learning. By contrast. parents reading to their
children has a larger effect on test scores for parents with less than average education.
That is. while children whose parents have no formal schooling score 0.13 standard
deviations above average if their parents read to them. those whose parents have
completed the mean level of schooling score 0.07 standard deviations higher than
average. Having a children's study area and discussing academic performance with
teachers has a large impact on test scores for children of parents with little education, but
no discemable impact for parents with average or greater levels ofeducation. These
findings nevertheless suggest that more educated parents choose different investment
vehicles than less educated parents. With village fixed effects and the other controls.
these effects fall in magnitude; indeed the estimated effect of providing children's
reading material changes signs for children of less educated parents.
Controlling for non-required spending on education-related goods and services
reduces the estimated impact of father's education on sons' mathematics test scores by
22.5 percent and on daughters' test scores by 28.1 percent. The etTect of mother's
education falls by 44.1 percent for sons' test scores and falls by 32.1 percent for
daughters' test scores. Controlling for reading to the child reduces the estimated effect of
parental education on sons' test scores by 8.3 percent for fathers and by 60.7 percent for
mothers. The estimated effect of parental education on daughters' test scores falls by 8.9
percent for fathers and by 47.3 percent for mothers. Including household wealth, teacher
quality rankings, cognitive ability, and village fixed effects has little influence on these
relationships, although the effect of mother's education on daughters' test scores rises,
suggesting again that mother's education correlates negatively with some community
characteristic (because mother's education has no measurable effect on sons' test scores
in the baseline estimates including village fixed effects, percentage changes in this
variable are not defined), Controlling for household weal~ teacher quality rankings,
cognitive ability, village fixed effects, and whether the household has a designated study
area yields a small reduction in the estimated effect of father's education on children's
test scores, but the estimated effect ofmother's education on daughters' test scores falls
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by 56.1 percent. Controlling for household wealth~ teacher quality rankings~ cognitive
ability~ village fixed effects, and whether the parents discuss academics with the child's
teacher has the opposite effect: while the reduction in the point estimates for mother's
education are negligible, the coefficient on father's education falls by 26.3 percent for
daughters and by 17.0 percent for sons.
4.73. Dis£ussion
Father's education has a strong positive effect on children's test scores~ with an
additional grade completed increasing test scores by between 0.020 and 0.033 standard
deviations from the mean test score. The effect of mother's education is smaller,
increasing scores by between zero and 0.024 standard deviations at the mean. Several of
the investments in goods and time examined here have also been shown to affect test
scores, often with investments increasing the test scores tor children of highly educated
parents and reducing test scores for children of less educated parents. This suggests,
perhaps, that more educated parents invest in their children's learning proactively while
less educated parents invest in their children's education in reaction to poor performance
in school. Moreover, controlling for these investments reduces the estimated effects of
parental education on child learning. For example, controlling for reading to children
reduces the point estimates for father's education by between 4.6 percent and 16.1
percent and the point estimates for mother's education by 17.2 to 60.7 percent.
Ofcourse, all of these estimates may be subject to endogeneity bias. Simultaneity
bias is a particular concern because low test scores may prompt additional investment in
education by concerned parents, as described above. Omitted variable bias may also be
problematic; as noted in Figure 4-1, investments in education may reflect characteristics
of the child, parent~ household, schools, and community, some ofwhich are not observed
in the data. IV estimation may be used to control for these biases if appropriate
instruments are found, but good IVs remain elusive. I tried using various exogenous
determinants ofhousehold wealth (e.g., the household's allocation ofhigh quality,
irrigated land as a share of the total land allocation and the quality of the previous year's
harvest), but they did not explain sufficient variation in the endogenous variable to
produce precise estimates. The second-best strategy adopted in this paper was to control
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for correlates of the omitted variables, e.g., household wealth, the teacher quality ranking,
cognitive ability, and unobservable characteristics of the school and village via village
fixed effects, but simultaneity and omitted variable bias may remain.
Even if these biases affect the point estimates, correlation between parental
education and various investments has been established, and subsequent research should
emphasize the search for instruments to better isolate the effects of investments on
children's test scores. Moreover, although these measures explain a share of the
relationship between parental education and child learning, much is left unexplained.
One possible explanation is that the there are other, unobserved investments that may
more fully explain the relationship of interest, and field researchers should consider
including these measures in future surveys.
4.8. Conclusion
The literature has documented a strong relationship between parental education
and child human capital accumulation, a relationship that persists despite the inclusion of
controls for household and community background factors. This relationship is often
attributed to higher levels of investment in children's human capital made by more
educated parents, but the nature of these investments is not well understood. T\vo such
investments are money spent on education-related goods and services and time spent
interacting with children, yet parents may face a trade-off between these investments in
resource-constrained households in areas with poorly developed credit markets. Because
more educated parents are likely to earn higher wages, the opportunity cost of time sPent
outside the workplace is high, and these parents may spend less time interacting with
children in order to provide more goods for children's human capital development.
Alternatively, more educated parents are likely to be more adept at teaching children in
the home, and thus they may forego some time in the workplace in order to provide more
time for children's human capital development. Finally, more educated parents may
provide more ofboth types of investments despite being resource-constrained if the
returns to children's human capital development differ for their children or if children's
human capital development is valued differently in such households. Theoretical
predictions about the demand for education-related goods and time depend critically on
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assumptions about how parental education affects ages, parental preferences, and the
production ofchildren's human capital as well as assumptions about the complementarity
of goods and time in producing human capital.
The tirst objective of this paper is to understand how parental education affects
investments in children's hwnan capital. Using a new survey of children, households,
schools, and communities in Gansu, China, I estimate the demand for six education-
related investments. I find that more educated parents provide higher levels of both
education-related goods (e.g., the provision of a designated study area for children) and
education-related time (e.g., time spent reading to children). For example. an additional
grade completed by either parent increases non-required spending on education-related
goods and services by 2.2 percent at the mean. At the same time, an additional grade
completed by fathers increases the probability that parents read to the sampled child by
between 0.7 percent and 1.3 percent, while an additional grade completed by mothers
increases this probability by 2.1 percent to 3.1 percent. Evidence suggests that the
perceived returns to education are higher for the children of more educated parents, a
reasonable assumption in rural China because more educated parents may have better
access to better paying off-farm jobs when their children seek employment.
The second objective of the paper is to analyze the extent to which these
investments explain the robust relationship between parental education and children's
learning described in the literature. To facilitate this, I estimate the effect of parental
education on children's Chinese and mathematics test scores with and without controlling
for individual investments; reductions in the estimated effect of parental education when
controlling for investments are interpreted as the degree to which the particular
investment explains the relationship between parental education and test scores.
Parental education has a strong positive effect on children's test scores, with an
additional year of father's education increasing test scores by between 0.020 and 0.033
standard deviations from the mean test score. An additional grade completed by mothers
increases test scores by between zero and 0.024 standard deviations at the mean.
Controlling for whether parents read to the sampled child reduces the estimated effect of
parental education on Chinese test scores by between 4.6 percent and 33.1 percent and
the estimated effect of parental education on mathematics test scores by between 8.3
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percent and 60.7 percent. Similarly, controlling for log spending on non-required
education-related goods and services reduces the estimated effect of parental education
on Chinese test scores by between 1.0 percent and 55.8 percent and the estimated effect
of parental education on mathematics test scores by between 22.5 percent and 44.1
percent. Unfortunately, these estimates may be biased by omitted variables. As a result,
[ add several potential correlates of investments to control for omitted variable bias -
household wealth, a teacher quality measure, a measure of the child's cognitive ability.
and village fixed effects. With the additional regressors, the effect of controlling for
whether parents read to the sampled child is to reduce the point estimates on parental
education by between 5.9 percent and 33.1 percent.
Even though endogeneity bias may remain, this paper demonstrates a strong
correlation between parental education and various investments in children'shuman
capital development. Future work on this topic will thus emphasize searching for
instruments tor education-related investments to better control tor bias. In the
meanwhile, it is evident that more educated parents make larger investments in their
children's human capital accumulation in rural China, and these investments are an
important mechanism - though certainly not the only mechanism - by which parental
education affects children's learning.
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: Alternatively, it may be assumed that the household has a single decision-maker, else
that there is only one parent present.
3 A straightforward generalization makes the sharing rule a function of parental education
as well, although it would operate quite similarly to the altruism function.
.. The comparative static results are identical if the human capital production function is
quasilinear in x rather than (J assuming that parental education affects either wages only
(case 1) or the productivity of time spent with children only (case 2). [f parental
education atfects the returns to education only or parental altruism only, the comparative
statics are ambiguous. As a result, only the comparative statics for quasilinear production
in (J are reported.
5 The elasticity of substitution between .~ and {} in g(x, (}) is (j' 'CD = (1 - a )x: - c ,
. (a-l)(c-x:)
where c =x~ + {} is a point along the production isoquant. The elasticity of substitution
for Cobb-Douglas production is fj.'CD = 1. The elasticities of substitution for the other
production functions given in the text are similar.
6 Identical comparative statics are derived if parental education affects the weighting of
rust and second period consumption instead of parental altruism and if more educated
farents have stronger preferences for second period consumption. See footnote 3.
The quality ofeducation eroded dramatically during the Cultural Revolution (1966-
1976). Tertiary education was suspended and many senior high schools closed,
streamlining ended, and the rigorous ··bourgeois" exam system for access to higher
education was replaced by a system based on class background and recommendations
(Han~ 2000). Labor and study were undertaken together at every level't further diluting
quality. Thus, the quantity ofeducation has different implications depending upon when
it was undertaken; controlling for measures such as age may help to mitigate this
variation.
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8 Ideally~ one would instrument for wealth because it may correlate with both parental
education and educational outcomes. I tried using the share of the household·s land
allocation that is irrigated and the quality of the previous year·s harvest as IVs; although
these measures performed well in the first stage. they do not explain sufficient variation
in the endogenous variable to produce precise estimates. Nevertheless. instrumenting for
wealth did not produce sign changes or large changes in the magnitudes of any
coefficients. so wealth is not instrumented in the analysis.
9 Of Gansu's 86 counties~ 7 are predominantly Tibetan. These counties were omitted
from the sampling because Mandarin is not widely spoken in these areas.
lO In 2000~ $1 US:: 8.27 Chinese yuan.
II Measurement error would also bias the estimates downward, but I doubt that this is the
case. First, there is no systematic difference in the reported education levels ofmothers
ofdaughters in the sample and mothers of sons in the sample. Second, even if there is a
true difference in the education levels of mothers ofdaughters and mothers of sons, I find
it implausible that mothers ofdaughters would misreport their education while mothers of
sons would not.
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Table 4-1. Comparative Statie Results
Relationship between parental education and the household problem
(case I) (case 2) (case 3) (case 4)
wage function efficiency of time returns to education altruism function
quasilinear in £)
dr:/dH
dO/dH
Cobb-Douglass
dr:/dH
dO/dH
g =x ll +()
+
g =xll +HO g =(xoJ + (})H g =xoJ +0
0 0
+ + +
g =x oJ (H(})ll-lll g =(XoJ(}Il-eJ)H g =x IJOtl - lJ )
+ +
+ + +
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Table 4-2. Variables and Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Ma.x
non-required education- 1918 yuan 46.519 55.595 0 836
related expenditures
household has children's 1918 dummy 0.544 0.498 0
books
child has study area 1918 dummy 0.588 0.492 0
help with homework 1918 total hours per week, 4.121 4.953 0 35
both parents
reads to child 1918 dummy 0.657 0.475 0
discuss child's school 1918 dummy 0.762 0.426 0
perfonnance with teacher
Chinese test score 1889 percentage 72.502 13.155 0 100
mathematics test score 1895 percentage 73.992 14.581 0 100
father's education 1918 grades completed 6.985 3.515 0 15
mother's education 1918 grades completed 4.190 3.514 0 12
father's age 1918 years 37.411 4.846 27 57
mother's age 1918 years 35.060 4.210 25 55
wealth 1918 yuan 14773.810 16963.810 115 209740
father's village residency 1918 months per year 9.935 3.475 0 12
mother's village residency 1918 months per year 11.732 1.547 0 12
male child 1918 dummy 0.539 0.499 0 I
child's age 1918 years 11.019 1.069 9 12.917
grade 1918 current grade level 4.301 1.343 1 9
cognitive score 1918 points 17.693 10.036 0 43
other enrolled children 1918 number 0.866 0.714 0 4
other non-enrolled children 1918 number 0.452 0.638 0 4
teacher rank 1918 O:on probation, 1.468 0.953 0 J
I = rank I,
2 = rank 2,
3 =highest rank
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Table 4-3. Log Spending on Non-Required Education-Related Goods (OLS)
Variable Unit (l) (2) (3) (4) (5)
father's education grades 0.0228·· 0.0197·· 0.0193· 0.0221·· 0.0180··
(2.12) (2.46) ( 1.76) (2.08) (2.24)
mother's education grades 0.0332··· 0.0097 0.0291 ** 0.0338··· 0.0077
(2.83) ( 1.12) (2.43) (2.92) (0.89)
father's age years 0.0088 0.0086 0.0125 0.0087 0.0102·
(0.94) (1.41 ) ( 1.33) (0.94) ( 1.67)
mother's age ;lears -0.0035 0.0036 -0.0066 -0.0017 0.0025
(0.37) (0.51 ) (0.69) (0.18) (0.35)
male dummy 0.0452 0.0672 0.0450 0.0386 0.0653
(0.50) (0.84) (0.52) (0.43) (0.81 )
age years 0.0148 -0.0035 0.0220 -0.0042 -0.0000
(0.46) (0.15) (0.71) (0.13) (0.00)
other enrolled children number 0.4460··· 0.4772··· 0.4515··· 0.4416··· 0.4715···
(12.11) ( 15.47) (12.50) ( 12.27) (15.26)
non-enrolled children number 0.0090 0.0250 0.0152 0.0057 0.0216
(022) (0.74) (0.38) (0.14) (0.64)
father's ed • male interaction 0.0044 0.0001 0.0038 0.0053 -0.0005
(0.32) (0.01) (0.28) (0.38) (0.05)
mother's ed • male interaction -0.0147 -0.0063 -0.0136 -0.0142 -0.0057
(1.14) (0.57) ( 1.06) (1.11) (0.52)
teacher quality ranking -0.0025 -0.0040
(0.11) (0.17)
log wealth yuan 0.1055··· 0.0579··
(3.33) (2.55)
cognitive ability Z-score -0.0652·· 0.0109
(2.16) (0.43)
Constant 1.3456·· 1.6364-·* 0.3778 1.4339**· 1.0413**
(2.60) (4.(3) (0.73) (2.72) (2.26)
Robust std errors yes yes yes
Village FE yes yes
Observations 1918 1918 1918 1918 1918
R-s9uared 0.194 0.417 0203 0.197 0.419
Grade dummies included
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
- significant at 10%; .- significant at 5%; *.* significant at 1'%
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Table 4-4. Household Provision of Children's Books (Probit)
Variable Unit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
father's education grades 0.0164*** 0.0109* 0.0126** 0.0171 *** 0.0083
(3.19) ( 1.79) (2.41 ) (3.41 ) ( 1.35)
mother's education grades 0.0183*** 0.0121* 0.0139** 0.0179*** 0.0091
(3.12) ( 1.90) (2.37) (3.05) ( 1.41)
father's age years -0.0026 -0.0027 0.0014 -0.0026 -0.0001
(0.58) (0.59) (0.30) (0.57) (0.02)
mother's age years 0.0138** 0.0087 0.0107** 0.0123** 0.0069
(2.57) (1.63) (1.98) (2.30) ( 1.28)
male dummy 0.0243 0.0535 0.0236 0.0307 0.0515
(0.46) (0.85) (0.44) (0.60) (0.81)
age years -0.0464*** -0.0283 -0.0398** -0.0301 ** -0.0228
(3.06) ( 1.59) (2.56) (2.00) ( 1.21)
other enrolled children number -0.0699*-* 0.0178 -0.0644·-- -0.0661 *.* 0.0108
(3.07) (0.78) (2.80) (3.0 I) (0.47)
non-enrolled children number -0.0805·** -0.0146 -0.0756··* -0.0782**· -0.0205
(3.06) (0.58) (2.77) (3.03) (0.80)
father's ed * male interaction -0.0019 0.0036 -0.0026 -0.0028 0.0023
(0.30) (0.43) (0.4l) (0.44) (0.28)
mother's ed • male interaction -0.0055 -0.0137* -0.0040 -0.0062 -0.0124
(0.66) ( 1.68) (0.48) (0.73) ( 1.50)
teacher quality ranking 0.0172 0.0147
(0.99) (0.84)
log wealth yuan 0.1209*** 0.0890*·*
(6.40) (5.16)
cognitive ability Z-score 0.0589*** 0.0200
(3.44) ( 1.04)
Robust std errors yes yes yes
Village FE yes yes
Observations 1918 1818 1918 1918 1818
Grade dummies included
Absolute value ofz statistics in parentheses
* significant at 100/0; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4-5. Household Provision ofa Designated Children's Study Area (Probit)
Variable Unit (I) (2) (3) (4) (5)
fathers education grades 0.0105·· 0.0127·· 0.0074 0.0106·· 0.0102·
(2.03) (2.11) ( 1.39) (2.05) (1.68)
mother's education grades 0.0141·· 0.0093 0.0115· 0.0147·· 0.0061
(2.32) ( 1.46) ( 1.16) (2.31) ( 1.04)
fathers age years ~0.0003 0.0000 0.0030 -0.0003 0.0027
(0.07) (0.00) (0.66) (0.06) (0.58)
mothers age years 0.0022 0.0010 -0.0006 0.0020 -0.0009
(0.41 ) (0.18) (0.12) (0.37) (0.17)
male dummy 0.0391 0.0570 0.0394 0.0400 0.0533
(0.79) (0.95) (0.17) (0.80) (0.88)
age years -0.0462··· -0.0460··· ·0.0407·· -0.0440··· -0.0508·"
(2.81) (2.60) (2.48) (2.69) (2.12)
other enrolled children number -0.0067 0.0306 -0.0011 -0.0060 0.0251
(0.31) ( 1.30) (0.05) (0.27) ( 1.08)
non-enrolled children number -0.0277 -0.0279 -0.0232 -0.0273 -0.0327
( L.14) (1.09) (0.92) ( 1.(2) (1.26)
fathers ed • male interaction -0.0035 -0.0041 -0.0039 -0.0036 ~0.0048
(0.52) (0.50) (0.57) (0.53) (0.59)
mother's ed • male interaction 0.0054 0.0034 0.0063 0.0053 0.0046
(0.69) (0.41) (0.77) (0.67) (0.56)
teacher quality ranking 0.0151 0.0143
(0.85) (0.80)
log wealth yuan 0.0940··· 0.0821···
(5.88) (4.81)
cognitive ability Z-score 0.0019 -0.0164
(0.47) (0.83)
Robust std errors yes yes yes
Village FE yes yes
Observations 1918 1184 1918 1918 1784
Grade dummies included
Absolute value ofz statistics in parentheses
• significant at 10%; •• significant at 5%; ••• significant at 1%
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Table 4-6. Parental time Allocated to Helping Children with Homework -
Hours per Week (Tobit)
Variable Unit (I) (2) (3) (4) (5)
father's education grades 0.4029··· 0.3560··· 0.4094·" 0.4065··· 0.3554···
(5.71) (5.24) (5.78) (5.75) (5.22)
mother's education grades 0.4214··· 0.3392··· 0.4285*" 0.4187··· 0.3385···
(5.94) (4.87) (6.01) (5.90) (4.83)
father's age years -0.0634 -0.1295·· -0.0703 -0.0624 -0.1290··
(1.20) (2.52) ( 1.32) ( 1.18) (2.50)
mother's age years -0.0605 -0.0550 -0.0549 -0.0689 -0.0553
(0.98) (0.91) (0.88) (1.11) (0.92)
male dummy 0.2552 0.1488 0.2569 0.2766 0.1500
(0.34) (0.21 ) (0.34) (0.37) (0.21 )
age years -0.3932·· -0.0993 -0.4062·· -0.3106 -0.0816
(2.04) (0.51 ) (2.10) ( 1.56) (0.40)
other enrolled children number -0.3407 -0.0335 -0.3508 -0.3233 -0.0393
( 1.37) (0.13) (1.41 ) ( 1.30) (0.15)
non-enrolled children number -0.2452 -0.2090 -0.2550 -0.2317 -0.2138
(0.85) (0.74) (0.88) (0.80) (0.75)
tather's ed • male interaction -0.1020 -0.0420 -0.1014 -0.1054 -0.0428
( 1.06) (0.46) ( 1.05) ( 1.09) (0.47)
mother's ed • male interaction 0.0634 -0.0232 0.0618 0.0618 -0.0236
(0.68) (0.26) (0.66) (0.66) (0.26)
teacher quality ranking 0.0637 0.0643
(0.34) (0.34)
log wealth yuan -0.1857 0.0203
( 1.05) (0.11 )
cognitive ability Z-score 0.2811· 0.0609
( 1.65) (0.29)
Constant 7.9211··· 5.8840· 9.6390··· 7.5389·· 5.4417
(2.64) ( 1.77) (2.82) (2.51 ) ( 1.41)
Village FE yes yes
Observations 1918 1918 1918 1918 1918
Grade dummies included
Absolute value oft statistics in parentheses
• significant at 10% ; •• significant at 5%; ••• significant at 1%
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Table 4-7. Either Parent Reads to the Sampled Child (Probit)
Variable Unit (I) (2) (3) (4) (5)
tather's education grades 0.0094* 0.0074 0.0091 * 0.0098* 0.0077
( 1.85) ( 1.39) ( 1.79) (1.95) (1043)
mother's education grades 0.0271*** 0.0220*** 0.0267*** 0.0269*** 0.0222***
(4.95) (3.80) (4.86) (4.94) (3.80)
father's age years -0.0091 ** -0.0115*** -0.0088** -0.0091" -0.0117***
(2.51) (2.82) (2.40) (2.53) (2.84)
mothers age years 0.0085* 0.0055 0.0082* 0.0076* 0.0057
( 1.81) (1.18) (1.74) (1.67) (1.22)
male dummy -0.0087 -0.0145 -0.0086 -0.0041 -0.0098
(0.17) (0.27) (0.17) (0.08) (0.18)
age years -0.0183 -0.0080 -0.0175 -0.0080 0.0034
( 1.08) (0.51 ) ( 1.05) (0.46) (0.20)
other enrolled children number -0.0368* 0.0211 -0.0363* -0.0339* 0.0194
( 1.83) ( 1.03) ( 1.79) (1.75) (0.94)
non-enrolled children number -0.0282 0.0069 -0.0276 -0.0263 0.0048
( 1.28) (0.30) ( 1.25) ( 1.23) (0.21)
father's ed * male interaction 0.0031 0.0049 0.0031 0.0026 0.0042
(0.45) (0.68) (0.44) (0.38) (0.58)
mothers ed • male interaction 0.0045 0.0056 0.0046 0.0040 0.0048
(0.57) (0.74) (0.59) (0.50) (0.64)
teacher quality ranking 0.0136 0.0134
(0.87) (0.86)
log wealth yuan 0.0100 0.0001
(0.77) (0.00)
cognitive ability Z-score 0.0358** 0.0392**
(2.05) (2.22)
Robust std errors yes yes yes
Village FE yes yes
Observations 1918 1885 1918 1918 1885
Grade dummies included
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10°,/0; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4-8. Parents Discuss Sampled Child's Academic Performance
with Teachers (Probit)
Variable Unit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
father's education grades 0.0051 -0.00 II 0.0048 0.0049 -0.0013
(1.(2) (0.24) ( 1.05) (I.OS) (0.2S)
mother's education grades 0.0177*** 0.0132** 0.0173*** 0.017S··* 0.0130··
(3.S9) (2.53) (3.73) (3.85) (2.49)
father's age years 0.0044 0.0032 0.0047 0.0044 0.0033
(1.25) (0.87) ( 1.34) (1.26) (0.91 )
mother's age years -0.0029 0.0002 -0.0032 -0.0022 0.0001
(0.70) (0.05) (0.78) (0.5S) (0.02)
male dummy -0.0333 -0.0690 -0.0332 -0.0368 -0.0695
(0.84) ( 1.50) (0.83) (0.93) (1.51 )
age years -0.0182 -0.0142 -0.0176 -0.0250 -0.0140
(1.39) ( 1.02) ( 1.36) (1.63) (0.96)
other enrolled children number 0.0040 0.0056 0.0045 0.0015 0.0052
(0.20) (0.31) (0.23) (0.08) (0.28)
non-enrolled children number 0.0189 -0.0004 0.0196 0.0172 -0.0006
(0.84) (0.02) (0.87) (0.80) (0.03)
tather's ed • male interaction 0.0080 0.0132** 0.0079 0.0084 0.0131··
(1.55) (2.05) ( 1.53) ( 1.61) (2.05)
mother's ed • male interaction 0.0013 -0.0004 0.0013 0.0017 -0.0004
(0.24) (0.06) (0.25) (0.32) (0.05)
teacher quality ranking 0.0051 0.0050
(0.37) (0.36)
log wealth yuan 0.0106 0.0055
(0.80) (0.41 )
cognitive ability Z-score -0.0245 0.0010
(1.26) (0.07)
Robust std errors yes yes yes
Village FE yes yes
Observations 1915 1749 1918 1918 1749
Grade dummies included
Absolute value ofz statistics in parentheses
• significant at 10%; •• significant at 5%; ••• significant at 1%
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Table 4·9. Expe~tedReturns to Edu~ation
percent ofmothers who agree that education has "a great deal ofinfluence .. on
children's juture income. by educational attainment ofthe parents and educational
attainment and sex ofthe child
difference in child's educational anainment
43.3% 40.2%
boys girls
junior secondary school
Ys.
primary school
49.0% 51.4%
56.8%
boys girls
52.2%
senior secondary school
Ys.
junior secondary school
48.5%48.6%
quintile of households with the lowest adult
educational anainment
quintile ofhouseholds with the highest adult
educational attainment
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Table 4·10. Effect of Investmeots 00 Chinese Test Scores (OLS)
Variable Unit (1) (2) (3) (4)
father's education grades 0.0260·· 0.0251 0.0265· 0.0299**
(2.43) (1.11) ( 1.83) (2.42)
mother's education grades 0.0193· 0.0063 0.0162 0.0227
( 1.67) (0.25) (1.12) ( 1.63)
father's age years -0.0053 -0.0050 -0.0051 -0.0056
(0.70) (0.65) (0.66) (0.73)
mother's age years 0.0043 0.0039 0.0026 0.0044
(0.51) (0.46) (0.31) (0.53)
male child dummy -0.2395*· -0.2391** -0.2403** -0.2451**
(2.23) (2.22) (2.24) (2.26)
age years -0.0697** -0.0695** -0.0638** -0.0683**
(2.40) (2.39) (2.22) (2.35)
other enrolled children number 0.0208 0.0333 0.0284 0.0202
(0.60) (0.89) (0.81 ) (0.58)
non-enrolled children number 0.0549 0.0540 0.0653 0.0558
( 1.39) ( 1.38) ( 1.62) ( 1.41)
father's education * male interaction 0.0072 0.0073 0.0073 0.0079
(0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.55)
mother's education * male interaction -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0025 -0.0029
(0.21) (0.21 ) (0.17) (0.20)
non-required spending log yuan -0.0469
(0.81 )
has children's books dummy 0.1530
( 1.26)
has child's study area dummy 0.0916
(0.84)
help with homework hourslwk
parents read to child dummy
discusses with teacher dummy
father's ed * investment interaction 0.0005 -0.0047 -0.0076
(0.09) (0.31) (0.54)
mother's ed * investment interaction 0.0039 0.0019 -0.0058
(0.56) (0.14) (0.39)
Constant 0.6857* 0.7689* 0.6503 0.61~"!
(1.7l) ( 1.85) (1.60) ( 1.45)
Robust std errors yes yes yes yes
Observations 1876 1876 1876 1876
R-squared 0.037 0.037 0.041 0.037
Grade dummies included
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 100/0; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4-10. Effect of Investments on Chinese Test Scores (OLS) (coot.)
Variable Unit (5) (6) (7)
father's education grades 0.0211* 0.0253 0.0396*·
( 1.76) (1.60) (2.38)
mother's education grades 0.0206 0.0244 0.0330*
( 1.62) (l.40) (1.77)
father's age years -0.0055 -0.0045 -0.0054
(0.73) (0.60) (0.70)
mother's age years 0.0043 0.0035 0.0040
(0.52) (0.42) (0.48)
male child dummy -0.2393** -0.2386** -0.2346**
(2.23) (2.22) (2.22)
age years -0.0709** -0.0681** -0.0670**
(2.40) (2.36) (2.28)
other enrolled children number 0.0227 0.0250 0.0200
(0.65) (0.72) (0.57)
non-enrolled children number 0.0542 0.0594 0.0567
( 1.37) ( 1.50) (1.44)
father's education .. male interaction 0.0074 0.0068 0.0071
(0.52) (0.48) (0.50)
mother's education * male interaction -0.0033 -0.0029 -0.0032
(0.23) (0.20) (0.22)
non-required spending log yuan
has children's books dummy
has child's study area dummy
help with homework hourslwk -0.0090
(0.67)
parents read to child dummy 0.1271
( 1.28)
discusses with teacher dummy 0.1700
(1.62)
father's ed * investment interaction 0.0014 -0.0005 -0.0184
( 1.04) (0.04) (1.14)
mother's ed • investment interaction -0.0003 -0.0106 -0.0167
(0.18) (0.61) (0.90)
Constant 0.7483· 0.5949 0.5649
(1.90) ( 1.46) ( 1.42)
Robust std errors yes yes yes
Observations 1876 1876 1876
R-squared 0.037 0.039 0.039
Grade dummies included
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; *. significant at 5%; ••• significant at 1%
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Table 4-11. Effect of Investments on Chinese Test Scores (OLS) - 2
Variable Unit (1) (2) (3) (4)
father's education grades 0.0224·· 0.0247 0.0231· 0.0289··
(2.21) ( 1.09) (1.73) (2.25)
mother's education grades 0.0238·· 0.0115 0.0221 0.0275··
(2.23) (0.46) (1.59) (2.01)
father's age years -0.0039 -0.0036 -0.0040 -0.0041
(0.5 I) (0.46) (0.52) (0.54)
mother's age years 0.0044 0.0043 0.0041 0.0047
(0.51) (0.49) (0.48) (0.55)
male child dummy -0.2077·* -0.2061** -0.2089*· -0.2132**
(2.03) (2.0 I) (2.04) (2.05)
age years 0.0146 0.0138 0.0158 0.0127
(0.49) (0.46) (0.53) (0.42)
other enrolled children number -0.0037 0.0107 -0.0046 -0.0043
(0.10) (0.27) (0.12) (0.11)
non-enrolled children number 0.0208 0.0209 0.0221 0.0203
(0.55) (0.55) (0.57) (0.53)
household wealth log yuan 0.0829··· 0.0846··· 0.0779·· 0.0856···
(2.74) (2.79) (2.56) (2.83)
teacher quality ranking -0.0140 -0.0143 -0.0149 -0.0138
(0.43) (0.44) (0.46) (0.43)
cognitive ability Z-score 0.3359··· 0.3353··· 0.3349··· 0.3365···
(7.84) (7.73) (7.77) (7.82)
father's education • male interaction 0.0091 0.0090 0.0089 0.0097
(0.62) (0.61 ) (0.60) (0.65)
mother's education • male interaction -0.0142 -0.0141 -0.0135 -0.0137
(1.01) ( 1.00) (0.95) (0.98)
non-required spending log yuan -0.0403
(0.80)
has children's books dummy 0.0794
(0.69)
has child's study area dummy 0.0592
(0.56)
help with homework hourslwk
parents read to child dummy
discusses wi teacher dummy
tather's ed • investment interaction -0.0004 -0.0021 -0.0113
(0.07) (0.14) (0.78)
mother's ed· investment interaction 0.0035 0.0022 -0.0054
(0.51) (0.17) (0.36)
Constant -1.4211··· -1.3526··· -1.4198··· -1.4644···
(3.06) (2.92) (3.07) (3.08)
Village FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 1876 1876 1876 1876
R-squared 0213 0"14 0"14 0214
Grade dummies included
Absolute value oft statistics in parentheses
• significant at 10%; •• significant at 5%; ••• significant at 10/0
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Table 4-11. Effect of Iovestments 00 Chinese Test Scores (OLS) - 2 (coot.)
Variable Unit (5) (6) (7)
father's education grades 0.0254** 0.0260* 0.0320**
(2.28) (1.80) (2.07)
mother's education grades 0.0265*· 0.0303* 0.0434*·
(2.12) (1.91 ) (2.59)
father's age years -0.0044 -0.0032 -0.0036
(0.58) (0.41) (0.47)
mother's age years 0.0041 0.0040 0.0037
(0.48) (0.47) (0.42)
male child dummy -0.2076·* -0.2080·· -0.2054**
(2.03) (2.05) (2.03)
age years 0.0153 0.0132 0.0158
(0.52) (0.45) (0.53)
other enro lied children number -0.0051 -0.0044 -0.0024
(0.13) (0.12) (0.06)
non-enrolled children number 0.0202 0.0233 0.0256
(0.53) (0.62) (0.67)
household wealth log yuan 0.0838**· 0.0821· ..• 0.0825*··
(2.74) (2.71) (2.73)
teacher quality ranking -0.0144 -0.0144 -0.0134
(0.45) (0.44) (0.41 )
cognitive ability Z-score 0.3369··* 0.3337*·· 0.3357···
(8.03) (7.77) (7.78)
father's education * male interaction 0.0090 0.0092 0.0096
(0.61) (0.63) (0.65)
mother's education • male interaction -0.0145 -0.0144 -0.0145
( 1.03) (1.04) ( 1.03)
non-required spending log yuan
has children's books dummy
has child's study area dummy
help with homework hourslwk -0.0031
(0.24)
parents read to child dummy 0.1517
( 1.46)
discusses wi teacher dummy 0.1102
(1.01)
father's ed • investment interaction -0.0005 -0.0072 -0.0129
(0.39) (0.51) (0.82)
mother's ed * investment interaction -0.0002 -0.0106 -0.0234
(0.13) (0.64) (1.36)
Constant -1.4168··· -1.5089··· -1.4775***
(3.02) (3.27) (3.28)
Village FE yes yes yes
Observations 1876 1876 1876
R-squared 0.214 0.214 0.215
Grade dummies included
Absolute value oft statistics in parentheses
• significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4-12. Effect of Investments on Mathematics Test Scores (OLS)
Variable Unit (1) (2) (3) (4)
father's education grades 0.0235* 0.0139 0.0187 0.0234·
( 1.96) (0.58) (1.34) ( 1.83)
mother's education grades 0.0112 0.0059 0.0109 0.0255*
(0.99) (0.24) (0.86) ( 1.94)
tather's age years -0.0150*· -0.0146* -0.0145* -0.0149**
(2.04) ( 1.97) (1.96) (2.05)
mother's age years 0.0197*· 0.0191** 0.0182** 0.0~95·*
(2.56) (2.43) (2.37) (2.56)
male child dummy -0.0833 -0.0834 -0.0841 -0.0876
(0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.68)
age years -0.0684*· -0.0683*· -0.0630·* -0.0661*·
(2.16) (2.15) (1.99) (2.10)
other enrolled children number -0.0191 -0.0090 -0.0115 -0.0209
(0.48) (0.22) (0.29) (0.53)
non-enrolled children number 0.0034 0.0029 0.0115 0.0029
(0.09) (0.07) (0.30) (0.08)
father's education • male interaction 0.0054 0.0055 0.0056 0.0055
(0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
mother's education" male interaction -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0026 -0.0018
(0.21) (0.22) (0.19) (0.13)
non-required spending log yuan -0.0487
(0.85)
has children's books dummy 0.0819
(0.72)
has child's study area dummy 0.0942
(0.99)
help with homework hoursiwk
parents read to child dummy
discusses with teacher dummy
tather's ed * investment interaction 0.0030 0.0061 0.0011
(0.48) (0.45) (0.08)
mother's ed * investment interaction 0.0017 -0.0028 -0.0250*
(024) (0.20) ( 1.76)
Constant 0.5267 0.6093* 0.4947 0.4356
(LSI) (1.69) (1.41 ) ( 1.21)
Robust std errors yes yes yes yes
Observations 1882 1882 1882 1882
R-squared 0.022 0.022 0.025 0.023
Grade dummies included
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; .* significant at 5%; .** significant at 1%
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Table 4-12. Effect of Investments on Mathematics Test Scores (OLS) (coot.)
Variable Unit (5) (6) (7)
father's education grades 0.0166 0.0243 0.0404**
( 1.21) ( 1.54) (2.22)
mother's education grades 0.0172 0.0166 0.0057
( 1.35) (1.03 ) (0.29)
father's age years -0.0152** -0.0142* -0.0151 **
(2.11 ) ( 1.95) (2.06)
mother's age years 0.0198** 0.0190** 0.0196**
(2.58) (2.49) (2.54)
male child dummy -0.0830 -0.0830 -0.0785
(0.65) (0.65) (0.62)
age years -0.0680** -0.0670** -0.0669**
(2.09) (2.12) (2.11 )
other enrolled children number -0.0165 -0.0153 -0.0200
(0.42) (0.39) (0.50)
non-enrolled children number 0.0030 0.0081 0.0030
(0.08) (0.21) (0.08)
father's education • male interaction 0.0060 0.0051 0.0050
(0.38) (0.33) (0.32)
mother's education • male interaction -0.0037 -0.0027 -0.0029
(0.27) (0.20) (0.21 )
non-required spending log yuan
has children's books dummy
has child's study area dummy
help with homework hourslwk -0.0062
(0.43)
parents read to child dummy 0.1327
( 1.34)
discusses with teacher dummy 0.1297
(1.21)
father's ed * investment interaction 0.0018 -0.0029 -0.0225
( 1.05) (0.22) ( 1.44)
mother's ed • investment interaction -0.0014 -0.0106 0.0069
(0.86) (0.71 ) (0.35)
Constant 0.5628 0.4390 0.4427
( 1.48) ( 1.24) ( 1.27)
Robust std errors yes yes yes
Observations 1882 1882 1882
R-squared 0.022 0.023 0.023
Grade dummies included
Robust t statistics in parentheses
• significant at 10% ; *. significant at 5%; *•• significant at 1%
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Table 4-13. Effect of Investments on Mathematics Test Scores (OLS) - 2
Variable Unit (1) (2) (3) (4)
father's education grades 0.0202* 0.0115 0.0155 0.0226*
(1.71) (0.45) ( 1.(2) (1.68)
mother's education grades 0.0173 0.0201 0.0163 0.0310**
(1.60) (0.80) ( 1.33) (2.38)
father's age years -0.0147** -0.0142* -0.0144** -0.0145**
(2.07) ( 1.98) (2.03) (2.07)
mother's age years 0.0225*** 0.0222*** 0.0221*** 0.0223***
(2.81 ) (2.73) (2.80) (2.84)
male child dummy -0.0552 -0.0543 -0.0558 -0.0595
(0.43) (0.42) (0.43) (0.46)
age years 0.0195 0.0191 0.0203 0.0193
(0.65) (0.64) (0.68) (0.65)
other enrolled children number -0.0344 -0.0241 -0.0336 -0.0365
(0.82) (0.55) (0.80) (0.87)
non-enrolled children number -0.0116 -0.0113 -0.0121 -0.0128
(0.30) (0.30) (0.32) (0.34)
household wealth log yuan 0.0510 0.0522 0.0474 0.0526*
(1.61 ) ( 1.65) (1.46) ( 1.66)
teacher quality ranking -0.0162 -0.0161 -0.0162 -0.0162
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43)
cognitive ability Z-score 0.3349*** 0.3350··· 0.3340··· 0.3360***
(7.81) (7.79) (7.78) (7.81)
father's education * male interaction 0.0087 0.0087 0.0085 0.0086
(0.53) (0.53) (0.52) (0.52)
mother's education * male interaction -0.0175 -0.0176 -0.0170 -0.0161
( 1.35) ( 1.34) (1.30) ( 1.25)
non-required spending log yuan -0.0363
(0.63)
has children's books dummy -0.0133
(0.12)
has child's study area dummy 0.0738
(0.76)
help with homework hourslwk
parents read to child dummy
discusses wi teacher dummy
father's ed • investment interaction 0.0027 0.0086 -0.0025
(0.39) (0.62) (0.17)
mother's ed * investment interaction -0.0007 0.0009 -0.0234*
(0.10) (0.06) (1.67)
Constant -1.3871*·· -1.3346··* -1.3670··· -1.4495··*
(2.82) (2.66) (2.79) (2.91 )
Village FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.182
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
Grade dummies included
Absolute value oft statistics in parentheses
• significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ••• significant at 1%
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Table 4-13. Effect of Investments on Mathematics Test Scores (OLS) - 2 (cont.)
Variable Unit (5) (6) (7)
father's education grades 0.0192 0.0208 0.0362**
( 1.42) (1.37) (2.02)
mother's education grades 0.0251 ** 0.0258* 0.0207
(2.05) (1.70) ( 1.19)
father's age years -0.0151** -0.0142** -0.0145**
(2.15) (2.00) (2.06)
mother's age years 0.0224*** 0.0224*** 0.0220*"
(2.79) (2.82) (2.74)
male child dummy -0.055 I -0.0550 -0.0510
(0.43) (0.43) (0.40)
age years 0.0206 0.0184 0.0203
(0.69) (0.62) (0.68)
other enrolled children number -0.0359 -0.0347 -0.0339
(0.86) (0.84) (0.80)
non-enrolled children number -0.0133 -0.0097 -0.0087
(0.35) (0.26) (0.23)
household wealth log yuan 0.0532 0.0504 0.0510
( 1.66) ( 1.59) (1.61 )
teacher quality ranking -0.0164 -0.0161 -0.0154
(0.43) (0.43) (OAI)
cognitive ability Z-score 0.3358*** 0.3329**· 0.3341**·
(7.92) (7.77) (7.71)
lather's education * male interaction 0.0091 0.0085 0.0086
(0.55) (0.52) (0.53)
mother's education * male interaction -0.0184 -0.0173 -0.0177
( 1.42) ( 1.34) (1.35)
non-required spending log yuan
has children~s books dummy
has child~s study area dummy
help with homework hourslwk -0.0016
(0.11 )
parents read to child dummy 0.1119
(1.07)
discusses wI teacher dummy 0.1208
(1.09)
father~s ed • investment interaction 0.0004 -0.0021 -0.0209
(024) (0.16) (1.33)
mother's ed * investment interaction -0.00 IS -0.0135 -0.0036
(0.92) (0.90) (0.20)
Constant -1.4149·** -1.455 I.*. -1.4434*·*
(2.82) (2.94) (2.98)
Village FE Yes Yes yes
Observations 0.182 0.181 0.182
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.18
Grade dummies included
Absolute value oft statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; .* significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Appendix to Chapter IV
This appendix presents the comparative static results for section 4-2 more
formally. If parental education enters the wage function ( (J) ), but neither the human
capital production function nor the altruism function (case 1), and if the human capital
production function is quasilinear in 8 with g(x,8) = x tJ +8. then:
a[a(8(; -1) - a)(; -1) + f/J{( P )tJ~1 ]" w'(H)
ow(H)
d8/dH = <0(Ala) (a -1)[; + 8(; -1)(; -1) +; - ;;}v(H)
1
(
P )1.1_1 (J)'(H)
d"C/ dH = ow(H) > 0
(1- a )m(H)
If, instead., goods and time are complementary inputs and the production technology is
Cobb-Douglas with g(x,B) =xaBll-lll , then:
(Alb)
dB/dH =0
d"C/dH= aT[8(~-I)-ak;-I)w'(H)>0
p[~ +c5(~ -1)(; -I) +; - ~;]
Now suppose that parental education affects the household problem by
augmenting the returns to time spent with children but neither the wage function.. the
altruism function., nor the efficiency or efficacy ofgoods inputs (case 2). If the human
capital production function is quasilinear in 8 with g(x.,8;H) =XII + HB :
(A2a)
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dO/dB =T[o(-I+~)-~k-I+;)
a[a[-5 +(-1 +5)qk-1 +tP +tP{(:=f"r
---------~----=--> 0(-I+a)H
I
(HPJ-I....,
d"C / dH = 0 (JJ < 0
-H+aH
By contrast, with a Cobb-Douglas production function in which g(x,9; H) =X"9 HlI -'" :
(A2b)
dO / dH = (0 -l)T[o(; -1) -~k;-l)[a[8(~-1) -;k¢ -I) +¢] 0
[-[a(H -I) - Hlo(; -I) -c;X; -I) +;]2 >
d"C I dH = (a -l)aT(o +; - 0;)\; _1)2 (JJ < 0
P[-[a(H -l)-Hlo(~ -I)-~k;-I)+;r
Assume again that parental education affects neither the wage function nor the
altruism function, but that it affects the returns to education (case 3). With quasilinear
production of the form g(x,9;H) =(x el +O)H :
(A3a)
[5(Q-I)-QktP-11){T -(a-l)(C::J~In
dO/dB = ., >0[H(8(~ - I) - .;)(; - I) + ; ]-
(A3b)
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Finally~ suppose instead that parental education affects the altruism function «(j)~
but neither the wage function nor the human capital production function. If the human
capital production function is quasilinear in e ~ then:
(A4a)
(0 -1)(<6 -l)9{T - (0 -I{(:m ).~Ir]~'(H)
dB/dB = ., >0[0 +; - 0; + (0 -l)(~ -I);(H)]-
dh/dH=O
With Cobb-Douglas production:
(A4b)
dB / dH = (0 -1)T(8 -1)(; -1);~'(H) > 0
[8 + tP - 0; + (8 -1)(; -1);(H»)2
dT / dH = aT(8 -1)(; -l);f.t)~'(H) > 0
P[8 +; - 0; + (8 -1)(; -1);(H)]2
